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Abstract
This thesis addresses the measurement and manipulation of value accessibility, the influence of value 
accessibility on the vaiue-attitude relationship and its implications for attitude change. Studies 1 and 2 
assess whether value accessibility (as measured by response latency) is a reliable and valid measure 
of value strength, as indexed by ratings on the Schwartz Value inventory (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). 
The results are promising but inconclusive. It is suggested that further work is necessary in order to 
determine if both measures tap the same aspects of value strength.
Study 3 examines whether manipulated increases in value accessibility raise the accessibility of 
semantically related attitudes. Attitude accessibility is determined by measuring the speed with which 
individuals respond to a query concerning the positive or negative connotation of an attitude item. 
Results indicate that response latencies are shorter when attitude items are preceded by a related, as 
opposed to an unrelated value prime. Furthermore, for related primes, this effect is strongest when the 
values are perceived to be personally ‘important’ than when they are considered to be ‘not important’. 
These results provide evidence for the structural link between semantically related values and attitudes 
in individuals' minds.
Studies 4 and 5 examine the impact of value accessibility on attitude change, specifically its impact on 
the elaboration of persuasive appeals. Although the results of study 4 are insignificant, following some 
methodological changes, the results of study 5 provide support for such an effect. When value 
relevance and importance are high, increases in value accessibility lead to the increased elaboration of 
related persuasive messages, as indicated by greater differentiation between strong and weak 
persuasive arguments. The implications of these findings for the conceptualisation of value strength 
and value structure are discussed, as well as limitations of the present studies and some directions for 
future research.
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER
This chapter is divided into seven main sections. Section 1 outlines the conceptualisation of values 
within social psychology. Dominant approaches to the value construct are examined as well as a 
number of theoretical controversies, which surround the concept. Definitions and theoretical 
approaches to the attitude concept are then reviewed in section 2 and the dominant dimensions of 
attitude strength are presented. Finally in section 3, the similarities and differences between the 
attitude and value constructs are discussed. The general conclusion is that whilst theorists have 
frequently included values within the generic category of attitudes, the two concepts can be 
distinguished on a number of characteristics, which justify their separate consideration.
In section 4, both attitude and value structure are reviewed. A summary of the vast literature in this 
field is not attempted but the two constructs are compared in the light of the main structural models. 
Similarities between the structural properties of values and attitudes are debated. Next, in section 5, 
the implications of attitude structure for resistance to change are analysed.
Section 6 discusses the measurement of attitudes and values in general. More specifically, with 
reference to attitudes, the measurement of accessibility using response latency techniques is 
discussed. Theories concerning the validity of operative and meta-attitudinal measurement techniques 
are also considered. With regard to value measurement, the Schwartz Value Inventory (SVl) developed 
by Schwartz and his co-workers (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz, 1996;) is discussed in detail.
In conclusion, section 7 focuses on the rationale of the present research. The value definition that 
informs the current thesis is outlined and the research is discussed in brief.
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Social Science and the Value Concept
The study of values is central to a number of disciplines within the social sciences. It involves the 
intersection of interests of philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists (Braithewaite 
& Scott, 1991). Values are frequently referred to in theories and this reflects the widely held 
assumption that values influence attitudes and are at the root of behaviour (Van Deth & Scarbrough,
1995). There have been numerous conceptualisations of values, however, and no genera! 
understanding of the term values appears to exist across the social sciences. Wright (1955, p.449 as 
cited by Van Deth & Scarbrough (1995, p.22), for example, stated that ‘the psychological, scientific, 
philosophical, and sociological school of general ethics have respectively based values on desire, 
necessity, reason and custom*, in economics, values are used to distinguish between the different 
approaches to economic life (e.g. Maxist, Ricardian), whilst the basic economic concepts such as utility, 
exchange, and price are all related to values. A review by Kmieciak, (1976) of distinct meanings of the 
term ‘value’ in 4000 publications resulted in 180 different definitions (Braithewaite & Scott, 1991).
The Historical Development of the Value Concept within Social Psychology
This conceptual diversity of values within the social sciences is also visible within the discipline of social 
psychology. The earliest social psychological studies of values include those of Allport (1935) and 
Kluckhohn (1951). The 1960’s led to further research (e.g. Allport, Vernon & Lindzay, 1960; Scott,
1965; Smith, 1969) but value research was held back by problems of definition and reservations about 
the empirical viability of the construct. This resulted in conceptual diversity and theoretical division 
within the value domain.
Most recent researchers recognize the work of Miiton Rokeach (1968,1973) as particularly significant. 
His work is seen as integrative of research up to the late 1960's in terms of value definition, 
conceptualisation and measurement (Braithewaite & Scott, 1991). As such, the contribution of Rokeach 
(1968,1973) is generally considered to be a turning point in research. Rokeach (1973, p.5) defined a 
value as: “ an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or 
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.” He 
regarded values as cognitive representations of the demands of society and the needs of individuals.
He proposed that values denote either behaviours (instrumental values), or desirable goals (terminal
SECTION 1: THE CONCEPTUALISTION OF VALUES
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values). Values were thought to be more abstract than attitudes and relatively specific, transcending 
objects and situations.
Rokeach believed that there are a relatively small number of important values and that it is the relative 
importance of these values within a person’s value system (rather than the absolute importance of any 
one value) that ultimately determines attitudes and behaviour (see also Tetlock, 1986). He argued that 
people usually feel strongly about their central values as is evident when values are questioned or 
frustrated. He suggested that values are structured hierarchically and developed a measurement 
instrument -  The Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973) - to determine their relative importance.
Despite Rokeach’s work, a review of the relevant literature suggests that the value construct remains 
problematic and lacking in coherence (e.g. Braithwaite, & Scott 1991; Dose, 1997). Three 
interconnected concerns regarding value conceptualisation can be identified. These are:
1. An ongoing lack of consensus regarding the definition of the concept -since Rokeach, values 
have been defined as: general beliefs (Feather, 1975; 1995); beliefs about the way an 
individual ought to behave (Ravltn & Meglino, 1987); goals (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987); 
attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975); a ‘special case’ of attitude (Levy, 1990); ‘similar to' 
attitudes (Homer & Kahle, 1988); modes of arguing and thinking (Billig, 1987) and as the 
moral dimension of action (Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995).
In 1968; Albert stated that," For the foreseeable future, it is doubtful whether a definition of 
values can be produced that embraces all the meanings assigned to the term and its 
cognates, or that would be acceptable to ail investigators (p288)” A review of the research 
literature on ‘values’ suggests that 30 years later, the conceptualisation of value remains in 
dispute. However, Schwartz and Bilsky, (1987) have outlined five main features of values 
which are thought to encompass those identified by different theorists, namely, values are; (a) 
concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviours, (c) that transcend specific 
situations, (d) guide the selection or evaluation of behaviour or events, and (e) are ordered 
by relative importance. In short, values are generally thought of as a finite number of abstract 
goals that are arranged hierarchically into a value system and that can serve as a guide to 
attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Kluckholn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).
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2. The lack of a unifying theoretical structure - there has been little agreement concerning the 
structure of individual values, how value systems are organised and also how they relate to 
other psychological constructs, in particular to attitudes.
3. Measurement issues - a multitude of value inventories have been developed but there are a 
number of difficulties associated with assessment relying on seif-report. Also, there is 
considerable diversity in the dimensions used for the evaluation of values. Braithewaite & 
Scott's (1991) review of 15 value measures revealed that value judgements have been made 
in terms of preferences, agreement, goodness, justifiability, importance as guiding principles, 
and consistent admiration. Although the semantic distinctiveness of the dimensions has been 
well documented e.g. Levitin (1968), their empirical distinctiveness is uncertain and research 
has suggested both equivalence (e.g. Bolt, 1978) and non-equivaience (e.g. Morris, 1956).
The Meaning and Stability of Values
There are two ongoing theoretical debates concerning the value concept. The first concerns the 
meaning of value measures in terms of their empirical viability and the second concerns value stability. 
In the same way that a number of theorists have suggested attitudes might be “cognitive illusions" 
which are created after behaviour (Bern, 1970), a number of theorists have questioned the empirical 
viability of the value construct. For example, Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) do not accept that 
values are 'real1. They regard values as “a/vyb/f'concepts, introduced by individuals in order to help 
them deal with their environment. Although their meaning can be inferred by researchers in the 
analysis of underlying patterns among attitudes, or ‘value orientations', there is no presumption that 
respondents to the value surveys have used the values in the same way. In a similar vein, research 
derived from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), has suggested that people act first and 
then invoke whatever salient values conventionally justify those acts e.g. Kristiansen & Zanna (1988).
Up to this point, traditional models of values that assume a stable value system have been discussed. 
Implicit in these models is the assumption that attitudes are based on a relatively invariant rank 
ordering of an individual’s values, and that attitudes towards an issue are guided by this relatively 
enduring set of value priorities. However, there is evidence that these rank-orders can vary according 
to contextual factors. Furthermore, this context-specific rank ordering of values can predict attitudes 
more strongly than when the same values are rank ordered as general guiding principles.
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The stable value system is illustrated by Rokeach’s (1973. p.5) definition of value systems as an 
"enduring organisation of beliefs”, which implies that individuals adhere to a relatively determinate, 
‘enduring’, body of values, in which the only difference between one value and another is their place in 
the hierarchy of salience - the ‘continuum of relative importance’. However, such a definition suggests 
that individuals live their lives in a single domain in which a single set of values serve whenever and 
wherever action is called for. Van Deth & Scarborough (1995) argue that this is implausible since 
people take part in several worlds and universes of meaning, each of which are governed by 
situationally appropriate values.
For instance they suggest that the expressions, ‘family values’, ‘spiritual values’ and ‘commercial 
values’ have become part of everyday language. It is suggested that conflict may occur between ‘moral 
discourses’ as the different worlds intersect. Similarly, Becker (1981) contrasts the altruistic values 
embedded in the family with the more competitive values of the business world. These suggestions 
negate the idea that values are universally desirable. Although there may be some values that 
‘transcendentally guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations’ (Rokeach, 1976, 
p.160), values may need to be studied within their social context.
This multiple values perspective is supported in a study by Seligman & Katz (1996) who demonstrated 
that values can be ranked differently depending on whether individuals are instructed to rank the 
values as they are generally important to them versus when the ranking instructions specify a ranking 
context such as abortion. The values of freedom and wisdom were found to become more or less 
important, in line with their attitudes towards abortion, compared to their earlier value rankings made 
independently of a particular context. This research suggests that different situations may prompt 
people to think in terms of different value priorities and that relationships between values may be 
situationally specific.
Seligman and Katz (1996), recognising evidence for both value stability and flexibility, have suggested 
that a ‘middle ground* is needed between the two. They argue that individuals need both a coherent 
value system reflecting their self-concepts but also to be able to respond flexibly if necessary. They 
conclude, “taken to extreme, neither the stable view nor the multiple value system perspective is 
tenable” (Seligman & Katz, 1996, p71). Future research will hopefully alleviate the confusion between 
both these possibilities.
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SECTION 2: THE ATTITUDE CONSTRUCT
The conceptualisations of attitudes have focused on the evaluation of ‘attitude objects’, although many 
definitions also inciude a number of components, namely, cognitive (consciously held beliefs about 
characteristics of the attitude object); affective (feelings, moods, related sympathetic nervous system 
activity) and conative (disposition for action). There is disagreement concerning the relative importance 
of these components. Cognitive theorists usually argue that underlying beliefs are fundamental, 
behaviourists concentrate on the conative component and define attitudes as ‘response tendencies’, 
whilst most other researchers suggest that a combination of the affective and evaluative components 
are critical (Strahlberg & Frey, 1992). The definition of attitude therefore depends on the theoretical 
background of the researcher and is reflected in their structural models of attitudes (see section 4).
Rosenberg and Hovland (1960, p.3), for example, provide a very broad definition of attitudes as 
‘‘predispositions to respond to some class of stimuli with certain classes of response". They specify 
three classes of response, nameiy, affective, cognitive, and conative/behaviourai. This “three- 
component model” of attitudes assumes the three components should be moderately correlated and 
the consistency between the evaluation of an object and the different types of information associated 
with it has been studied extensively. However, a large degree of discrepancy has been found between 
empirical measures of the three attitudinal components (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and since the model 
has not been shown to have strong predictive or explanatory power (Pratkanis, 1989), its status is 
currently in decline (e.g. Greenwaid, 1989).
Contrary to the multicomponent view of attitudes, other theorists have proposed unidimensional 
attitude conceptualisations that focus on the evaluation of an attitude as its most important or even 
sole component. For example, Petty & Cacioppo (1981, P.7) state, “the term attitude should be used 
to refer to a general, enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object, or issue”. 
McGuire (1985, p.239) states that “...attitudes are defined at least implicitly as responses that locate 
objects of thought’ on ‘dimensions of judgement’. Eagly & Chaiken, (1993, p.269) define an attitude as 
a “psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor 
or disfavor". Such definitions see attitudes as evaluations and refer to an individuals’ orientation to an 
object, or attitude referent (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995),
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Zanna & Rampel (1988) have suggested that although attitudes can be based on cognitive and 
affective information as well as information concerning past behaviour, these categories of information 
can act independently or in combination to influence attitudes. However, they suggest that defining 
attitudes simply as evaluations has heuristic value.
Although there are other conceptions of attitudes, the unidimensional and three-component models 
have received the most attention in the literature. The definition of attitude as an evaluation is 
becoming progressively more widespread though it is not yet universal (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). 
However, in spite of attitudes being the most researched topic in social psychology, Augoustinos & 
Walker (1995, p.12) remark that their meaning is “more often than not left tacit, vague and 
inconsistent”.
Attitude Strength
Definition of Attitude Strength
There has been little precision in the definition of attitude strength (Raden, 1985) and no one 
understanding of attitude strength dominates contemporary research. However, there is general 
agreement as to the features that define strong attitudes. Strong attitudes are thought to be persistent 
overtime, resistant to change, influence information processing and judgment, and guide behaviour, 
whilst weaker attitudes lack one or more of these features (e.g. Krosnick & Petty, 1995).
A large body of empirical research has been accumulated supporting the idea that a range of different 
properties of attitudes influences this underlying strength. Scott (1968) produced one of the first lists 
of strength properties. This included ten attitudinal properties, namely, extremity, intensity, 
ambivalence, salience, affective salience, cognitive complexity, overtness, embeddedness, flexibility and 
consciousness.
Later, Raden (1985) identified a number of additional labels, which had been applied to the concept of 
attitude strength, namely, accessibility, certainty, direct experience, importance, stability, evaluative- 
consistency, vested interest and latitudes of acceptance and importance. Since Raden, several other 
strength characteristics have been proposed including elaboration, knowledge, personal relevance and 
inter- and intra-attitudinal consistency (e.g. Petty & Krosnick, 1995).
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Considering the number of strength properties identified, it is not surprising that, with the exception of 
a few (e.g. Smith, Bruner and White, 1956), the majority of researchers have focused on just one or 
two strength-related properties, their causes and consequence and the relations among them 
(Wegener et al, 1995).
Categorisation of Strength Properties
A number of categorisations of the attitude properties outlined above have been proposed. For 
example, Eagly & Chaiken, (1993), distinguish between ‘structural’ variables (derived from models of 
attitude structure) and ‘experiential’ strength variables (defined by subjective awareness of attitude 
strength). However, Petty and Krosnick (1995) provide a more extensive categorisation of strength 
variables, distinguishing between aspects of the attitude itself and aspects of the structure associated 
with the attitude. Eagly & Chaiken’s (1993) ‘experiential’ variables are labelled ‘subjective beliefs’, and 
they provide an additional category, ‘cognitive processes'. These categories are discussed below.
Two types of structural variables have been identified:
(a) Aspects of the attitude itself: this refers to aspects of the evaluative continuum, which has been 
divided into attitude valence (positive or negative) and attitude extremity (degree of favourability / 
unfavourability). It is hypothesised that negative attitudes might be more durable and impactful than 
positive ones and that the more extreme an attitude, the more an individual likes or dislikes an attitude 
object
(b) Aspects of the structure associated with the attitude and attitude object in memory: Eagly &
Chaiken (1998) divided attitude structure into two types: (i) intra-attitudinal e.g. knowledge, 
consistency and accessibility (ii) inter-attitudinal structure (e.g. centrality, embeddedness). Both 
attitude structure and the conceptualisation of attitude accessibility will be discussed in more detail 
below.
Experiential variables/ subjective beliefs 
Individuals hold beliefs about the attributes of their own attitudes and about the attitude object. This 
‘subjective awareness’ of attitude strength is usually measured by self-report and includes personal 
involvement, personal relevance, importance and certainty. These beliefs have been referred to as 
‘metacognitions’ that people hold in relation to their attitudes (Bassili, 1996). The measurement 
validity of such experiential strength variables has been questioned. This issue will be discussed in 
section 6.
Cognitive Processes
Cognitive processes by which an attitude is formed include ‘elaboration’. This refers to the degree of 
thinking that an individual does and has done about the attributes of an attitude object, its qualities 
and weaknesses (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; 1986),
Fazio (1995) has proposed a more limited structural conceptualisation of attitude strength than Eagly 
& Chaiken (1993). He distinguishes between qualities of the attitude as represented in memory and 
antecedents or consequences of such qualities. Although there is general agreement concerning the 
consequences of attitude strength, Fazio disputes a number of properties, which have been considered 
variables of attitudinal strength.
In Fazio’s framework, qualities of the attitude (and hence the concept of attitude strength) refer solely 
to variables that focus on the representation of the attitude in memory e.g. attitude accessibility (the 
strength of the object evaluation association in memory and the resulting capability for automatic 
activation -  see section 2); attitude ambivalence (the likelihood that the attitude will activate both 
positive and negative evaluations simultaneously) and affective-cognitive discrepancy (the extent to 
which any affectively based and cognitively based evaluations that might be activated in response to 
the attitude object are consistent with each other).
According to Fazio, the ‘experiential’ or ‘subjective’ variables identified by Eagly and Chaiken (1998) 
and Krosnick and Petty (1995), respectively, would describe the relationship between the individual 
and the attitude issue. Despite having implications for the strength of the attitude, these variables are, 
it is claimed, more rightly thought of as ‘antecedents’ of attitude strength rather than indicants of 
attitude strength. Furthermore, the structural properties relating to the ‘knowledge base’ of the attitude 
and the inclusion of the extent of elaboration, as a strength property (Krosnick and Petty’, 1995), have 
been disputed by Fazio (1995). He suggests that they do not reflect the qualities of the attitude but 
the properties of the representation of the attitude object or issue itself. As a result they should be 
treated as consequences that may influence attitude strength.
Accessibiiitv
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Construct Accessibility
The accessibility of psychological constructs, which include attitudes and values, has been defined as 
“the readiness with which a stored construct is retrieved from memory and/or utilised in stimulus 
encoding” (Higgins & King, 1981). Researchers have identified a number of determinants of construct 
accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981). These include salience (e.g. Higgins & King, 1981) and the 
relation of a construct to other accessible constructs e.g. Collins & Loftus, (1973), recency of activation 
e.g. Wyer & Srull, (1981). The results of several studies have demonstrated that frequent activation of 
a construct increases its accessibility e.g. Houston & Fazio, (1989); Fazio, Chen, McDonal & Sherman, 
(1982); Powell & Fazio, (1984).
Attitude Accessibility
As well as research into construct accessibility in general, there has been much research into the 
accessibility of attitudes in particular. Although attitude accessibility has been addressed by a number 
of theorists, Fazio and his colleagues (Fazio & Williams, 1986, Fazio, 1990, Fazio etal, 1992, Powell 
and Fazio, 1994) have provided the most coherent theoretical account (Bassilii, 1995). Fazio (1995, 
p.247) defines an attitude as an "association in memory between an attitude object and one’s 
evaluation of the object”. The range of potential attitude objects is said to be very broad and includes 
specific individuals, physical objects, categories of situations / people, and physical objects and social 
issues. The evaluative continuum can be split into valence (positive or negative) and extremity (degree 
of favourability / unfavourability).
Attitudes are assumed to be stored in an associative memory network in which evaluations of an 
attitude object are activated by a process of ‘spreading activation’. Attitude objects that are frequently 
encountered or are highly salient to the individual are thought to become strongly associated with their 
evaluation and as a result, a decision about the object can be made very shortly after the object is 
presented. Novel objects and those of low salience to the individual will not be strongly associated with 
an evaluation and the individual will need to deliberate more extensively about any decisions that might 
relate to them (Fazio et al, 1982).
In order to test this view of attitudes as object-evaluation associations, Fazio and his associates (Fazio 
et al, 1982; Powell & Fazio, 1984) conducted a series of experiments, which employed latency of 
response to an attitudinal inquiry as a measure of associative strength. Fazio et al (1986) 
demonstrated that attitudes, which were chronically accessible, were more likely to be activated by the 
mere presence of the attitude object. In a priming paradigm, the strength of the associative link
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between an object and its evaluation was initially tested using a straightforward response latency 
procedure. Objects that are associated with quick evaluative (good/bad) decisions were assumed to be 
those attitudes that are more strongly and unambiguously held. Long response latencies were thought 
to reflect weak or non-existent links. Subjects were asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether 
they felt positively or negatively toward a given attitude object. Subjects who had been induced to 
express their attitudes repeatedly believed to strengthen the object-evaluation association - were able 
to respond relatively quickly to these direct inquiries about their attitudes.
In an extension of the paradigm, Fazio et al (1986) presented subjects with the name of an attitude 
object (prime) followed by an adjective with a positive or negative evaluation (target). Subjects then 
pressed a button indicating whether the adjective had a positive or negative connotation. The prime 
could be evaiuatively congruent with the target (e.g. cockroach-grisly) or it could be incongruent (e.g. 
sunset-pain). Responses to the target were faster when the prime and target were evaiuatively 
congruent but only when attitudes towards the prime had been found to be highly accessible on an 
earlier response latency task, in an experimental version of the procedure, accessibility of the prime 
was manipulated by means of the repeated expression procedure. Results indicated that there was a 
greater correspondence between prime-target congruence and response latencies on the target when 
attitudes toward the prime had been repeatedly expressed. Thus, it appears that attitudes can be 
activated automatically upon exposure to an attitude object, and the more accessible the attitude, the 
greater is the likelihood of this automatic activation.
Fazio (1990) suggests that when people are either unable or unmotivated to deliberate on 
information, spontaneous or automatic processes will mediate any effect of attitudes on behaviour. 
However, this mediating effect is a function of the strength of the evaluative association with the 
attitude object. If conditions conducive to deliberative processing are not present and the evaluative 
association is too weak to be activated, behaviour will be based on factors other than attitudes.
These findings imply that attitudes characterized by strong object-evaluation associations may be more 
accessible from memory, irrespective of whether this associative strength was measured or 
manipulated experimentally, evidence of automatic activation of the attitude was found to be strongest 
when the association was ‘strong’. These findings regarding the moderating role of associative 
strength have been replicated numerous times and a meta-analysis examining the effect of associative 
strength on automatic activation has supported its reliability (Fazio, 1995).
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However, it is notable that Fazio et ai’s (1986) findings that attitude strength moderates the automatic 
activation effect have been challenged. Bargh and co-workers (e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender and 
Pratto, 1992; Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond and Hymes, 1996) have been unable to replicate the findings 
using a similar paradigm. It is suggested that attitude strength is not a moderating influence on the 
automatic activation effect and that the unconditional activation effect may result from general lexical 
associations between words and evaluations (Bargh et al, 1996).
Despite these challenges, consistent with Fazio’s work, a substantial body of research has been 
accumulated demonstrating a number of consequences of accessibility that suggest that attitudes 
relatively high in accessibility are stronger than attitudes relatively low in accessibility (Fabrigar et al,
1998). For example, highly accessible attitudes-have been found to be more predictive of a wide 
variety of behaviours (e.g. Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Bassilli 1993; 1995; Berger and 
Mitchell, 1989) than are attitudes low in accessibility. Accessible attitudes influence perceptions of the 
attitude object, such that one is more likely to make attitude-consistent judgements about relevant 
information (Fazio & Williams, 1986; Houston & Fazio, 1989). Also, the more accessible the attitude, 
the more resistant it is to contradictory information (Houston & Fazio, 1989); cf, Wu & Schaffer, 1987).
Is Attitude Strength Uni- or Multi-dimensional in Nature?
An ongoing area of debate among attitude theorists concerns the extent to which the range of attitude 
properties identified in the literature can be reduced to one singie underlying construct representing 
attitude strength. Correlational measures of attitude strength suggest that strength is multidimensional. 
For example, Raden (1985), in his review of strength variables identified in the literature, found low 
correlations between strength-related properties. He concluded that attitudinal properties are not 
interchangeable and that attitude strength is not a “global, unitary property". Furthermore, no clear 
factor structure of attitude strength has been found in factor analytic studies (e.g. Abeison, 1988, 
Bassili, 1986). Similarly, Krosnick et al (1993) using confirmatory factor analysis, found the majority of 
dimensions to be only weakly related and a multifactor model was required to account for their 
intercorrelations. It was proposed that the dimensions be viewed as ‘distinct’ as opposed to different 
expressions of a collection of core ‘attributes’ (Krosnick et al, 1993).
So, although it is generally recognised that no one construct can account for the multitude of attitudinal 
dimensions identified, the dimensions are thought to reflect a limited number of common higher order 
dimensions that produce associations with stability, resistance, and impact on cognition and behaviour.
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Eagly & Chaiken (1998) suggest that a distinction could be made between affective and cognitive 
aspects of attitude strength and a possible future dimensions could be based on attitude function. 
However, they also maintain that all dimensions are ultimately explainable in terms of attitude structure 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). Indeed, research has established that the structural dimension of accessibility 
(e.g. Fazio, 1986) is correlated with a number of aspects of attitude structure (e.g. ambivalence Bargh 
et al 1992; Fazio, 1995) suggesting that accessibility may function as an indicator of the overall 
strength that results from such attitude structure. Alternatively, accessibility could be a consequence of 
strength that is defined in intra- or inter-attitudinai terms (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).
Exactly how multiple strength-related attitude properties are related and how attitude measures and 
manipulations may access multiple constructs related to attitude strength, remains an issue for further 
research Therefore, conclusions concerning the distinctive contributions of each strength -  related 
property will benefit from procedures that involve the experimental or statistical control of potential 
confounding variables (Wegener et al, 1995).
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A review of the social psychological literature contains innumerable references to the relationship 
between values and attitudes and this relationship has been supported by extensive empirical studies. 
Despite general recognition of a link between attitudes and values, debate concerning the definition of 
values and their conceptual nature has resulted in a lack of consensus concerning the exact 
relationship between the two concepts. Whilst the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably -  
suggesting little distinction between the two concepts, some theorists suggest that values can be 
categorised as a specific type of attitude. However, both similarities and differences between values 
and attitudes have been identified. In addition, a number of theorists have stressed the hierarchical 
relationship between values and attitudes. These varying interpretations of the value-attitude 
relationship will be discussed in more detail below.
Values as a Type of Attitude
Whilst a number of attitude theorists tend to subsume the concept of values within their discussion of 
attitudes, by using a broad definition of attitudes (e.g. McGuire, 1986), which includes abstract 
attitudes, it is interesting to note that within attitude research, the majority of empirical studies carried 
out utilise specific attitudes and general values, and attitude processes are seldom reported in terms of 
common values, for example, those reported in the Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz & Bilsky,
1990). Value researchers, on the other hand, tend to argue for a distinction between the two concepts. 
Furthermore, attitude surveys generally refer to specific attitudes, whilst surveys measuring systems of 
values have developed separately.
Indeed, a number of psychological concepts once defined within the generic category of ‘attitudes’, 
have received more attention, both theoretically and empirically, and as a consequence, have 
developed specific names. For example, attitudes towards groups have been called ‘prejudice’, whilst 
attitudes towards the self have been termed ‘self-esteem’ (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). The same process 
can be seen to have occurred for values. Attitudes towards relatively abstract goals or end-states of 
human existence have been labelled ‘values' (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). The study of values has slowly 
become established as a separate research discipline, earning independent attention within many 
psychology texts.
SECTION 3: VALUES AND ATTITUDES
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A number of similarities between values and attitudes have been highlighted. Firstly, it is generally 
agreed that values, like attitudes, cannot be observed directly. Both are hypothetical constructs that 
are inferred through behavioural, cognitive or affective responding (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Ajzen, 
2000).
Levy (1990) suggests that since value items are characterized by a range ordered from positive to 
negative towards the object, such items automatically belong to the ‘universe’ of attitude items, indeed, 
attitude theorists have generally defined attitude objects very broadly. Attitude theorists have both 
collectively and individually treated practically any nameable or discernabie entity as an attitude object 
(Greenwaid, 1989; Fazio, 1995). In addition, theorists have studied attitudes towards abstract 
concepts (e.g. personality traits) and other attitudes (e.g. towards prejudice) (Greenwaid, 1989).
Within the constraints of such definitions, values could presumably be categorised as ‘attitude objects’. 
However, as Greenwaid (1989) notes, the cost of such a broad definition could be a lack of both 
theoretical development and a lack of precision.
Differences between Values and Attitudes
Whilst some theorists suggest that values share many of the defining features of attitudes, values have . 
also been differentiated from attitudes on a number of dimensions. These differences could be 
interpreted in two ways: either as evidence that values and attitudes are separate concepts or that 
values exist as a subset within the attitude domain.
Firstly, it is generally acknowledged that unlike attitudes, values do not correspond to a particular 
object or situation. This idea of values being general rather than specific is reflected in numerous 
definitions. Values have been referred to as “generalised attitudes” (Dukes 1955; Smith, 1963; Bern,
1970) and as relatively ‘abstract’ goals or end states of human existence (Rokeach 1973; Eagly & 
Chaiken 1993). Rokeach (1973) differentiated the-concepts in terms of the types of beliefs composing 
them i.e. a value refers to a specific ‘proscriptive or prescriptive belief’ that transcends specific objects 
or situations, while an attitude refers to an arrangement of several beliefs focused on a specific object 
or situation. This idea of values being abstract entities is reflected in value surveys, which typically ask 
respondents to report on the strength (e.g. importance) of their values in the abstract, with no 
situational/contextual boundaries.
Similarities between the two concepts
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Secondly, values are usually regarded as more consistent than attitudes across both time and 
circumstance. However, the contextual of values stability has been questioned as was discussed earlier. 
Thirdly, values have been likened to cultural truisms (e.g. Maio and Olson, 1998) suggesting that, as 
with truisms, people should agree highly with values and they should be relatively bereft of cognitive 
support. Maio & Olson refer to conflicting theoretical evidence in the literature. Supportive arguments 
for this idea include the fact that value rankings tend to be unstable across situations (Seligman &
Katz, 1996) and this may occur because individuals lack a consistent set of reasons to support the 
values and so adjust values in different situations. Secondly, values are learned partly through 
uncritical socialisation processes (e.g. Kelman 1974). Lastly, because values serve universal basic 
needs (e.g. Schwartz, 1992), it is the drive to fulfil these needs that causes values to be important. If 
values serve universal needs they should be widely shared, and therefore people may rarely question 
or reconsider their values. Indeed Maio and Olson found supportive evidence that values do not derive 
their strength from cognitive support: specifically, asking individuals to focus on the reasons for their 
values resulted in value change. They suggest that values are supported primarily by memories of 
value-consistent behaviour.
This conceptualisation of values highlights two potential differences between values and attitudes. For 
example, whereas the evaluation of an attitude object is thought to range from a highly emotional to a 
more elaborated cognitive response (Fazio, 1995), the evaluation in the case of values is principally 
emotive if values are relatively bereft of cognitive support. It is often observed that if individuals are 
pressed to justify their attitudes, al! explanations ultimately terminate with references to values that 
people are unable to justify any further. This would be expected if values lacked supportive arguments. 
For example Tetlock (1986) suggests that anti-abortion partisans consider “because life is sacred” 
self-explanatory for their position whilst pro-choice supporters consider “women’s liberty" a self- 
justifying rationalization for their decision.
Hierarchical Relationship between Values and Attitudes
Some theorists have suggested that there may be a hierarchical relationship between attitudes and 
values. Early value theorists such as Woodruff & Divesta (1948, p.657), suggest that an attitude 
towards a specific object is a result of “the way one conceives that object from the standpoint of its 
effects on one’s most cherished values”. Ostrom and Brock (1968) viewed attitudinal involvement in 
terms of relations between attitudes and values whilst Johnson & Eagly (1989) proposed the concept
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of value-relevant involvement to refer to a motivational state induced by the linkage of an activated 
attitude to one’s values. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘value-centrality’, Abelson & Prentice (1989) 
talk about the extent to which particular values represent beliefs which are ‘deeper’ and more 
‘fundamental’ to the individual. Stern et al (1995) explored a model in which individuals construct 
attitudes to new attitude objects by considering the consequences of an attitude for their personal 
values and from this information construct an attitude. They propose that values provide a stable and 
relatively enduring foundation for attitudes.
Rokeach (1973) viewed the self-system as a hierarchical arrangement in which the self-concept is most 
central, followed in order of decreasing centrality, by values, attitudes and behaviour. Changes in any 
one element in the system were thought to affect other parts. Changes in more central aspects such as 
the self-concept would be likely to result in relatively enduring and far-reaching changes in less central 
aspects such as behaviour, whereas changes in less central aspects would not influence central 
aspects as strongly. Likewise, Feather (1996), suggests that attitudes are often embedded in a 
complex network of relations between attitudes, beliefs, and values in which strongly held values are 
core, or central, elements in the sense that they are linked to many attitudes and beliefs as well as to 
other values.
Feather (1996) argued that values might be treated as background factors that affect the strength and 
sign of the attitudes. He proposed that the general valuing of “achievement” and “honesty” would, for 
instance, be translated into positive evaluations of specific achieving or honest actions and specific 
successes following such actions.
The view of a hierarchical relationship between values and attitudes has intuitive appeal since it is often 
observed that if individuals are pressed to justify their attitudes, explanations frequently conclude with 
references to values that people find it difficult to defend further (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As discussed 
above, this view is in line with the findings of Maio & Olson, (1998) and Tetlock (1991).
A number of theorists regard values as heuristic devices, implying that, rather than engaging in careful 
analysis of the impact of different behaviour on internalised values, individuals may react to situations 
whilst on ‘autopilot’ with instinctive responses, which depend on the momentary situation (Van Deth & 
Scarbrough, 1995). An individual may keep track of a small number of general values, which in turn 
provide direction on how to respond to a large number of specific issues (Tetlock, 1991). For example,
30
Butler & Stokes (1971, p.230) suggest that, "many of the issues of electoral politics owe more to the 
voters’ orientation towards values and goals than to their assessment of policy alternatives”.
The hierarchical nature of values and attitudes has been discussed within literature concerning the 
‘inter-attitudinal’ structure of attitudes and the ‘anchoring’ of attitudes to vaiues (Eagly & Chaiken,
1995,1998). It is suggested that some attitudes are linked to more abstract attitudes (i.e. values) in a 
hierarchical structure and that such attitudes are particularly strong. For example, if a ‘lower-level’ 
attitude (e.g. recycling) were a consequence of a more general attitude or value (e.g. environmental 
preservation), then the lower-level attitude would be more resistant to change since it would derive its 
support from its relation to the higher-level attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). These structural 
considerations are discussed further in section 5 with reference to attitude change.
As well as hierarchical structures within an individual’s cognitive system, hierarchical links between 
thematically consistent structures across individuals i.e. ‘ideologies’ have been examined. An ideology 
is defined as a shared collection of beliefs, attitudes and values organised around some coherent core 
and associated with a particular group (Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995). Beliefs associated with a 
general attitude may allow attitudes towards specific social issues to be derived. So, attitudes are 
formed at least partially in top-down fashion as generalisations from broader issues,
Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence for a hierarchical relationship between attitudes and values comes from both 
correlational and experimental studies. For example, there is considerable evidence that the general 
importance of particular values can predict particular attitudes towards a wide range of social issues 
e.g. abortion (Seligman & Katz, 1996); racial attitudes (Katz & Hass, 1988), civil rights (Rokeach,
1973). These findings are commonly assumed to imply that values underlie or exert a causal influence 
on attitudes. For example, Stern, Dietz, Kalof, and Guagnano (1995) argued that in relation to 
environmental attitudes, people might fall back on their values to develop a position when faced with a 
specific environmental dilemma. In factor analytic studies, they derived measures of three values that 
were positively or negatively correlated with this attitude, namely, egoistic, altruistic and biospheric 
values.
Rokeach (1979) has shown that creating a sense of self-dissatisfaction by drawing a person’s attention 
to inconsistencies between values and attitudes can be a catalyst for promoting change throughout the 
whole system. Similar findings have been found by Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach & Grube (1984). Support for
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Rokeach’s hierarchical model was obtained using a “value self-confrontation procedure”. It was 
assumed that if people could be induced to perceive an inconsistency between their self-concept and 
the relative ranking of important values, self-dissatisfaction would be aroused. This dissatisfaction 
should motivate people to change the rankings of these values, resulting in changes in attitudes and 
behaviour. Subjects were first asked to rank order 18 terminal values and were then lead to believe 
that the relative ranking of 2 of their values (freedom and equality) differed from the ranking of the 
same two values by members of a positive reference group.
For example, they were told that members of the positive reference group (people in favour of civil 
rights) placed a much higher priority on the importance of equality than did members of the negative 
reference group (those opposed to civil rights). It was assumed that subjects tended to be sympathetic 
to the civil rights movement, and would therefore identify with the positive reference group. As a result, 
Rokeach believed that the perceived discrepancy between the stated value priorities of subjects and 
the value priorities said to be held by pro-civil rights individuals would cause subjects to experience 
dissatisfaction, resulting in long-term changes in values, attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, changes in all 
these areas were observed.
Subjects were tested 17 months after the manipulation and relative to those in control conditions, 
experimental subjects ranked equality higher, expressed more positive attitudes towards blacks, and 
were more willing to join or renew their membership in the National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People. Rokeach implied that the sequence of changes ending in behaviour change began 
with self-dissatisfaction associated with the inconsistency between the actual importance rankings of 
values and the way subjects thought these values should be ranked. The value rankings were therefore 
reordered, and the relevant attitudes then changed to reflect the new value priorities. Finally, behaviour 
was adjusted to be consistent with the attitudes. Similar findings have been found by a number of 
theorists (e.g. Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988).
There have been few explicit attempts to model the relationship of values and attitudes with the 
exception of Homer & Kahle (1988), who used structural equation modelling techniques to explore the 
Value-Attitude-Behaviour Hierarchy. Measures were taken of values, attitudes and behaviours 
associated with the consumption of natural foods. Subjects rated the importance of 9 values including 
self-respect, excitement, security, and a sense of accomplishment. In addition to responding to 
questions about a number of attitudes and behaviours related to shopping for food. These included
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questions concerning attitudes about nutrition and natural foods, as well as questions about how 
frequently they shopped for food and how much money they spent on food.
Modelling revealed that correlations among these elements best fitted a hierarchical causal model in 
which values are superordinate, behaviour is subordinate, and attitudes mediate the relationships. 
Correlations between values and nutrition attitudes were stronger than correlations between values and 
shopping behaviours, and attitudes were significantly correlated with behaviours. These results were 
consistent with Rokeach’s (1973) model. Prisiin et al (1997) demonstrated that individuals’ attitudes 
towards a news item concerning sex discrimination were derived from their existing evaluation on the 
general issue of equal rights for women.
Although most research has provided evidence of a one-way relationship between values and attitudes, 
not ail theorists have conceptualised the value-attitude relationship in this way. Van Deth & Scarbrough 
(1995), for example, perceive the ‘values-attitudes axis’ as a reciprocal relationship. They argue that 
values have an impact on attitudes but likewise, attitudes can influence values by the way individuals 
learn from their own experience in appealing to their values, and also from the influence of the values 
of other people.
There does not appear to be any one understanding of the relationship between attitudes and values. 
Moreover, it may not be that all values exist within a value-attitude hierarchy, an idea that is supported 
by theories and research on attitude function (e.g. Smith, Bruner & White, 1956; Katz, 1960) which 
suggest that attitudes serve one of several possible functions of which value expression may be only 
one.
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SECTION 4: VALUE & ATTITUDE STRUCTURE 
Attitude Structure
Overview of Attitude Structure
A comprehensive review of the literature pertaining to attitude structure is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. The following section offers a brief review of social cognition approaches and a discussion 
of those issues, which are most germane to the current thesis.
Psychologists have frequently imbued attitudes with structural properties (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and 
as discussed earlier, attitude structure has been identified as one aspect of attitude strength (e.g.
Fazio, 1995; Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). There is extensive reference to attitude 
structure within both the social and cognitive psychology literature. McGuire (1989) provides a unifying 
framework for organising these different perspectives. This includes three leveis of increasing structural 
complexity; the structure of individual attitudes, systems of attitudes and systems of attitudes in 
relation to other systems within the individual.
Eagly & Chaiken (1993) discuss the first two levels in their distinction between intra- and inter- 
attitudinaiattitude structures. They suggest that the structure of attitudes results from one of two 
processes by which an attitude is initially formed. Firstly, an attitude can be formed experientially i.e. by 
cognitive, affective or behavioural responding to an attitude object (directly or indirectly, to cues that 
represent the attitude object). Information produced by these responses is stored as mental 
associations between the attitude object and prior experiences/responses. This results in ‘intra- 
attitudinaP structure. Secondly establishing links between attitude objects can form an attitude. These 
links are stored, along with the target attitude itself and this results in ‘inter-attitudinal’ structure.
These larger structures may be cognitively consistent, as defined by balance theory (Heider, 1958) or 
thematically consistent in the sense that they form an ideology (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Other theorists have focused on either the structure of individual attitudes (e.g. Fazio, 1995) or the 
links between attitudes and other cognitive structures. Literature pertaining to both these 
categorisations will be discussed. For the purposes of this discussion, the term ‘internal structure’ will - 
be used to denote the structure of individual attitudes and ‘external structure’ to refer to systems of 
attitudes and other cognitive elements.
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Internal Attitude Structure
Although a number of attitudinal dimensions have been identified (e.g. McGuire, 1989), most 
researchers focus on the evaluative dimension (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1995). Also, 
although individual differences in attitudes have typically been measured by placing target attitudes on 
a bipolar evaluative continuum, a number of structural models have been presented, namely unipolar 
dimensional, bipolar dimensional and non-dimensional. In addition, a number of theorists have included 
belief components in addition to evaluative aspects in their models of internal structure.
Dimensionai Models of Attitude Structure 
Dimensional models of attitude structure are not widely accepted. The assumption that people encode, 
store and retrieve attitude-relevant information in terms of a bipolar evaluative dimension has been 
endorsed, however, by a number of theorists such as Thurstone (1931) and by proponents of social 
judgement theory (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergail, 1965).
Empirical evidence for the bi-polar evaluative schemas is provided by Judd & Kulik (1980) who found 
that favourable or unfavourable statements were processed more easily than neutral statements. They 
suggested that people holding a bi-polar schema process information that ‘fits’ it more easily than 
ambiguous information.
However, Eagly & Chaiken, (1993), point out that since a dimension has a middle point in addition to. 
two ends all information located along a dimension should, in theory, ‘fit it’ equally. However, they 
suggest that attitude dimensions containing positions that people feel indifferent towards or that 
cannot readily be recognized as pro or con may be relatively uneiaborated in their cognitions and so in 
this sense, such information would not ‘fit’ middle regions as easily as the more clearly defined end 
regions of the dimensions.
Other theorists (e.g. Kerlinger 1984; Luker 1984; Tourangeau, Rasinski & D’Andrade, 1991), argue 
that attitudinal domains are best represented by two relatively independent dimensions because people 
who strongly agree with statements at one end of an attitudinal continuum are often indifferent rather 
than opposed to, statements at the other end, which are viewed as irrelevant to their own beliefs. 
Support for this theory of a unipolar dimension is provided by Kristiansen & Zanna (1988) in their 
research examining the values that people use to justify their attitudes. For example, they found that 
respondents with negative and positive attitudes differed in the values that they regarded as relevant 
to the introduction of nuclear weapons in Canada. Respondents who favoured nuclear weapons rated
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“national security” and “a comfortable life” as more relevant than did those opposed to nuclear 
weapons who viewed "wisdom", “salvation” and “true friendship” as most relevant.
However, it has been suggested that bipolar structures may develop in situations where groups 
favouring different policies are in conflict. Research for example, suggests that when people have cause 
to represent opposing views, they are able to access or develop appropriate cognitive structures 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This may also be the case for social issues that are often discussed. For 
example, most individuals would be able to provide arguments both for and against abortion 
irrespective of their personal opinions.
In addition to models of attitude structure, which assume that attitudes consist solely of an evaluation 
of an object stored in memory, a number of models include the beliefs that individuals hold about the 
attitude objects. For example, in his sociocognitive model, Pratkanis, 1989, suggests that although 
some attitudes may consist solely of an evaluation, such as the cultural truism, (McGuire, 1986), 
attitudes are often associated with elaborate knowledge structures which may contain for example, 
arguments for and against a given proposition, knowledge and subjective beliefs about the domain and 
information on how to behave toward the object. In this model, the cognitive representation of a fully 
developed attitude consists of three parts: an object-category, an evaluative summary of the object as 
well as a structure consisting of related knowledge. Pratkanis (1989) views his model as an extension 
of those of attitude that of Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) who distinguished between the affective 
tone and the information support of an attitude and more recently, Schlegel and DiTecco (1982) 
suggested that attitudes consist of evaluations and knowledge structures.
There are a number of theories regarding how evaluative and cognitive attitudinal components combine 
to form an overall attitudinal response. Some research questions the assumption that people form 
attitudes by aggregating their beliefs. Fishbein & Ajzen’s (1975) approach treats a person’s attitude at 
a particular point in time as a function of the beliefs that are salient or accessible at that point. Some 
theorists have questioned the extent to which people base their attitudes on beliefs about the specific 
attributes of attitude objects. Linder many circumstances, people retrieve intact evaluations obviating 
the need to consider or review their beiiefs. Rosenberg (1960) argues that most persuasion research 
induces changes in beliefs, which then results in a corresponding change in associated attitudes.
With respect to the dimensional models of structure discussed earlier, Schlegal and DiTecco (1982) 
who showed that attitudinal structures could be conveyed in a single affective response when relevant
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beliefs about the attitude object are simple, their number is smail and they do not contradict each 
other. However, if beliefs are numerous, complicated and at least partly contradictory e.g. if a person 
has intense personal experiences with the attitude objects, a simple evaluative response will fail short 
of representing the whole attitude structure.
In brief, empirical evidence in support of unidimensional or multidimensional attitude models can be 
considered contradictory. In practical research, however, operationalisations of attitudes following the 
unidimensional concept are usually preferred since they can be measured more simply and most 
standard attitude scales are based on the unidimensional concept.
Nondimensiona! Representations of Attitude Structure
The majority of attitude theorists do not discuss attitudes in terms of dimensional structure but in terms 
of associations between an attitude ‘object’ and beliefs, affects and behaviours. For instance, the 
information processing approach, which is derived from cognitive psychology, suggests a categorical 
rather than a dimensional analysis of attitudinal responses. The cognitions linked to the attitude are 
believed to have evaluative labels indicative of their favourability or unfavourability i.e. they express 
valence but not extremity. Consequently, unlike dimensional models, such theories suggest that no 
‘evaluative continuum’ exists in the minds of individuals and it is therefore wrong to use an evaluative 
continuum during measurement.
For example, Fazio’s model (1986,1989) discussed earlier can be seen as an example of such a 
model except that his model focuses on evaluative rather than cognitive links to the attitude object-. 
Attitudes are said to be stored in an associative memory network in which an attitude is represented as 
one node and the attitude object is represented as the second node.
The Structure of Attitude Systems
Both internal and external attitude structure can be conceptualised in terms of associative memory 
networks. Fazio’s view of attitudes provides a well-documented associative network perspective 
regarding the internal structure of attitudes. Other theorists have discussed external attitudinal 
structure expiicitly in network terms. They assume that attitudes exist in memory within a network of 
‘associative links’ to other cognitive elements (e.g. Rokeach, 1967; Bern 1970; McGuire, 1989; Petty & 
Krosnick, 1989; Pratkanis & Greenwaid 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As a result, when an individual 
thinks about one attitude they may also think about another simultaneously.
37
In addition, Judd & Krosnick (1989) and Abelson & Rosenberg (1960), have represented attitudes as 
positive or negative signs attached to each attitude object. These vaianced attitude objects can be 
regarded as nodes in a network representing relations between attitudes. To use their example, the 
policy of affirmative action might have positive implications for the value of equality and might have 
negative implications for the value of freedom.
Consistent with associative network models is the suggestion that nodes have the property of strength 
as well as valence. The stronger the two attitudinal nodes, the greater the probability that these 
attitudes will simultaneously be brought into awareness and that the attitudes are evaluativeiy 
consistent. Strength is said to reflect the frequency with which a node has been activated in the past. In 
an example of spreading activation between attitude nodes, Judd, Drake, Downing and Krosnick (1991) 
showed that answering attitude questions about one political issue (e.g. equal rights amendment) 
increased the accessibility of attitudes (operationalised by the latency of attitudinal response) on a 
related issue (e.g. nuclear weapons freeze).
Eagly & Chaiken (1993,1998) suggest that network models are too general and limited to encompass 
the particular structural features of attitudes. In their discussion of inter-attitudinal structure, attitudes 
become linked to one another when one attitude implies another psychologically as a result of logical 
analyses; by observing a conjunction between two attitude objects and observations of covariation 
between attitudinal positions.
External structure is seen as hierarchical in the sense that more abstract and general attitudes 
encompass more concrete and particular attitudes. The attitude object associated with a more general 
attitude can be viewed as a category that contains more specific attitude objects as components. The 
implication is that the specific attitudes would have the same valence as the more general attitude.
They suggest that the external structure of attitudes on controversial social issues may often be 
hierarchical in the sense that these attitudes are linked to general attitudes, which are termed ‘values’.
Rajecki (1990) provides the example of a hypothetical person with an attitude towards God, with a set 
of related beliefs. He supposes that (a) many people who believe in God are also active in some kind of 
organised religion or faith; (b) these believers presumably have a positive attitude towards their own 
religion; (c) since most religions preach some form of ‘brotherly love’, it is likely they have a positive 
attitude towards the notion of humanitarian acts. The attitude towards humanitarianism is therefore
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thought to be based on this vertical structure of attitudes in a chain and since it is predicated or built 
upon other attitudes it is a ‘higher-order’ attitude.
In addition to vertical structure, Rajecki also discusses horizontal structure. Attitudes can be anchored 
in more than one elaborated series of prior attitudes. With reference to the previous example, a 
positive attitude towards one’s country may lead to a positive attitude towards domestic aid programs 
and this would result in positive attitude towards humanitarian acts. As a result, an individual’s attitude 
towards humanitarianism acts may have a number of sources. The exact nature of an attitude's 
external structure has implications for attitude change, which will be discussed later.
Attitude Systems in Relation to other Systems within the Person
McGuire (1989) considers a more complex level of structure i.e. ‘molecular’ correspondence between 
attitude systems and both action and information processing. It is noteworthy that, as discussed 
earlier, despite being considered an aspect of attitude structure, typically, the effect of attitudes on 
behaviour and information processing has been represented as a consequence of attitude strength 
rather than a property of strength itself (e.g. Fazio, 1995, Petty & Krosnick, 1995).
Most theories of attitude change accept the one-to-one correspondence between the favourability of 
salient information about a topic and an individual’s evaluation of that topic for instance the Learning 
Theory approach (e.g. Hovland, ianis & Kelley, 1953) and Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). The 
cognitive-response approach (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) implies high information-evaluation 
correspondence. However, evidence for these relationships has been ambiguous, as expressed by 
McGuire (1989, p.54) “Although empirical support for one-to-one molecular correspondence between 
information and attitudes is sad, that for correspondence between action and attitude is tragic.”
The implications of attitude structure for both the measurement of attitude strength and for attitude 
change will be discussed later and some predictions derived from aspects of attitude structure will 
appear in subsequent chapters.
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Traditionally, as with attitudes, values have been measured along a bi-poiar evaluative continuum. If it 
were assumed that value structure mirrors this operational definition, values would have simple 
structural properties and would exist as a pro versus con dimension in individuals’ minds. However, 
value structure is not typicaliy described in this way. Within the attitudinal literature, values have been 
described as ‘abstract attitudes’ and as such their external structure has been discussed, both 
implicitly and explicitly, with reference to hierarchical attitude structure. In the following section, 
structural models specific to values are examined, with particular emphasis on Feather’s (1990) 
conceptualisation of value structure, which offers an explicit account of both internal and external value 
structure.
In terms of individual values, for the most part, value theorists have not discussed their cognitive 
representation in terms of evaluative, belief, and cognitive components, but have focused on the 
content of each value. There is thought to be finite number of values arranged within an individual’s 
value system. For example, Rokeach, (1973), discussed the external hierarchical structure of values 
beliefs and attitudes which he argues collectively form the ‘value-attitude’ system, which is rooted 
within a wider belief system. Similarly, Schwartz and his colleagues (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987,1990; 
Schwartz, 1992) present a complete typology of the content domains of values which assumes that 
values are cognitive representations of three types of universal human requirements: bioiogicaliy based 
needs of the organism, requirements for interpersonal coordination, and social institutional demands 
for group welfare and survival. They suggest that the structure of human values refers to the 
conceptual organisation of values on the basis of their similarities and differences.
Feather (1971,1990), on the other hand has presented a structural theory of values (and value 
systems), which includes both the structure of individual values and structural links of values to other 
constructs within a larger cognitive system. Values are described as a type of ‘abstract structure’, an 
organised and relatively stable ‘residue’ or ‘summary’ of past experience. The particular value may 
differ structurally across individuals. It may, for example, have a restricted and undifferentiated network 
of associations and therefore take up a relatively minor place in the system of beliefs, attitudes and 
values. On the other hand it may have a much more central position. Feather proposes that, as with 
other cognitive structures (such as attitudes), the structural properties of values could be examined in 
terms of a number of dimensions such as degree of differentiation, integration, isolation and centrality.
The Structure Of Values
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For example, Feather (1990) proposes that ‘important values’ (and by implication, ‘strong’ values), 
are those which are (1) associated with strong affective reactions (either positive or negative) along a 
dimension of evaluation and (2) are related to their central location in the total cognitive-affective belief 
system and in their dose links to self-conceptions. Other elements in the cognitive structure depend 
upon their stability, Each value can be considered an abstract structure when viewed in isolation and in 
addition, each person’s value system or hierarchy of values can be conceptualised as a more complex 
type of abstract structure, one in which values are ordered along a continuum of importance for self. 
Values can also function as motives so that when a particular value is elicited, a value induces valences 
on objects and events so that these objects and events become subjectively attractive or aversive 
(Feather 1990,1992). Finally, values have a normative quality about them involving what is desirable 
or undesirable, what ought to be preferred or not preferred. This is reflected in value definitions (e.g. 
Schwartz, 1996).
Feather’s conceptualization of values is similar to that proposed by Eagly & Chaiken (1993,1998) in 
relation to attitudes, in that it considers both internal and external aspects of values or attitudes. Like 
Fazio (1990,1995), Feather discusses a link between the evaluation and the value object, which Eagly 
and Chaiken refer to as the intra-attitudinal. Flowever, he also discusses links to other aspects of the 
molar system, as do both Rokeach (e.g. 1973) and numerous attitude theorists (e.g. Ostrom & Brock,
1968; Rokeach, 1973; Abelson, 1988; Homer & Kahle, 1988 and Eagly & Chaiken. 1993,1998).
Comparison Of Attitude And Value Structure: Can Values be equated with Attitudes in Terms of
Structure?
There is evidence within the literature that the evaluative component of attitudes may differ from that of 
values in two respects. Firstly, whereas the evaluation of an attitude object is thought to range from a 
highly emotional to a more elaborated cognitive response (Fazio, 1995), the evaluation of values could 
be regarded principally as emotive since values are believed to lack cognitive support. Individuals find it 
difficult to justify their endorsement of values and they are accepted unconditionally (Rokeach 1973; 
Feather, 1990; Seligman & Katz, 1996; Maio & Olson, 1998). In addition, although some attitude 
theorists argue that attitude structures are based only on an evaluative-object link (e.g. Fazio, 1995), 
others discuss attitude structure in terms of evaluations and beliefs (e.g, Pratkanis, 1989). However, 
according to Levy (1990), the expression “extent of importance” can be regarded as a cognitive 
assessment and he suggests that values are limited only to the cognitive modality of assessment.
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Secondly, whereas the evaluative range of an attitude object is thought to range from a strongly 
positive orientation to a strongly negative orientation (e.g. Fazio, 1995), it is conceivabie that, for 
values, this range is from positive to neutral since, values are by definition, generally desired and 
accepted unconditionally (e.g. Rokeach, 1967). This is supported by the fact that value ratings in 
surveys generally show a high level of item endorsement by the majority of respondents unlike attitude 
scales in which agreement or disagreement with the attitude items is often more variable between 
respondents. For example, the SVI (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) ranges from -1 (not 
important) to +7 (of supreme importance).
With reference to Fazio’s structural framework, if the internal structure of values were structurally 
identical to that of attitudes, then values would consist of a link between a ‘value object’ and an 
evaluation of that object. Clearly, it is more appropriate to compare value objects (e.g. social justice, 
equality) not to attitudes, but to attitude objects since attitude objects have been defined very broadly 
in the psychological literature and within the constraints of such definitions, values could, presumably, 
be categorised as a type of attitude object.
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The internal aspects of attitude strength have provided a basis from which to design techniques for 
inducing attitude change. For instance, Eagly & Kulsea (1997) have suggested that persuasion 
techniques should provide people with a large amount of new experience (either cognitive, affective or 
behavioural) with the attitude object. The new associations given their recency would heavily influence 
the attitude and repetition of the new structural elements would increase their strength (Eagly &
Kulsea, 1997). For example, communications could change such attitudes by adding new intra- 
attitudinal structure (such as new beliefs), but first these must be understood and recipients must 
engage in the favourable elaboration of their details. This is the principle on which central route 
processing of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) is based.
Attitude structure and Attitude Change
As discussed in section 4, both the internal and external structure of attitudes have implications for 
attitude strength and its consequences including resistance to persuasion and influence on information 
processing. The structure underlying an attitude’s strength is thought to dictate the mechanisms by 
which attitudes are changed
Internal Attitude Structure
An attitude's internal structure is believed to provide a counterweight against attitude discrepant 
information. As such this discrepant information would be less likely to result in persuasion. For 
example, if an attitude is grounded extensively in prior experience any new information would be 
averaged with this information producing a smaiier alteration of the attitude's evaluation (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993).
As well as the extensiveness of an attitude’s evaiuative-object association, evaluative coherence has 
also been shown to be an important factor in determining resistance to change factor. For example, in 
respect to the three-component model of attitudes, high levels of evaluative-cognitive consistency, 
evaluative-affective consistency and lower levels of ambivalence have al! been found to predict 
resistance to persuasion (Eagiy & Chaiken, 1993).
in reference to models of attitude structure involving belief structures, the relation between knowledge 
and attitude change is complex. On the one hand, accessible knowledge about an attitude object has
SECTION 5: THE IMPLICATIONS OF ATTITUDE STRUCTURE FOR DESIGNING PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS
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been found to facilitate resistance to attitude change if used to form a defence against counter 
attitudinal information. An extensive belief structure could also enable a more critical evaluation of the 
validity of a message's arguments by facilitating more effective counter arguing (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). In addition, knowledgeable message recipients have been shown to process new information in 
a way that maintains their attitudes (e.g. Wood, Rhodes & Biek, 1995). On the other hand, knowledge 
may increase the ability to receive new information and to evaluate it critically (Wood & Kailgren,
1988).
External Attitude Structure
It is generally accepted that extensive inter-attitudinal structure increases resistance to persuasion. 
Linkages to more abstract attitudes (perhaps even values), in hierarchical structures, may provide an 
active defence against attacks on a target attitude if they are used to justify maintaining the lower level 
attitude and may therefore negate the persuasive arguments (Rajecki, 1990; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).
For example, an individual might counter an attack on recycling (as difficult and expensive) by the 
argument that recycling is necessary despite its disadvantages, in order to ensure the protection of the 
environment. Invoking the more abstract attitude (environmentai protection) would obviate the need to 
counter argue the specific arguments contained in the attack on recycling (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). in 
some cases, linkages to abstract attitudes, despite being personally significant, may not be consciously 
formulated in terms that allow them to be easily used in counter arguing, in such cases, the 
mechanisms considered by dissonance theories (Festinger, 1957) might be used to attack challenges 
to an individual's attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This view is inconsistent with those theorists who 
discuss how values are often used to justify attitudes (e.g. Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988).
Ostrom & Brock (1968) provided empirical evidence for these processes. Subjects indicated the extent 
to which various values were reflected in aspects of a topic. These were cues that subjects had 
previously judged as either personally important or not important. Next subjects received a counter- 
attitudinal message that was highly discrepant with their attitudes. Subjects in important-value 
conditions were significantly less influenced by this message than those in unimportant-value 
conditions, suggesting that linking an attitude to important values produced attitudinal resistance.
However it is not only an attitude’s hierarchical structure which is important in its resistance to change. 
This idea of both vertical (i.e. hierarchical) and horizontal structure is implied in the associative network 
models of attitude structure (see section 4). Similarly, earlier theorists discuss this inter-attitudinal
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aspect of strength in their concepts of embeddedness (Scott, 1968) and the centrality of an attitude to 
an individual’s basic concerns (Rokeach, 1968), both of which refer to the extent to which attitudes are 
well connected to other attitudes.
Whilst network theorists discuss the process of “spreading activation” between attitudes, other 
theorists have referred to this process as the “domino principle”. Both illustrate the process of 
attitude change throughout linked cognitive structures. According to the domino principle, (e.g. Rajecki, 
1990; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) change in one element of a structure causes changes in related 
elements causing a possible chain reaction which may result in the restructuring of the whole set of 
interrelated elements. As Rajecki (1990) puts it, if an attitude were toppled experimentally, then a 
higher order terminal attitude should topple accordingly. Indeed, research has supported this 
proposition and change has been shown to reverberate through attitudinal structures that are 
composed of linked elements (e.g. Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach and Grube, 1984; Ostrom & Block, 1988; 
McGuire & McGuire 1991).
Rakjeki (1990) provides the example of an attitude towards humanitarian acts that is based on a prior 
attitude towards religion, which in turn is based on a prior attitude towards God. He points out that it is 
not necessarily the case that by changing one of the two primary attitudes, the tertiary humanitarian 
attitude should follow. For example, the attitude towards humanitarianism acts may derive from a 
positive attitude towards community and towards neighbourhood organisations. Even in the event of a 
reversal of an attitude towards God, an attitude could be maintained by these other horizontal links. 
Therefore changes in a particular attitude can influence other attitudes to a varying extent, depending 
on their location in vertical and horizontal attitude structures.
However, Eagly and Chaiken (1995) propose that tendency for change to travel through an inter- 
attitudinal structure acts as an ‘inertial’ force that limits attitude change. They refer to the ‘dampening’ 
effect of inter-attitudinal structure, suggesting that if the psychological effort involved in changing a 
whole attitudinal structure is too great this produces resistance to change. An attitude that exists within 
a molar structure of related attitudes would require more mental effort to change as the individual 
would be need to consider the implications of change. As a result, although change could reverberate 
through such an attitude structure, this change would be slow (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995).
There is, however, as discussed in relation to hierarchical attitude structure, evidence of chain 
reactions occurring through linked cognitive structures. Indirect evidence for the domino principle is
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provided in a study by Hendrick & Seyfried (1974), although they do not refer directly to the domino 
effect and are not explicit about higher order effects or structure (Rajecki, 1990). Subjects were paired 
on the basis of their pre-test attitudes towards the issue of subject voting in local elections. An attempt 
was made to persuade subjects to change their attitudes and it was found that the majority were in 
favour. The researchers then assessed if this new attitude influenced subsequent responses, which 
reflected higher order attitudes
After post-test attitudinal measurement, subjects were asked to examine attitudinal ratings on the issue 
of student voting that presumably reflected the attitudes of two strangers. They had to rate which 
stranger was the most similar to themselves and the most attractive, in the experimental condition, one 
strangers’ attitude was identical to their pre-test score and the other stranger to their post-test score. 
The test was based on the assumption that people are highly attracted to others who share their 
attitudes. If attraction to a stranger is based on a match between attitudes, then this liking was 
assumed to be a higher order effect based on prior attitudes i.e. the terminal attitude is based on prior 
attitudes. If a persuasive communication had really changed subjects’ prior attitudes, it was predicted 
that a related pattern of attraction later on would be expected.
Results showed a shift in prior attitude resulted in a change in higher order attitudes. Attitude changes 
of experimental subjects lead to a related pattern of preferences for strangers with similar as opposed 
to dissimilar attitudes. This shift in attitudes for the experimental subjects could be interpreted to 
represent a domino effect on their subsequent higher order attitudes (Rajecki, 1990). A change in a 
presumably important attitude seems to have led to the outcome that related or terminal attitudes 
come into line. This supports the idea of structural consistency within systems of attitudes and provides 
evidence for the processes of change and stabilization -  the domino effect -  occurs across attitude 
domains.
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Strategies for changing attitudes with strong external structure
A number of strategies for designing persuasive appeals when attitude strength is derived from its link 
to values have been outlined by Eagiy & Chaiken (1998):
(1) invoking values commonly associated with attitudes: for example, in research on abortion 
attitudes towards abortion (Eagly and others 1995), the persuasive arguments were 
developed from those arguments most frequently used by pro-life and pro-choice groups. The 
pro-choice message appealed to individual freedom and self-determination and the pro-life 
choice appealed to traditional family values And sanctity of life.
(2) Priming values for message recipients rather than referring to values directly or indirectly in 
persuasive communication: In research on whites' racial attitudes, Katz and Hass (1988) 
demonstrated that priming one of the values relevant to attitudes towards blacks caused 
predictable changes in attitudes towards the social group. Priming a value involved asking 
participants to respond to a set of items that assessed the value. These findings suggest that 
merely activating a value may strengthen the aspect of an attitude that is linked to the value, 
without the presentation of a persuasive message.
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SECTION 6: MEASUREMENT
Overview: the Measurement of Attitudes and Values
It is generally acknowledged that as latent variables or hypothetical constructs, both attitudes and 
values are inaccessible to direct observation and must therefore, be inferred from some kind of 
measurable response (e.g. Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995; Ajzen, 2000).
In the case of attitudinal measurement, there is no one interpretation of what these ‘measurable 
responses’ should be. As discussed earlier, research on attitude strength has identified a large number 
of related dimensions and the operationalisation of these variables has resulted in a plethora of 
measurement procedures. There has been much debate as to the relative validity of these measures.
As discussed in section 1, despite being categorised as abstract attitudes by a number of theorists, the 
measurement of values differs from that of attitudes in a number of ways. Unlike attitudes, individuals 
are believed to hold a finite number of values and as a result, scales assessing an individual’s 
comprehensive system of values have been developed. Although there is disagreement concerning the 
precise number of values in an individual value system, researchers have attempted to explain the 
meanings and interrelationships associated with these values. In contrast, attitude scales are only able 
to focus on a subset of the attitudinal domain.
Both attitude and value measurement have focused predominantly on the measurement of the 
evaluative dimension. Value measurement has, however, been restricted to direct self-report 
techniques. Examining the items used for research on values shows that the range of these items is 
usually ordered from positive to negative, but since values are defined as desirable and universally 
accepted, the response formats are often positively skewed. For example, in the Schwartz Value 
Inventory (e.g. Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), value ratings range from -1 (not important) to +7 (of 
supreme importance). This would be an example of a unipolar scale as long as the ‘strongly opposed’ 
option was ignored. There is also a special emphasis on the concept of importance in value 
assessment compared to an emphasis on the extent of agreement in attitude measurement.
The following review firstly examines the measurement of attitudes. The interdependence of attitude 
theory and measurement will then be discussed followed by an evaluation of the validity of attitude
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measures. The measurement of values will then be reviewed with emphasis on the Schwartz Value 
Inventory (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).
Attitude Measurement
In order to measure attitudes, due to their abstract nature, an attitudinal indicator must firstly be 
found. Most attitude measurement techniques are based on the assumption that attitudes can be 
measured by indexing the opinions or beliefs that individuals hold about attitude objects (e.g. 
Thurstone, 1931; Likert, 1932). Direct and indirect methods have been developed. The former involves 
the subject giving some kind of self-description. With indirect techniques, such as response latency 
discussed beiow, attitudes are measured without the individual's awareness and are thought to be less 
susceptible to self-presentationa! motives (Strahlberg & Frey, 1988).
The Measurement of Attitude Accessibility
Attitude accessibility has been measured by two methods: (1) self-report and (2) response latency. 
Although no direct self-report measures of attitude accessibility have been used (e.g. “How easily or 
quickly does your attitude come to mind when you encounter attitude object X?”), some indirect 
measures have been developed which ask people how often they think or talk about the attitude object, 
assuming that the more accessible the attitude is, the more an individual will report thinking or talking 
about it (Brown, 1974).
Fazio and his associates (Fazio et al, 1982; Powell & Fazio, 1984) have operationalised response 
latency as the amount of time between the presentation of an attitude object and the individual's 
reported evaluation of it (Fazio, et al, 1982). This response latency is typically assessed with a 
computer that times the delay between evaluations of the object by pressing a computer key (Fazio 
1986). To reduce variability in response-time data, various precautions can be taken: instructing 
research participants to respond as quickly and accurately as possible; including practice trials to 
familiarize participants with the task; using filler trials so that data adjustments can be made; and using 
a two-alternative response framework (e.g. Yes/no, iike/dislike, Fazio, 1990).
Attitude accessibility can also be manipulated. Manipulations typically involve having the respondents 
express the attitude(s) repeatedly since recent and frequent expressions of the attitude cause it to be 
activated more rapidly afterwards (Fazio et ai, 1982; Powell & Fazio, 1984; Houston & Fazio, 1989). 
The more often an attitude is expressed, the more accessible it becomes. Consequently, some
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researchers have asked people to copy their attitudinal responses several times on a number of 
identical response scales (e.g. Fazio et al, 1982).
The Interdependence of Attitude Theory and Measurement
The relationship between attitude theory and measurement is bi-directional and “advances in one 
contribute to (and benefit from) advances in the other” (Ostrom, 1989, p.11). Research into new 
attitudinal phenomena has progressed alongside the development of new measurement techniques. 
Ostrom (1989) discusses two main deveiopments. Firstly, early attitude theorists such as Thurstone 
(1928), concentrated research solely on the evaluative dimension of attitudes. However, the later 
development of multidimensional techniques such as factor analysis and multidimensionai scaling 
resulted in a conceptual shift, directing research towards a greater range of attitudinal dimensions. 
Secondly, by the 1960's, the use of Fisher’s analysis of variance approach had encouraged the use of 
experimental studies which enabled the generation and testing of causal predictions from attitude 
theory.
In the same way that new measurement techniques have drawn attention to new attitudinal 
phenomena, attitude theory has supplied a ‘conceptual language’, which has guided the interpretation 
of empirical results (Ostrom, 1989), for example, by specifying the germane attitudinal properties and 
suggesting which responses need to be observed. The majority of attitude measures are based on the 
dominant unidimensional conceptualisation of attitudes discussed earlier and therefore measure 
positive or negative evaluations of the attitude object.
However, some theorists have examined attitudinal properties other than the evaluative and have 
examined the more heterogeneous set of cognitive reactions evoked in persuasion settings (c.f. Petty, 
Ostrom & Brock, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Semantic differential scales enable researchers to 
assess responses to an attitude object on a number of different dimensions, Individuals rate attitude 
objects on a number of bipolar scales assessing 3 dimensions: evaluative (good/bad), potency (e.g. 
strong/weak), and activity (e.g. fast/siow).
The specific attitudinal definitions adopted have determined which attitudinal responses are measured. 
For example, the cognitive view of attitudes requires the sampling of thoughts and beliefs held about 
the attitude object i.e. attitude-relevant thoughts (Greenwaid, 1968; Petty, Ostrom & Brock, 1981; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). People are asked to list all of the thoughts, however relevant, they have
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about the attitude object after they were exposed to a persuasive communication. The index of overall 
attitude is derived from judgments of how positive or how negative each of the thoughts is. Other 
theories require focus on different subcategories of content e.g. the functional theories.
The Validity of Attitude Strength Measures
Related to the discussion in section 2 concerning whether properties of strength reflect single or 
multiple constructs, a recent and ongoing debate concerns the validity of measures associated with 
particular strength variables. Whilst a number of theorists (Petty & Krosnick, 1995; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1998) discuss the “subjective’ nature of attitude properties, in a similar vein, Bassili (1996) 
distinguishes between two ‘indexes’ of attitude strength on which attitude measures are based:
a) Meta-attitudinal: these are based on respondents’ impressions of their own attitudes
b) Operative: these are linked to the cognitive representations and information processing that is 
linked to judgment processes that produce attitudinal responding, or the retrieval of 
information, which is the product of such processes.
It is supposed that operative measures provide a relatively non-reactive (and possibly unconscious) 
means of assessing properties of strength. In contrast, meta-attitudinal measures rely on respondents’ 
memorial information that, it is claimed, may not be available or accessible for examination. As a result, 
meta-attitudinal measures may be susceptible to other contextual influences, which are irrelevant to 
attitude strength (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Operative Measures
For example, response latency is considered an operative measure of strength since it assesses the 
process of attitude activation. This measure of attitude strength is taken unobtrusively whilst the 
subject’s attention is focused expressing their opinion (Fazio, 1995). Attitude extremity and 
ambivalence can also be measured operatively. Extremity is measured by calculating the polarization of 
participants’ responses to an attitudinal enquiry and ambivalence, by assessing the amount of conflict 
revealed by their answers to questions assessing positive and negative feelings towards an attitude 
object. Based on the output of judgmental processes which are derived from information assumed to 
be stored in memory, the valence of the summary evaluation (extremity) and the valences of positive 
and negative aspects (ambivalence), can be calculated (Bassili, 1996).
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Elaboration can also be regarded as an operative measure of attitude strength. It is defined as the 
extent to which an individual has carefully scrutinised and thought about the merits of information 
relevant to the attitude object (Wegener et al, 1995). It can be assessed by asking respondents to list 
thoughts that come to mind as a result of a persuasive communication. The content of these thoughts 
are then categorised e.g. thoughts favourable, or neutral toward the persuasive message (Cacioppo, 
Harkins, & Petty, 1981) and counted (e.g. Burnkrant & Howard, 1984), with greater elaboration being 
indicated by a larger number of generated thoughts.
Meta-attitudinal Measures 
By contrast, self-reports of attitude certainty, importance, strength of feeling, frequency of thought, 
attentiveness to the issue and knowledge are all considered meta-attitudinal. Bassiili (1996) argues 
that it is doubtful whether individuals normally save complex ‘summary assessments’ of such 
information in memory for all except the most familiar of attitude objects. It is argued that evaluations 
form the foundation of attitudes but properties of strength are secondary to them.
As a result, self-report measures of such properties may not produce valid measures since they are 
assumed to be neither represented with the attitude object in memory nor easily derived from the 
cognitive processes that bring about attitudinal judgments. They are ‘second order’ judgments and 
require a level of ‘intrapsychic awareness' people rarely have (Bassili, 1996). When reporting on such 
attitudinal properties, respondents may base their responses on environmental information to help 
them give credible answers. For example, the reported importance of an issue may be based on past 
behaviour and when reporting certainty, respondents may maintain that their attitudes have changed in 
order to convey their‘open-mindedness’ (Bassiili, 1996).
All measures which are based on self-descriptions start from the assumption that the individual who 
responds is able and motivated to disclose their true attitudes. However, there is a iot of evidence that 
there are tendencies to attitude misrepresentation e.g. tendencies to give socially desirable answers 
because seif-evaluation data can be easily falsified, and are susceptible to impression management 
motives.
Evidence for the lack of direct access to meta-attitudinal attitude properties is provided by a number of 
studies which have found that it is the result of thinking, not the process, which appears in 
consciousness (Bassili, 1996). For example, Wilson et a! (1989) found a discrepancy between the 
actual causes of people’s attitudes and their verbalised reasons for them. Greenwald & Banaji (1995),
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in discussing ’meta-attitudinal’ measures suggest that resulting attitudes are ‘implicit’ and result from 
unrecognised aspects of past experience.
in addition, Ostrom (1989) has questioned whether individuals are able to locate their attitudes as a 
point on an evaluative subjective continuum as is required in self-reports, Individuals may reduce 
possible ratings into a small number of basic response categories such as “favourable toward the 
object”, "unfavourable toward the object”, and “undecided”. The category that most is most 
representative of individuals’ current thoughts would be then be selected. Individuals may be indifferent 
as to which specific point is marked as long as it is the corresponding portion of the scale that 
coincides with their chosen category.
Empirical Evidence Supporting the Advantages of Operational Measures 
Bassili’s (1996) hypothesis concerning the relative strength of operative, compared to meta-attitudinal 
measures, has received empirical support in a number of studies. Recent studies have illustrated the 
power of response latency in indexing attitude strength compared with meta-attitudinal measures.
Bassili (1995) conducted a study of the 1990 Ontario election. Individuals’ response latencies to a 
question concerning their voting intentions (an operative measure of strength) were compared to 
responses to a question concerning the finality of this voting choice (a meta-attitudinal measure) and 
the former was found to be a better predictor of voting behaviour.
Roese & Olson (1994) also found that repeated attitudinal expression produced faster response 
latencies as well as enhanced ratings of the importance of the target issues. However, the effect of 
repeated expression on latencies remained reliable when the effect of importance was controlled for, 
suggesting that individuals use attitude accessibility as a heuristic cue for inferring attitude importance
i.e. meta-attitudinal judgments sometimes may be based on operative properties of the attitude. When 
attitude accessibility was increased by experimental manipulation, there was a resultant increase in 
subjects’ judgments of the importance of the attitude issue.
in another study by Bassili (1996), respondents were interviewed using a computer assisted telephone 
interview, which allowed for the measurement of response latencies. Questions were asked on a 
number of controversial issues and participants were then asked to consider a negative consequence 
of their expressed view in order to assess attitude pliability and attitude stability. Factor analysis 
revealed that meta-attitudinal and operative measures fell on two distinct factors among measures of 
attitude strength with meta-attitudinal measures being less powerful, more erratic and showing less
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predictive validity than operative measures. Among operative measures, response latency was more 
effective than extremity and ambivalence in accounting for opinion pliability and stability. It was 
concluded, “response latency constitutes one of the purest implicit measures of attitude strength 
presently available to researchers” (Bassili, 1996, p.649).
Future Research Concerning Attitudinal Properties 
A number of theorists have attempted to categorise meta-attitudinal and operative measures on a 
smaller number of dimensions. For example, Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas (1995) in a factor 
analysis of self-report strength measures revealed two items reflecting embeddedness and items 
reflecting commitment. Erber, Hodges & Wilson (1995) distinguish between ‘operative’ measures that 
assess the consistency of people’s database and those that assess the strength and accessibility of 
people’s general evaluation of the attitude object - i.e. a dichotomy among sets of measures that are 
predominantly operative. However, the extent to which such labelling is theoretically informative or of 
practical use is questionable. Rather than simplifying the conceptualisation of attitude strength, the 
comprehension of strength components appears to remain as complex as ever.
However, there does appear to be a general consensus concerning the relative advantages of 
operative over meta-attitudinal measures. Greenwald & Banaji, (1995), urge researchers to place more 
emphasis on such ‘indirect measures’ of social constructs i.e. those often mediated by ‘implicit 
unconscious processes’. Measures based on participant’s direct appraisal of such processes (i.e. 
meta-attitudinal measures) have been found to “miss the mark by dramatic margins” (Bassili, 1996, 
p.637).
It should be noted that although a number of strength properties are routinely associated with meta- 
attitudinal measurement, the distinction between operative and meta-attitudinal measures has been 
found to result from the method of measurement rather than the specific property being measured. 
Bassili (1996) found that properties measured in both meta-attitudinai and operative ways were not 
highly correlated. In principle, all properties of strength that can be measured using operative 
measures can also be measured using meta-attitudinal measures by asking respondents to report their 
subjective impressions of psychological processes. However, many properties e.g. certainty, or 
importance, however, are inherently subjective and can only be measured meta-attitudinally.
For a number of strength variables, the option of operative rather than self-report measurement is 
becoming increasingly available. Furthermore, research such as that described above shows that it is
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not that meta-attitudinal measures are unrelated to properties of attitude strength, but that they are 
less powerful and more erratic (Bassili, 1996). Furthermore, all meta-attitudinal measures may not be 
‘subjective’ to the same extent (Bassili, 1996). For example, there is face-validity in the link between 
certainty and attitude stability and research has demonstrated the power of self-reports of certainty in 
predicting this attitudinal consequence (Bassili 1996), as well as their correlation with operative 
measures tapping the same property. Survey research is easy to understand and information on a 
complicated attitudinal property can be accessed by one question. For this reason survey research wilt, 
no doubt, continue to be a popular technique in attitude measurement.
Value Measurement within Social Psvchologv
Whilst some value programs have focused on the values of cultures (Kluckhohn, 1951; Hofstede, 1980: 
Schwartz, 1992) others have focused on the values of individuals (e.g. Morris, 1956; Rokeach, 1973; 
Feather, 1975; Schwartz, 1992). There is also a split between those scales which measure general 
values, and those related to specific groups of values or values in a particular context. The following 
section will focus on those scales relating to the measurement of individual value systems.
The Measurement of Personal Value Systems
Up until the 1960’s value measurement was beset by a lack of consensus regarding value definition 
and more fundamentally, debate about the empirical feasibility of the construct. This disagreement was 
reflected in divergent operationalisations of the values concept (Braithewaite & Scott, 1991). However, 
research by Rokeach (1968,1973) provided a conceptual and operational ‘synergy’ that had been 
lacking (Braithewaite k Scott, 1991, p.690).
The Rokeach Values Survey or RVS (Rokeach, 1967) consisted of what was supposed to be a 
comprehensive list of 18 terminal (preferred end-states of existence) and 18 instrumental (preferred 
modes of conduct) values. Respondents are required to rank-order the values in each list (which were 
printed on moveable gummed labels) according to how important they feel the values are as guiding 
principles in their lives. The result was thought to reflect an individual’s value system. The RVS was by 
far the most popular values scale of the 1970’s and 1980’s and is still used extensively 30 years later 
by researchers in a number of disciplines.
Despite its widespread popularity, the RVS has been criticised on a number of grounds. These 
criticisms include the adequacy of the item sampling, the use of the ranking techniques and most
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frequently, its use of single-item measures. Although single-item measures are more efficient in terms 
of time and convenience, it is well established that constructs are best measured using multiple-items 
in order to calculate internal consistency and therefore estimate the error present in the measure. The 
ranking task is demanding for subjects and limits the range of statistical techniques that can be used 
for data-analysis. Ranking may also result in ipsativity (nonindependence) of the data (e.g.
Braithewaite & Law, 1985; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990). However, Rokeach defended the use of the 
rank-order procedure by claiming it was necessary in order to capture adequately the idea of relative 
importance of values. Braithewaite & Law (1985) also suggest that an understanding of the influence 
of values on behaviour may depend on knowledge of people’s ability to assign priorities to their values. 
Finally, the RVS has been criticised for being applicable primarily to Western culture (Braithewaite & 
Scott, 1991).
Despite these criticisms, value scales developed since Rokeach’s work have frequently been based on 
the RVS. For example, the List of Values (Kahle et al, 1986) was based partly on Rokeach’s work and 
Schwartz and his colieagues (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) developed a model for the 
organisation of value-systems and a related values-measurement instrument, and the Schwartz Value 
Inventory or SVI, which originally drew heavily upon the RVS. The SVI, however, developed Rokeach’s 
definition of values both conceptually and methodologically and subsequent revisions and extensions 
have moved it gradually further away. The SVI is based on the RVS both for 21 of its specific values and 
for its phrasing of values as guiding principles in one’s life. However, it includes values taken from the 
full range of Eastern and Western cultures, and the values are systematically sampled to measure ten 
value types. The current inventory has a larger number of items, increased from 36 to 56 and no 
longer distinguishes between instrumental and terminal values. Also subjects are required to rate 
rather than rank the values and it is a multi-item measure and has been shown to be a cross-culturally 
vaiid measurement scale. The details of the theory and the related measurement scale are examined 
below.
The Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990): Overview 
Values are defined as: "desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding 
principles in people’s lives.” (Schwartz, 1996, p.2). Values are categorised according to the type of 
motivational goal they represent. It is assumed that values represent, in the form of conscious goals, 
three universal ‘requirements of human existence’ and are therefore present in every culture. These 
requirements are; (1) biological needs, (2) requirements of coordinated social interaction and (3)
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survival and welfare needs of groups. These goals are represented cognitively as specific values and 
are used to ‘explain, coordinate and rationalise behaviour’ (Schwartz, 1996, p.2).
This results in ten motivationally different value types. For example, the motivational type of 
“conformity” is derived from the prerequisite of “smooth interaction” and “group survival” - individuals 
inhibit actions that might hurt others. Each value type is defined in terms of its central goal and specific 
single values that represent it. Classification of these values into domains is important both theoretically 
and also for measurement since it can help avoid the Sow reliability inherent in the measurement of 
single values.
Figure 1: The prototypical structure of value systems (taken from Schwartz, 1996).
Actions taken in the pursuit of each value type have psychological, practical and social consequences 
that may conflict with or be compatible with the pursuit of others. This pattern of relations is thought to 
result in a circular structure of value systems in which values from each type are located in a separate 
wedge-like region (see Figure 1 above). Competing value types lie in opposing directions from the 
centre and such motivational goals cannot easily be pursued at the same time e.g. pursuing 
achievement values may conflict with pursuing benevolence values. In contrast, types whose values 
may be.attained simultaneously are in close proximity. Adjacent value types share motivational
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orientations and form a motivational continuum around the circular value structure e.g. achievement 
and hedonism both express self-centeredness. Hedonism and stimulation both entail a desire for 
affectively pleasant arousal
Two major value conflicts have been identified. Opposite quadrants of the circle represent a more 
general level of organization with two underlying dimensions: (1) Openness to Change (self-direction, 
stimulation) conflicts with Conservation (security, conformity, and tradition)] (2) Seif-Transcendence 
(benevolence, universaiism) conflicts with Self-Enhancement (power, achievement). The motivational 
types are split between these four quadrants but the motivational type hedonism shares aspects of 
both Openness and Self-Enhancement, individuals order values hierarchically according to their 
importance as guiding principles in their lives. It is by making choices among competing values that 
people form an integrated structure of value priorities (Schwartz, 1996). The view of values as 
integrated structures allows the generation of systematic, coherent hypotheses regarding the relations 
of value priorities to other variables:
1. Any outside variable tends to be associated similarly with value types that are adjacent in the value 
structure.
2. These associations decrease moving around the circular structure in both directions.
Evaluation o f the S. V.i
There are a number of criteria by which measurement scales can be evaluated including reliability, 
validity and item sampling and empirical evidence. Because each value type of the SVI (e.g. 
achievement), is measured by several value items (ambitious, influential, capable, successful) that 
converge on theoretical meaning, this results in a reliable and valid measure of the construct, in terms 
of interna! consistency the scales have been found to be very reliable, ranging from .70 to .90 and 
exceeding .80 for most scales (Schmitt et al 1993). The test-retest reliability of the scale is also 
acceptable, with scales correlating more than .5 across a period (Schmitt et al, 1993). However, 
Schmitt et al point out that an individual’s values should be measured on more than one occasion to 
account for potentially confounding state and trait-interaction factors. A considerable body of evidence 
has also built up in relation to the cross-cultural validity of the theory (e.g. Schwartz 1994).
A number of potentially problematic issues can be identified in Schwartz’s work. Firstly, Schwartz 
(1996) states that it is in the presence of conflict that values are likely to be activated, enter 
awareness, and to be used as guiding principles. However, Schwartz does not appear to address this 
issue in his value measure. During completion of the S.V.I., participants need not make any trade-offs
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in order to rate the individual values. If Schwartz’s point were accepted it would suggest that the rating 
of values in the abstract, as with the SVI, might be effectively meaningless since, Schwartz (1996) 
suggests that without value conflict, no attention may be given to values and individuals may act in 
terms of routine scripts.
Secondly, Schwartz (1996) suggests that respondents must first be asked to read through all values 
and to choose the most and least important before rating the values. This is done in order to generate 
top and bottom anchoring points. The rationale is that if respondents begin to rate the values directly, 
they tend to change their use of the importance scale as they proceed which causes artefactual effects 
of item order. However, asking respondents to essentially complete the scale twice is a demanding task 
for a scale containing 56 items and may result in participant boredom or fatigue.
Thirdly, Schwartz proposes guidelines to discard data if subjects score too many maximum values. 
Respondents who mark values as being of “supreme importance" too many times (21 times among 56 
values) are dropped before analysis. Since “supreme” means that the value takes precedence over 
virtually all others it is assumed that they are either unwilling or unable to consider their value priorities 
seriously enough to describe them accurately. Wood (1999) suggests that these rules are ‘arbitrary’ 
and it is not clear why these criteria are selected especially considering that respondents are instructed 
that the rating of 7 is ordinarily used for no more than two values.
However, the SVI whilst being similar in many ways to the RVS, avoids its major criticisms. In addition, it 
has the advantage of a strong theoretical base and is amenable to stronger statistical analysis. 
Reflecting these benefits, the SVI has received little criticism in the psychological literature.
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The central research problem of the present thesis can be seen as important on both theoretical and 
practical grounds. Both attitudes and values are accepted as important concepts within the social 
sciences in general and social and cognitive psychology in particular. The recognition of similarities 
between conceptualisations of values and attitudes suggests that the application of attitudinal research 
to the value domain may be justified. Whereas value research has focused largely on content, attitude 
research has involved the analyses of psychological processes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1992), specifically 
attitude change. The application of such these findings to the value domain would be beneficial since 
values research is relatively less grounded in theory (Levy, 1990). Likewise, Dose (1997) suggested 
that attitude research should be applied directly to values and it would provide what is lacking in value 
research.
Compared to attitudes, the psychology of values appears to be a relatively under-researched topic 
despite being a component in the explanations of thought and behaviour (Feather, 1990). Irrespective 
of values’ disputed status as attitudes, vaiue theorists have argued for the importance of research on 
values as distinct constructs. Individuals are supposed to have fewer values than attitudes, making 
them a more ‘economical concept’ (Rokeach, 1968). It is possible, therefore, to assess individuals' 
total value structure by using comprehensive scales such as the SVI (Schwartz, 1990), whereas given 
that individuals have ‘tens of thousands’ of attitudes (Rokeach, 1968) a comprehensive measurement 
would be unfeasible. Values are regarded as more holding a more central position in the individual's 
cognitive system (Rokeach, 1968), they are ‘higher’ rather than ‘lower level’ concepts (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1998). They are also regarded as being more closely linked to personality and motivation 
(Rokeach, 1967).
A number of theorists have suggested that attitude importance is a consequence of attitude 
accessibility (e.g. Fazio, 1995). The broad definition of attitude object means that a value item can be 
conceptualised as an attitude object. An evaluation is made with respect to some entity or thing that is 
the object of the evaluation i.e. attitude object. Virtually anything that is discriminated, can be evaluated 
and therefore function as an attitude object (e.g. abstract ones (liberalism, secular, and humanism) i.e. 
political ideology. This suggests that values can be attitude objects -  so values/labels themselves are 
not attitudes but attitudes can be had about the values.
SECTION 7: JUSTIFICATION FOR RESEARCH
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Firstly, a conceptual framework of attitudes (e.g. Fazio et ai, 1982) is extended to explicitly include 
values as abstract attitude objects, suggesting that the internal structure of values consists of ‘value 
object’-evaluation associations in memory. In this conceptualisation, what Schwartz (1996) refers to as 
values, i.e. the transituational goals such as happiness, would be ‘value objects' i.e. the equivalent of 
attitude objects about which an individual expresses an evaluation which, in the case of the SVI (e.g. 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), is its importance as a ‘guiding principle’ in an individual’s life. This enables 
the measurement of values using response latency techniques. To date, response latency 
measurement has been used exclusively to measure attitude accessibility (with the exception of 
Gilchrist’s unpublished dissertation in 1996). Gilchrist found response latency to be a reliable and valid 
measure of value importance. This finding suggests that a network of values may exist in memory 
analogous to that of attitudes and that the principles of Fazio’s model could be applicable within the 
domain of values.
There are a number of advantages to be gained from the application of response latency measurement 
to the value domain. Response latency would provide an additional measure of value strength, one 
which is considered to be more objective and valid than many self-report measures and has been 
called “one of the purest implicit measures of attitude strength available to researchers” (Greenwald & 
Banajii, 1995). It would also provide insight into an additional dimension of value strength. Whereas 
attitudinal research has identified a large number of strength dimensions (see section 2), value 
research has been restricted primarily to the dimension of value importance.
Theoretically, the validity of response latency as a measure of value strength would provide indirect 
evidence regarding the structural properties of values, specifically that the structural object-evaluation 
representation proposed by Fazio is true for both values and attitude objects i.e. that a network of 
values may exist in memory analogous to that of attitudes. At present there is considerable 
disagreement and confusion in the literature as to the exact nature of attitudes and values. Value 
structure has mainly been addressed with reference to inter-attitudinal structure and little empirical 
research has focused on the internal structure of values.
A second theme of the present thesis involves value strength derived from the structural relationship 
between values and attitudes. This strength is thought to represent a further source of value 
accessibility since in addition to the activation of the evaluative-object link; a value could be accessed 
by the activation of a related cognitive structure. Raising the accessibility of values through related 
expression was therefore assumed to raise the accessibility of a related attitude. It is assumed that
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activating a value would facilitate the retrieval (and accessibility) of related attitude as the activation 
process spreads throughout the associative network
Such a conceptualisation of values would also suggest that the same principles of Fazio’s (1986) 
model could be applicable to the domain of values i.e. that values which are highly accessible from 
memory are likely to guide processing of relevant information and attitudinal judgements than less 
accessible, weaker values. Potentiaily, response latency could provide a measure of value strength, 
which is superior to conventional self-report measures, offering a less biased and more direct measure 
of an individual’s true values.
The implication of this conceptualisation is that values should behave in a similar way to attitudes in the 
persuasion context, it is probable that in the same way as attitude accessibility has been shown to 
determine the elaboration of persuasive messages (cf. Fabrigar et al, 1998), so too would value 
accessibility determine message elaboration since values are structurally comparable to attitudes.
Overview of Thesis
This thesis examines the conceptualisation and measurement of value strength. More specifically, the 
structural dimension of value strength is examined, namely value accessibility. The central question of 
this thesis is “ Are structural models of attitude strength (e.g. Eagiy & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio 1995) 
applicabie to the analysis of value strength?” Five studies are reported which address questions 
concerning the nature of value accessibility, its measurement, the influence of value accessibility on the 
value-attitude relationship and its implications for attitude change.
This question will be addressed firstly, within the conceptual framework of Fazio (1986) since this has 
provided both a structural definition of attitude strength and a related measurement technique, which 
could be extrapolated to the assessment of value strength. It is assumed that values have the same 
structural characteristics as attitudes i.e. they exist in an associative network consisting of a link 
between an object and an evaluation of that object. This narrow definition of value is chosen for a 
number of reasons; it is compatible with the general conceptualisation of values as evaluative 
tendencies, as suggested by measurement techniques; it bases the concept within a specific theoretical 
tradition and as a result, response latency could be used to index the strength of this association i.e. 
value accessibility.
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Secondly, the external structure of values is considered and its relation to value strength and 
specifically value accessibility. Thirdly the mechanism by which value accessibility influences related 
attitudes is examined. Value accessibility is experimentally manipulated in two experiments designed to 
analyse whether increasing the accessibility of a primed value leads to the increased elaboration of 
persuasive arguments, indexed by the effect of argument quality.
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RATIONALE FOR USING THE SVI
in selecting an appropriate values measure, fifteen value scales reviewed by Braitheaite and Scott 
(1991) were considered, as well as a number of more recent scales, (Triandis, (1972); Hofstede,
(1980), Inglehart (1977) and Schwartz (1996). In addition to acceptable reliability and validity, the 
nature of the research problem generated additional requirements which restricted the range of 
suitable scales. The SVI, (Schwartz, 1996) was selected as the most appropriate scale for use in the 
current research. Reasons for this choice are discussed below.
Firstly, so as to avoid limiting the generalisability of the research findings, a scale based on a broad 
conceptualisation of an individual’s value domain was seen as desirable. Measures of specific values 
were therefore ignored. Examples of such specific measures include materialist-postmaterialist goals 
(Inglehart, 1971,1977); altruism (Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981); the Personal Values Scale 
(Scott 1965), which is restricted in scope to interpersonal values and the Morally Debatable 
Behaviours Scale (Harding & Philips, 1986). Measures that focused on values in specific contexts such 
as work values (Hofstede, 1980) were also considered too restricted and were therefore discarded.
In contrast to these scales, the items of the SVi are based on a broad conceptualisation of the value 
domain. Although it is noted by Schwartz (1996) that it may be useful to add values of special 
relevance when studying a particular topic, the 56 value items contained within the ten value types of 
the SVI are believed to be comprehensive. Indeed, it was found that when researchers from a number 
of countries added what they considered to be missing values, these values were found to be 
’exemplars’ of the existing value types (Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995). An examination of the current 
social science journals, to date, does not reveal any empirical evidence to negate Schwartz’s claims, it 
is assumed therefore that choice of the SVI for the current research would not delimit the range of 
values to which the research findings could be applied.
The Rokeach Value Survey (or RVS) (Rokeach, 1967) was rejected due to a number of criticisms that 
have been raised against it. For example the RVS is among a limited number of scales based on single­
item measurement. Although single-item measures are more efficient in terms of time and convenience, 
it is well established that constructs are best measured using multiple-items in order to calculate 
internal consistency and therefore estimate measurement error (Braithewaite & Scott, 1991)
CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1
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As dicsussed above, in the SVi each value type (e.g. achievement) is measured by several value items 
(ambitious, influential, capable, successful) that converge on theoretical meaning, whilst diverging on 
relevant aspects that are being unavoidably assessed. Five items that tap different aspects of equality, 
for example, provide a clearer basis for interpretation than one item since it provides respondents with 
more than one chance to communicate their views and several sources of data are available on which 
to rely when interpreting the results (Fazio, 1995).
It was also considered desirable to use a values measure which was well grounded in theory. Spates 
(1983) suggests that there has been a ‘dearth’ of theory to guide value research, but since Rokeach, 
many value scales have been guided by psychological theory. For example, inglehart’s materiaiist- 
postmaterialist value dimension (1971,1977) provides a conceptualisation of values based on 
Maslow’s (1962), theory of human needs. However, this scale was not considered amenable to 
response latency measurement.
As discussed in chapter 1, response latency is assessed with a computer, which times the delay 
between presentation of the attitude object, and the moment the subject provides an evaluation of the 
object by pressing a computer key (Fazio, 1986). In order to reduce variability in response-time data, 
research participants are instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Although the 
effect of word length can be partialled out, brief scales can be regarded as preferable since word 
length could produce less of a confounding effect due to individual differences in reading speed.
Inglehart's materialism-postmaterialism dimension measure involves the ranking of twelve national 
policy objectives. The ranking procedure meant that respondents’ latencies to respond to a particular 
item would be unlikely to reflect value strength since ranking is known to be a time-consuming and 
demanding task. The Empirically Derived Value Construction scale (Gorlow & Noll, 1967) was similar to 
the SVI in a number of ways but consisted of 139 values, which needed to be compiled into 13 piles 
and then ranked from the lowest to the highest valued item. The length of both these scales was not 
seen as appropriate for response latency measurement. The SVI was, however, conceptually simple 
and not too demanding. Although the original measure contains 56 items, a brief version of the SVI, 
containing four, three item scales have been developed by Stern, Dietz and Guagnano (1998) and it 
was found to have acceptable reliability and validity.
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Many early measures in the 1960’s were rejected since they were not compatible with the dominant 
conceptualisation of values as "notions of the desirable”. Using a scale dominant with the current 
interpretation of values would increase the applicability of the results to contemporary research. There 
is considerable diversity of criteria incorporated into the instructions given to those responding to value 
scales and the value construct has frequently been operationslised in a way that is not necessarily 
consistent with the conceptions of the desirable. Judgments have been made in terms of preference, 
agreement, importance, goodness, justifiability, importance as guiding principles, and consistent 
admiration (Braithewaite & Scott, 1991). Empirical research is needed in order to determine if these 
dimensions can be regarded as synonymous.
A difficulty of vaiue operationalisation identified by Braithewaite and Scott (1991), concerns the 
appropriate level of abstraction for item sampling. Values are widely accepted as general rather than 
specific. However, as Braithewaite and Scott (1991) point out, it is unclear whether values should be 
inferred from responses to specific attitude statements or more directly from general orienting 
responses i.e. "at what point on the specific-general continuum did attitudes become values?”. Bearing 
this in mind, one of the aims of the present research involved testing the reliability and validity of using 
response latency measures to test value strength. For this reason, it was considered important to use 
scale items, which were clearly identifiable as values.
For the present thesis the vaiue items needed to be presented therefore as abstract concepts. A 
number of scales used value items, which were ambiguous in terms of their distinction from attitudes. 
For example, the Value Profile (Bales & Couch, 1969) consists of a series of general statements 
expressing opinions e.g. “Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they 
ought to get over them and settle down”. Such items appear to be more representative of an attitude 
that implicates a value. The Values Orientations Scale (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961) measures 
orientations of respondents towards four dilemmas. Apart from being lengthy and therefore not ideal 
for use in response latency measurement, again, the values are not measured directly.
An additional advantage of using the SVI is that it requires subjects to make judgments on the basis of 
rating values, rather then ranking them. Ranking measures are not amenable to response latency 
measurement. Also, if values are rated they can be measured at the interval level rather than the 
ordinal level and this, which enables the use of more powerful and advanced techniques of causal 
analyses. In conclusion, the SVI was selected for the present research because it represents a
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parsimonious and well-defined scale with a comprehensive list of value items, which is suitable for use 
in response latency measurement.
STUDY 1 
introduction
A general definition of values provided by Schwartz & Bilsky (1987), outlines their five main features. 
Values are; (a) concepts or beiiefs (b) about desirable end states or behaviours (c) that transcend 
specific situations, (d) guide the selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and (e) are ordered 
by relative importance. This definition includes most of the value features emphasised by different value 
researchers within social psychology.
However, this definition reveals little about the representational structure of individual values. Both 
Schwartz and his co-workers (e.g. Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987,1990) and Rokeach 
(1967,1973) discuss the content of value systems and hierarchical links between values and other 
cognitive structures within such systems. One exception is the work of Feather (1990), who refers 
explicitly to the internal structure of values. As well as proposing that 'important values’ (and by 
implication, ‘strong’ values), are those which occupy a central location in the total cognitive-affective 
belief system with close links to self-conceptions, Feather suggests that strong values also those 
associated with strong affective reactions (either positive or negative) along a dimension of evaluation.
This latter conceptualisation resembles that of Eagly & Chaiken (1993,1998) with regard to attitude 
strength. This suggests that attitudes can be formed experientially, by cognitive, affective or 
behavioural responding to an attitude object. Information produced by these responses is stored as 
mental associations between the attitude object and prior experiences/responses.
Similarly, Fazio (1986,1989) defines an attitude as an association, in memory, between an attitude 
object and an evaluation of that object. Attitudes are said to be stored in an associative memory 
network. Although Fazio does not refer to values explicitly, he does present a broad conceptualisation 
of attitude objects, which could include values as ‘abstract objects’.
Since values are accepted as hypothetical constructs, they are not directly observable (Ajzen, 2000). A 
frequent issue acknowledged by researchers concerns whether they can be verbalised and therefore
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made accessible for measurement. Values have usually been assessed using inventories where 
respondents rank or rate values according to their relative importance. The accuracy of such 
measurement has been the subject of much debate. For example, Bassili (1996) suggests that such 
self-report measures may lack validity since individuals’ assessments of value importance are unlikely 
to be represented along with the vaiue in memory.
In addition, Ostrom (1989) has questioned whether individuals are able to locate their attitudes as a 
point on an evaluative subjective continuum as is required in self-reports - they may be indifferent as to 
which specific point is marked as long as it is the corresponding portion of the scale that coincides with 
their self-assigned category. As a result respondents may base their responses on other information 
such as past behaviour. Furthermore, self-report measures assume that the respondent is motivated to 
disclose their true values; social desirability pressures and falsification may influence ratings. The 
measurement of value accessibility as an indicator of value strength could help overcome such 
measurement problems.
According to Fazio's (1995), conceptuaiisation, an attitude is defined as an association in memory 
between an attitude object and a summary of that evaluation of that object. Feather’s, (1990) 
structural representation of values as associations with strong affective reactions, is compatible with 
this idea of associative strength. In fact, Feather (1990) proposes that, as with other cognitive 
structures, the structural properties of values could be examined in terms of a number of strength 
dimensions. However, the examples he provides, such as degree of differentiation, integration, isolation 
and centrality seem to refer more to the external structure of values i.e. links between values and other 
cognitive structures rather than to features of the value itself. Presumably, however, given his definition 
of values, the dimension of accessibility could aiso be assessed.
Research has shown that attitude accessibility, as measured by response latencies, is positively 
correlated with attitude importance (e.g. Krosnick, 1989) and attitude extremity (e.g. Fazio, 1989). 
There is both theoretical and empirical evidence that value strength could also be measured by 
response latency and that value importance and value accessibility would be positively correlated.
There is considerable research, which has manipulated value accessibility, often as a technique to 
change attitudes in persuasive communication (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). For example, a number of 
manipulations have used the repeated expression of values. Although not discussed in terms of vaiue 
structure, it is conceivable that these manipulations work by activating and thereby strengthening, the 
evaluation-object link.
indeed, unpublished research by Gilchrist (1996), found response latency to be a reliable and valid 
measure of value importance. It is therefore conceivable that values can be equated with attitudes in 
terms of structure and that the principles of Fazio's (1986) accessibility framework could be applied to 
the value domain.
Present Study
The use of response latency aims to bypass some of the problems inherent in self-report value 
measurement by taking a measure of value importance unobtrusively. The individual is assumed to be 
unaware of the relevance of their response times, making responses less vulnerable to falsification. 
Response latency could in this way, represent a more direct indicator of value strength.
Despite being used with increasing frequency within the attitudinal domain, with one exception 
(Gilchrist, 1996), the authors are not aware of any attempt to measure value accessibility using 
response latency. The majority of attitude theorists have proposed a conceptualisation of attitudes, 
which could include values, nevertheless, an examination of studies using response latency reveals that 
evaluations have been measured toward specific attitude objects rather than towards abstract attitudes 
i.e. values.
The present study proposes a structural definition of values as object-evaluation association in 
memory. This definition, in addition to being compatible with value strength as measured by self-report 
on an evaluative continuum, also equates value strength with accessibility. Following Fazio (1989), 
value accessibility can be indexed as the speed with which individuals can indicate the importance of 
values. The more accessible a value is in memory the more quickly respondents should be able to 
indicate its importance.
Although attitude theorists have found a positive linear relationship between attitude extremity and 
attitude importance, it is assumed that since values are, by definition, desirable and are frequently 
accepted unconditionally (see Maio & Olson, 1998), there would be a not positive relationship between 
value importance and value accessibility. Unlike attitudes whose evaluations may be bi-polar, values 
would be rated by the majority of respondents as positive i.e. important. Therefore, in contrast to 
attitudinal findings (e.g. Downing, Judd & Brauer, 1992; Fazio, 1989), a direct correlation between 
value extremity and value importance would not be expected.
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The following study assesses the test-re-test reliability and validity of response latency as a measure of 
value strength. Specifically it is predicted that value accessibility (as operationalised by a measure of 
response latency) will be positively correlated firstly, with value importance as indicated by ratings on 
the SVI (e.g. Schwartz, 1996) and secondly, with the dichotomous response valences reported during 
response latency trials. In order to assess test-retest reliability, response latencies to each vaiue item 
are measured twice by each respondent. There are two experimental conditions. In condition 1, the 
value items presented during the latency trials consist solely of individual value names e.g. Enjoying 
Life), in condition 2, explanatory phrases are added in parenthesis e.g. Enjoying Life (enjoying food, 
leisure, sex, e tc )
o
Method
Participants
Sixty students enrolled at the University of Surrey, UK participated in the experiment. This included 30 
in condition 1(15 male, 15 female) and 30 in condition 2(16 male, 14 female). Students were 
psychology, sociology and economics students. Ages ranges from 19 to 22 years. Ail participants 
spoke English as their first language. Participants were directly recruited by the experimenter and 
asked if they were prepared to take part in a study examining individual values. All participants received 
a course credit in return for their participation.
Materials (see Appendix A )
Response Latency Measure 
The list of fifty-eight targets was derived directly from the Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987,1,990). in condition 1, values are presented without explanatory phrases and in condition 
2; each value in the inventory is followed by an explanatory phrase in parenthesis. Each value was 
presented to participants via an IBM clone PC placed in a quiet room. An additional eight value items, 
derived from The Value Survey (Rokeach, 1967) were used as practice trials. When the participant had 
demonstrated that they were able to respond to the value items in less than 5 seconds the main 
experiment began, in condition one the values iabeis were presented on the monitor without the 
descriptor words, elaborating on the meaning of the item. In condition two, the explanatory phrases 
from the SVI were included in parenthesis underneath each value. Each value appeared in capitals in 
the centre of the screen above the two participant response categories, ‘very important’ and ‘not 
important’. The value remained on the screen until the participant had indicated their response.
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However, after the first 30 subjects had been tested, it was realised that there was ambiguity about the 
meaning of the stimuli. Initially the descriptors were omitted so as to reduce the effect of stimulus 
length on the response latencies. The stimuli in the written form of the SVI were interpreted differently. 
Therefore in order to improve the validity of the data, a second condition included explanatory words in 
parenthesis.
Value Survey
The same value items were also presented in the original survey form of the Schwartz Value Inventory. 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of values “AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE”. 
Participants indicated the importance ratings of their attitudes towards each of the values by circling 
one number on a nine-point scale ranging from 7 (of supreme importance), 6 (very important), 5,4 
(unlabelled), 3 (important), 2,1 (unlabelled), 0 (not important), to -1 (opposed to my values). A 
demographic section at the bottom of the SVI asked for respondents to fill in their age and sex.
Procedure
Participants took part one at a time. The procedure consisted of 5 stages: (1) practice trials, (2) first 
latency assessment, (3) distractor task, (4) second latency assessment and (5) questionnaire 
completion. The presentation order of the values was kept constant across participants. Participants 
sat in front of a computer screen where they were told that the experiment concerned value 
measurement and that there were no right or wrong answers. Both verbally (by the experimenter) and 
visually (via an instruction sheet), participants were instructed to rest their hands comfortably and keep 
one index finger above each of the two response keys. It was explained that a series of words would 
appear sequentially in the middle of the computer screen and that their task was to press a key 
labelled ‘not important’ or a key labelled ‘very important’, as quickly as possible to indicate their 
judgement of the target word.
Each participant was instructed that there were two things they had to keep in mind (cf. Fazio, 1990). 
First and above all they were told to be accurate and not in such a hurry that they might regret a 
decision. Second, they were told that while being accurate, they should try to respond as quickly as 
possible, so they should maximize both the speed and accuracy of their responses and maintain 
concentration until the end of the task.
The first trial was preceded by 8 practice trials taken from The Value Sun/ey (Rokeach, 1967), which 
were not included in the SVI, so as to familiarise participants with the.task. A given value remained in
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the centre of the computer screen until the participant responded. Both the valence of response and 
the latency of response between stimulus onset and depression of the response key were recorded in 
milliseconds. A three second interval separated response and the presentation of the next value. It was 
assumed this would reduce the possibility of any evaluation effects confounding the latency of 
subsequent trials.
At the beginning of each trial, a series of asterisks appeared on the screen to form a visual fixation 
point in the centre of the screen. These were followed by the appearance of a value and its descriptor 
in capital letters where the fixation point had been. Once a response was recorded a fixation point 
appeared and was immediately followed by the next trial item.
In order to minimise problems associated with participants elaborating on the target items in the delay 
between testing sessions, the two sessions were separated only by a short period in which participants 
were required to engage in a demanding and unrelated cognitive task. Participants had no chance to 
reconsider their responses in the knowledge that they would be re-tested shortly. By imposing a delay, 
value activation was assumed to have returned to its baseline level of chronic accessibility before the 
second testing session began. The content was totally unrelated to the experimental materials and was 
included solely for the purpose of distraction, it required considerable concentration.
Participants were given instructions on how to perform the distractor task immediately after performing 
the first trial, which consisted of playing a visuo-spatial computer game (WORMOID). Participants were 
given a demonstration of how to play and the commands required, along with a brief synopsis of the 
basic objectives of the game. After the demonstration, they were told to play for three minutes, When 
their time was up, participants were thanked and told they would be performing the final word 
association task.
Once the second trial was performed, participants completed the SVI. Self-report value importance 
ratings were measured using the same technique employed by Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990. Participants 
rated each one of the fifty-eight values “AS A GUIDING PRINICPLE IN MY LIFE” by circling one number 
on a nine-point scale anchored by “not important" (-1) and “of supreme importance” (+7). 
Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. The complete testing session 
lasted between 15 and 20 minutes.
Results
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Treatment Of Raw Response Latencies
Following Fazio (1990), raw response latencies were transformed in two ways before the data analysis 
was performed.
Outliers
in order to reduce the effect of outliers, a post-hoc editing procedure similar to that used by Fazio et al 
(1986), was carried out which aimed to omit response times generated by processes other than those 
being studied. Extremely slow response times were reset to 5 seconds per participant and extremely 
quick responses, shorter than 0.25 seconds, were treated as missing.
Skewness
A reciprocal transformation of the latency scores was also performed to help eliminate distributional 
problems prior to analysis. This aimed to bring the tail ends involving slower latencies closer to the 
centre of the distribution, making the mean a more accurate reflection of the central tendency of the 
distribution. As participants could take less than 1000ms to respond to some objects, the constant 1 
was added to each latency before reciprocation (Fazio, et ai, 1986). Transformed latencies were used 
in all subsequent analyses.
Descriptive statistics
After the above procedures, the mean response latency for condition 1 was 1.75s (SD = .510) for the 
first testing session and 1.29s (SD = .394) for the second testing session. There was a significant 
difference between latencies in both sessions, with participants responding significantly faster to items 
on the second testing session (t = 5.50; df= 29; p~ 0). For condition 2, the mean response latency 
was 2.44s (SD -  .856) for the first testing session and 1.98s (SD = .698) for the second. Again, 
participants responded significantly faster to values during the second testing session (t = 3.80; df = 
29; p~0). Faster response latencies to items in the second response possibly reflect growing familiarity 
with the task.
It is notable that response times in condition 2 were longer than those in condition 1. Independent t- 
tests revealed that for both the first (t -  3.77; df= 58; p~ 0) and second testing sessions (t = 
4.68.50; df= 58; p~ 0), this difference was significant. This may reflect the addition of value
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descriptors to the response items since this would presumably increase reading times for each item 
before any evaluative response could be made.
Test-Retest Reliability
For each participant, Pearson product moment correlations for response latencies between the first 
and second testing sessions were computed. In each condition, the overall mean of the 30 correlations 
served as the estimated test-retest coefficient. In both condition 1 and condition 2, the mean reliability 
across participants was significant.
In condition 1, the mean reliability across participants was r = .311, n = 30, p < .05 (range = -.07 to 
.66). In condition 2, the mean reliability across participants was r = .381, n = 30, p < .025 (range = 
-.04 to .79). An independent t-test found no significant differences between the reliability coefficients 
for condition 1 and condition 2 (t = -1.33; df = 58; ns suggesting that the addition of explanatory 
phrases in condition 2 has little effect on reliability.
These results suggest that response latency is a reliable measure at the level of individual value items.
It should be noted that although these correlations are modest, in oniy a minority of cases (two in 
condition 1 and one in condition 2) were the correlations negative.
It was predicted that reliability analyses at the scale level would produce more significant correlation 
coefficients. To test this, for each individual, the mean response latencies for items loading on each of 
the ten motivational scales of the SVI were calculated. The test-retest correlations for mean latencies 
across each scale were then computed for each individual. These correlation coefficients were then 
tabulated across all subjects. However, these coefficients were essentially unchanged from those at the 
item level and are therefore not reported. All analyses involving the test-retest estimates were 
calculated using the r to z transformed correlation, though levels of the correlations are reported after 
re-translation into correlation coefficients.
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Correlations Partialling Out The Effect Of Item Length
Since the value items presented on the latency trials varied in length in condition 1 and more extremely 
in condition 2 which included the explanatory phrases in brackets, it was possible that the time 
required to read the items varied between value items and this variation may have confounded the 
reliability of the response latency data. As a result a series of partial correlations were carried out at 
the individual level, which removed the effect of item length.
In condition 1 the mean test-retest reliability after partialling out the effect of word length was r« =
.297 (range = -.09 to .67; SD = .190), compared to r« =.311. For condition 2, the adjusted mean 
test-retest was r« =. 371 (range = -.04 to .78; SD = .199), compared to r« = .381. So in both 
conditions, the reliability decreased when the effect of word length was taken into consideration. This 
suggests that the addition of explanatory phrases did not increase the reliability of response latency as 
predicted.
Convergent Validity Assessment
Convergent validity was measured in three ways. Following Fazio (1990), the correlation between 
individual response latency scores and the raw questionnaire and extremity scores for each item were 
calculated. However, in addition, the correlation between the valences and response latencies on both 
the first and second latency trials were examined.
(i ) Correlations With Paw Questionnaire Scores
The numerical value that participants circled for each value on the SVI was directly recorded. 
Correlations between absolute questionnaire score and response latency were then calculated for each 
participant and tabulated across all subjects. In condition 1 the mean correlation across subjects for 
the first testing session was not significant (r = .215, n = 30, ns). For the second testing session, the 
correlation was also insignificant (r = .133, n = 30, ns). Similarly, in condition 2 the mean correlation 
across subjects for the first testing session was not significant, r -  .240, n = 30, ns. For the second 
testing session, they were not significant, r = .235, n = 30, ns. This may have resulted from individual 
differences in scale usage. For this reason the correlations between response latency and extremity 
was examined.
(ii) Correlations With Extremity Ratings
The extremity of questionnaire response for each item was calculated using the absolute deviation from 
each subjects’ mean scale responses across the items. For each subject, the correlation between 
extremity and transformed response latency was calculated. However, analysis of the results showed
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that there was no significant correlation for either condition as might be expected if both conditions 
tapped ‘value strength’.
in condition 1, the mean correlation for the first testing session was r= - .023, n = 30, ns. For the 
second testing session, the mean correlation was r=. -.028, n = 30, ns. In condition 2 the mean 
correlation for the first testing session was r= -.Of 5, n = 30, ns. For the second testing session, the 
mean was -.020, n = 30, ns. It is noteworthy that for approximately 25% of participants, the 
correlations were negative. Taken across individuals it would be difficult to argue that there was a 
strong correlation between response latency and either raw questionnaire SVI scores or the extremity 
of these responses.
(iii) Relationship between Response Latency and Response Valences 
It could be argued that the valence of responses reported by each participant during the latency task 
itself could act as a validity measure of the response times rather than responses given to the same 
value items at a later stage on the SVI. To test this possibility, the relationship between the valence 
recorded by each subject (important = 1; not important = 0) and the corresponding response latency 
on each value item was recorded for both testing sessions. For each individual, the mean response 
times for those value items recorded as ‘‘important” and those recorded as "not important” were 
calculated for both presentations.
For condition 1, session 1, the mean response latency to those items regarded as "important” was 
1.386s and was significantly lower than that for items recorded as “not important” with a mean of 
1.703s (t = -2.6, df = 29; p <0.025). Fiowever in session 2, the mean response latency to items 
regarded as "important” was 1.257s and for items recorded as "not important” was 1.299s, however 
there was no significant difference between the two mean latencies (t=-126, df=29, ns).
For condition 2, session 1, the mean response latency to those items regarded as “important” was 
1.77 and this was significantly lower than for all items recorded as "unimportant” was 2.38 (t—-7.51; 
df=29, p~0). Likewise, for session 2, the mean response latency to those items regarded as 
“important” was 1.55, significantly lower than those recorded as "unimportant” was 1.97 (t -  -4.57, 
df=29, p—0).
These results suggest that, participants took longer to respond to items that they considered to be 
"not important”. A possible explanation the low correlations between response latencies and 
questionnaire responses is that participants were answering at random during the latency tasks. To
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test this, the valences of responses recorded for each target item were compared to the raw 
questionnaire responses.
Response Inconsistency Across Value Ratings
To test if respondents were answering at random, two analyses were carried out: (a) the valence of 
responses recorded to each value item were compared to the corresponding questionnaire responses 
for each participant and (b) the relationship between valences at different testing sessions were 
compared in order to calculate response inconsistency.
a) Inconsistent Valences Across Testing Sessions
Inconsistent evaluations across latency trials were analysed. An erroneous response is 
defined as one in which the participant indicates a different valence for each 
presentation o f  the same target item i.e. “ important”  to one presentation o f  the value 
item and “ not important”  to another. The aim in response latency measurement is for 
subjects to commit very few  errors while responding as quickly as possible. The 
percentage o f  such “ errors”  was calculated for each individual. For condition 1, the 
mean error rate was 13.77 %  (range =  3% to 45%). Although the error rate was lower 
for condition 2, i.e. 10.26% (range =  0 to 35%), for both conditions the error rate 
exceeds the maximum acceptable rate proposed in Fazio’ s (1995), guidelines, o f  10%.
b ) Correlation Between Questionnaire Scores And Valences
Whereas response valences were dichotomies, the vaiue ratings on the questionnaire were recorded on 
a 9-point scale and so a direct correlation between the two responses was not possible, inconsistency 
was operationalised as a case in which either the respondent indicated “not important” during a 
response latency trial and rated the same value as "important” on the SVI by indicating a rating of 0 or 
above on the 9-point scale, or “Important” during a response latency trial and rated the same value as 
"not important” on the SVI. After removing trials in which different valences were recorded in different 
latency trials of the same target value, the mean questionnaire scores for value items recorded as not 
important and those value items recorded important were tabulated.
in condition one, for values rated as “not important” during the latency trials, the mean questionnaire 
score across all subjects was 2.29 (range = -.5 to 4.98; SD = 1.14). For "important” values, the 
mean questionnaire score was 5.12 (range =2.24 to 6.57; SD = .805). A t-test revealed that the
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mean score for values rated as important was significantly lower than for those rated as unimportant (t 
= -9.30, df = 28, p ~ 0)
In condition two, for values rated as “not important” during the latency trials, the mean questionnaire 
score across all subjects was 2.03 (range = -3.33 to 14.94; SD = 2.29) and for “important” values, 
the mean questionnaire score was 5.20 (range = 1.03 to 6.68; SD = 1.40). A paired samples t-test 
revealed that the difference was significant (t = -5.10, df=27, p<0.025). These figures suggest that 
respondents were making consistent computer recorded responses that corresponded to their 
questionnaire responses.
Correlation Between Response Speed And Percentage Of Errors
An analysis was carried out to examine whether a speed-accuracy trade-off had occurred i.e. whether 
more inconsistent responses had been made by those participants who had responded on average 
more quickly. According to Fazio’s model (Fazio et al, 1986; Fazio, 1990), it would be expected that 
response latencies for inconsistently evaluated target items would be longer since no automatic, easily 
accessible, evaluative response exists in memory. Significantly more time should be required in 
responding to these targets, reflecting more deliberate processing.
To test this, the mean response latency across all value trials and the percentage of responses that 
were inconsistent were correlated for each subject. Across all subjects, in condition 1, the mean 
correlation not was significant, (r= 003, n = 30; ns) and similarly in condition 2, there was no 
significant correlation (r = .261, n = 30, ns). These results suggest that the speed of response had 
no effect on the number of inconsistent responses made.
Discussion
The mean response latency for condition two was longer than that for condition 1. This may reflect 
more ambiguity concerning the meaning of value items before the addition of descriptors in condition 
two. Latencies for both conditions were signifantly shorter in the second latency trial. This may have 
resulted from participants’ growing familiarity with the task.
The results of both conditions provide significant but moderate estimates of the test-retest reliability of 
response latency. After making modifications to the procedure in condition two, the test-retest reliability
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increased from r« = .311. to r« = .381. One explanation is that the presence of explanatory phrases 
in parenthesis in latency trials aided participants’ comprehension of the target values and their 
interpretation remained constant across both trials. In condition 1, descriptors were left out of the 
latency trials as it was predicted that subjects would be likely to read these only on the first trial and 
therefore respond, more quickly during the second trial without reference to descriptors thereby 
increasing their response times. However the two reliabiiity coefficients were not significantly different. 
The addition of explanatory phrases had no significantly effect on reliability of the target values 
interpretation remained constant across testing sessions.
To test the validity of response latency as a measure of value strength, individuals’ response latencies 
were compared to responses in which speed of responding is not an issue. Latency estimates of 
associative strength did not correlate significantly with either raw questionnaire scores or extremity 
estimates. According to Fazio's logic, this finding suggests weak construct validity regarding the 
appropriateness of response latency as a measure of associative strength.
Referring to construct validity in general, these anomalous results suggest either that the rating scales 
of the latency trials may have been an inappropriate measurement of value strength or that the results 
were affected by measurement error. These two possibilities are discussed later.
Analysis of the rate of inconsistent responses found it to be unsatisfactorily high according to Fazio's 
guidelines (1990). The inconsistency rate for condition 1 was 16.6% and although this decreased to 
10.26% for condition 2, these resuits suggest that participants were operating from a point that was 
well below maximum accuracy. One possible explanation is that respondents only had a dichotic 
response choice i.e. "very important” or “not important”. No option was available representing a 
middle ground i.e. slightly important. Individuals with either ambiguous values or values of low 
importance may have fluctuated in the rating they assigned to a particular value between trials, causing 
inconsistent, ‘erroneous* responses.
However, it is not so much the incidence of inconsistent responses as the speed at which participants 
respond to items that is crucial according to Fazio’s theory. It would predict that response latencies for 
inconsistently evaluated value objects would be longer as no automatic easily accessible evaluative 
response exists in memory. Therefore, significantly more time should be required reflecting more 
deliberate processing. However, no significant relationship was found between error rate and mean 
response time.
79
Possible reasons for the relatively low associations in this study merit comment. One possible 
explanation for both the low reliability and construct validity findings may have been the fact that there 
was little dispersion across and between subjects in their ratings of value strength on the SVI. The 
majority of values were rated as being "very important” or of “supreme importance”. Future studies 
could help avoid this affect using the least-most method whereby subjects are firstly asked to read all 
the items in the list and choose the most and the least important in order to generate top and bottom 
anchoring points. This may encourage subjects to differentiate between levels of value importance.
in addition, the sensitivity of the latency trials may have been reduced due to the limited number of 
response options available. As discussed, this may have increased the rate of inconsistent responding 
reducing both reliability and validity estimates if time was spent deliberating on the most preferable, 
response category. Individual response latencies could be measured by recording subjects' positions 
along a Likert-type scale (e.g. very important, important, neutral, slightly important, not important). 
Fazio (1990) found latency data to remain sensitive when a 5-response alternative Likert scale was 
employed.
Participant feedback suggested that a proportion of individuals might have believed that the aim of the 
experiment was a measurement of response consistency. A large proportion of participants remarked 
that they had experienced difficulty remembering which numerical response they had given during the 
response latency task presumably in order to repeat this response in the questionnaire. This may have 
affected the decision criteria used by participants. On encountering a value for the second time, 
participants may have arrived at an initial response relatively quickly but then have undergone a mental 
checking procedure to ensure that both responses to a particular item were consistent. As a result, 
response latencies may have been artificially increased for the second testing session. This biasing 
effect could possibly be reduced by increasing the time intervals between the two latency trials or 
between latency trials and the completion of the SVi. Despite low validity estimates, the finding of 
moderate levels of reliability suggested methodological improvements might result in reliable and valid 
results.
Also revealed at debriefing was a feeling that the period between the two testing sessions may have 
allowed participants to reconsider their responses in the knowledge that they would be re-tested 
shortly. This may have served to change the strength of participants’ attitudes due to repeated 
cognitive elaboration on some of the targets. Clearly if target attitude strengths had changed between
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the two testing sessions then the test-retest correlation would be a biased underestimate of the 
reliability of the response latency measure. To address these issues a second experiment was 
conducted with only one response latency testing session. It was considered unlikely that people would 
remember responses and that each judgement essentially acted as a distractor for the others.
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2
A replication of experiment one was carried out but a number of procedural modifications were carried 
out in an attempt to increase the reliability and validity of response latency measurement. Firstly, the 
explanatory phases were included in parenthesis, following each value item in the latency trials, since 
participant feedback had suggested this was necessary to avoid ambiguous and varying individual 
interpretation of the value items.
Secondly, in order to minimise problems associated with participants elaborating on the target item in 
the delay between testing sessions, in this experiment, only one latency assessment was used, in which 
each value item was included twice, in random order.
In addition, in order to increase the sensitivity of the latency data, experiment 2 included a larger 
number of response options on the latency trials. It was supposed that in order to make the latency 
data most comparable to that of the SVI (e.g. Schwartz, 1996) responses, then both measures should 
contain nine response options on a Likert-type scale ranging from -1 (opposed to) to +7 (of supreme 
importance). However, it was also possible that this number of response options would be 
inappropriate for latency measurement since indecision regarding the exact scale response might 
interfere with latency estimates. Fazio (1990) found latency data to remain sensitive when a five- 
response alternative Likert scale was employed. To account for this possibility, study 2 had 2 
experimental conditions. In condition 1, the latency trial had five response options and in condition 2, it 
had nine response options.
Method
Participants
Sixty students took part in the experiment. All were studying at the University of Surrey, UK. This 
included 30 participants in condition 1 (10 male, 20 female) and 30 participants in condition 2 (8 
male, 22 female). Participants were all psychology, sociology and economics students. Ages ranged 
from 18 to 23 years. All participants spoke English as their first language. Participants were directly 
recruited by the experimenter and asked if they were prepared to take part in a study examining 
individuals’ values. All received a course credit in return for their participation.
Materials (see Appendix B )
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Response Latency Measure 
As in experiment 1, all targets were derived directly from the Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987,1990). Each value in the inventory is followed by an explanatory phrase in parenthesis. 
Each value was presented to participants twice in random order, via an IBM clone PC placed in a quiet 
room. An additional eight value items, derived from The Value Survey (Rokeach, 1967) were used as 
practice trials. Each value appeared in capitals in the centre of the screen above the two participant 
response categories.
In condition 1, there were five response categories, namely: -1 (not at all important); 0 (slightly 
important); 1 (moderately important); 2 (very important) and 3 (supremely important), in condition 2, 
there were nine response categories, which ranged from -1 (opposed to the values); 0 (not at ali 
important); 1 (unlabelied); 2 (unlabelled); 3 (unlabeled); 4 (very important) and 5 (extremely 
important). The value remained on the screen until the participant had indicated their response.
The Value Survey
The same value items were also presented in the original questionnaire form of the Schwartz Value 
Inventory. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of values “AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY 
LIFE”. Participants indicated the extremity of their attitudes towards each of the vaiues by circling one 
number on a nine-point scale ranging from 7 (of supreme importance), 6 (very important), 5,4 
(unlabelled), 3 (important), 2,1 (unlabelied), 0 (not important), to 1 (opposed to my values). A 
demographic section at the bottom of the SVI asked for respondents to fill in their age and sex.
Procedure
Participants took part one at a time. The procedure consisted of 3 stages: (1) practice trials, (2) 
latency assessment and (3) questionnaire completion. The presentation order of the values was kept 
constant across participants. Participants sat in front of a computer screen where they were told that 
the experiment concerned a simple word association task and that there were no right or wrong 
answers. Both verbally (by the experimenter) and visually (via an instruction sheet), participants were 
instructed to rest their hands comfortably and keep one index finger above each of the two response 
keys. It was explained that a series of words would appear sequentially in the middle of the computer 
screen and that their task was to press one of the labelled keys to indicate their response. As before, 
the instructions advised participants that there were two things they had to keep in mind (cf. Fazio,
1990); to be accurate and not in such a hurry that they might regret a decision but while being 
accurate they shouid try to respond as quickly as possible.
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The first trial was preceded by 8 practice trials taken from The Value Survey (Rokeach, 1967), which 
were not included in the SVi, so as to familiarise participants with the task. A given value remained in 
the centre of the computer screen until the participant responded. Both the valence of response and 
the latency of response between stimulus onset and depression of the response key were recorded to 
the nearest millisecond. A three second interval separated a response and the presentation of the next 
value. It was assumed that the interval of 3s would reduce the possibility of any evaluation effects 
confounding the latency of subsequent trials. At the beginning of each trial, a series of asterisks 
appeared on the screen to form a visual fixation point in the centre of the screen. These were followed 
by the appearance of a value and its descriptor in capital letters where the fixation point had been.
Once a response was recorded a fixation point appeared and was immediately followed by the next trial 
item.
Finally, participants completed the SVI. Self-report value extremity ratings were measured using the 
same technique employed by Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990). Participants rated each one of the fifty-six 
values “AS A GUIDING PRINiCPLE IN MY LIFE” by circling one number on a nine-point scale anchored by 
“not important” (-1) and “of supreme importance” (+7). Participants were then debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. The complete testing session lasted between 15 and 20 minutes.
Results
Treatment of raw response latencies
As in experiment 1, the raw response latencies were transformed before data analysis. As before, 
response latencies were treated as missing if shorter than .25 seconds and latencies exceeding 5 
seconds were reset to 5 seconds. As before, latencies were transformed by adding 1 and taking 
reciprocals.
After outliers were excluded, the untransformed mean response latency for condition 1 was 3.29s (SD 
= .877) for the first testing session and 2.75s (SD = .798) for the second testing session. There was 
no significant difference between latencies in both sessions (t=-1.27; df =29; ns). For condition 2, the 
mean response latency was 3.28s (SD = .668) for the first testing session and 3.14s (SD = .781) for 
the second. Again, there was no significant difference in response latencies (t= -.861; df = 29; ns). 
The mean response latencies for studies 1 and 2 were compared and are presented in table 1 below:
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Expt. 1 Expt. 2
Testing Session Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 1 Condition 2
1 1.75 
(sd = .510)
2.44 
(sd = .856)
3.29
(sd=877)
3.28
(sd=.668)
2 1.29 
(sd= 394)
1.98
(sd=698)
2.75
(sd=.793)
3.14
(sd=.783)
Table 1: Mean response latencies for studies 1 and 2.
A mixed factor ANOVA, A x B x (C) experiment was carried out to determine whether there was any 
significant differences between the means of two between subjects factors, namely experiment (1 or 2) 
and condition. The F values confirmed the prediction that there was a significant between subject effect 
for both condition [ F (1,116) = 4.67; p < .05] and for experiment [ F (1,116) = 49.83; p < .05]. 
The interaction between condition and experiment was, however, not significant as would be expected [ 
F (1,116) = .031, ns].
T-tests were carried out to examine these differences more closely. The response latencies for the 5- 
response option (condition 1) in experiment 2 were significantly longer that those for experiment 1 
condition 1 (no explanatory phrases) for both testing session 1 (t= 8.29; df = 58; p~0) and testing 
session 2 (t= 9.0; df = 58; ns). Similarly for study 1, condition 2 for session 1 (t= 3.79; df = 58; 
p~0) and testing session 2 (t= -4.0; df =58; p~0).
Likewise, the response latencies for the 9-response option (condition2) in experiment 2 were 
significantly higher that those for experiment 1 condition 1 (no explanatory phrases) for both testing 
session 1 (t= 9.97; df = 58; p~0) and testing session 2 (t= 11.55; df = 58; p~0). Similarly for study 
1, condition 2 for session 1 (t= 4.25; df = 58; p~0) and testing session 2 (t= 6.07; df = 58; p~0).
As in study 1, all subsequent analyses involving the test-retest estimates were calculated using the r to 
z transformed correlation, though levels of the correlations are reported after re-translation into 
correlation coefficients.
Test-retest reliability
For each participant, Pearson product moment correlations for response latencies between the first 
and second testing sessions were computed. The overall mean of the 30 correlations served as the 
estimated test-retest coefficient. In both conditions the mean reliability across participants was 
significant. In condition 1, the mean reliability across participants was r = .321, n = 30, p < 0.05
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(range = -.06 to .81). In condition 2, the mean reliability across participants was r = .320, n = 30, p 
< 0.05 (range = -.12 to .67). These results suggest that response latency is a reliable measure at the 
level of individual value items.1
The reliability coefficients were compared to those of study 1 to determine whether the changes in 
methodology influenced reliability estimates. The mean reliability coefficients are presented below:
Expt 1 Expt 2
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 1 Condition 2
Test-retest Reliability 
(nt)
.311 .381 .321 .352
Table 2: Mean reliability coefficients for studies 1 and 2,
As can be seen in table 1, the highest correlation coefficient is for condition 2 in study 1 where 
response latency trials involved a dichotomous response format. Independent T-tests revealed that 
there was no significant difference between the reliability coefficients of study 1, condition 1 and either 
study 2 condition 1 (t= -.104; df = 58; ns) or study 2 condition 2 (t= -.1218; df = 58; ns). Likewise, 
there was no significant different between the correlation coefficients of study 1, condition 2 and study 
2 condition 1 (t= 1.234; df = 58; ns) or study 2, condition 2 (t= -1.233; df = 58; ns). This finding 
suggests that the methodological changes introduced in study 2 had no significant effect of the 
reliability of the response latency measure.
Convergent Validity Assessment
(a ) Correlations With Absolute Questionnaire Scores 
The numerical value that participants circled for each value on the SVI was directly recorded. 
Correlations between absolute questionnaire scores and response latency were then calculated for 
each participant and tabulated across all subjects, in condition 1 the mean correlation across subjects 
for the first testing session was not significant (r = .299, n = 30, ns). For the second testing session, 
the correlation was also insignificant, (r = .165, n = 30, ns).
Similarly, in condition 2 the mean correlation across subjects for the first testing session was not 
significant, (r = .264, n = 30, ns). For the second testing session, were not significant, (r = .129, n =
1 Calculations were carried out at the individual-item level only since analyses in study 1 had shown no significant 
differences between correlation coefficients resulting from individual and scale-level analyses.
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30, ns). This may have resulted from individual differences in scale usage. For this reason the 
correlations between response latency and extremity was examined.
(b ) Correlations With Extremity Ratings
The extremity of questionnaire response for each item was calculated using the absolute deviation from 
each subjects’ mean scale responses across the items. For each subject, the correlation between 
extremity and transformed response latency was calculated. However, analysis of the results showed 
that there was no significant correlation for either condition as might be expected if both conditions 
tapped ‘value strength’.
In condition 1, the mean correlation for the first testing session was (r = .118, n = 30, ns). For the 
second testing session, the mean correlation was (r = 150, n = 30, ns). in condition 2, the mean 
correlation for the first testing session was (r = .252, n = 30, ns). For the second testing session, the 
mean was .126, n = 30, ns).
(c ) Correlations With Valences
it could be argued that the valence of responses reported by each participant during the latency task 
itself couid act as a validity measure of the response times rather than responses given to the same 
value items at a later stage on the SVI. To test this possibility, the relationship between the valence 
recorded by each subject and the corresponding response latency on each value item was recorded for 
both testing sessions.
In condition 1, the correlation between valence and the response latency for the first testing session 
was significant (r = -.370; n = 30, p < .025). However, the correlation for the second testing session 
was not significant (r = -.217, n = 30, ns). in condition 2 both correlations were significant in both 
testing session 1 (r = -.317, n=30, p<. 05) and testing session 2 (r = -.356, n = 30; p<. 05). 
These figures suggest that, except for during the second trial in condition 1, the length of time subjects 
took to respond to the value items corresponded to the reported personal importance of that particular 
value as a guiding principle.
Response Inconsistency across value ratings
To test if respondents were answering at random, two analyses were carried out for each participant:
(a) the valence of responses recorded to each value item were compared to the corresponding
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questionnaire responses for each participant and (b) the relationship between valences at different 
testing sessions were compared in order to calculate inconsistent responses.
(a ) Correlation between questionnaire scores and valences
Unlike in study 1, in which participants responded using a dichotomous response format of “not 
important" or “important" in the response latency trials, in study 2, both the response latency valences 
and questionnaire responses were rated on interval scales and averaged across all respondents.
In condition 1, the mean correlation between the response valences of evaluative judgements made 
during the response latency sessions and raw pencil and paper questionnaire scores was significant for 
the first trial: r = .36; n = 30, p<. 05 (range = -.03 to .86; SD = .191) and for the second trial and r 
=. 357; n = 30, p<0.05 (range = -.06 to .83; SD = .211). In condition 2, the mean correlation 
between response latency valences and raw questionnaire scores was significant for the first trial: r = 
.575; no = 30, p ~ 0 (range = .07 to .96; SD = .191) and for the second trial r =. 556, no = 30, 
p~0 (range = -.12 to .94; SD = .275). These correlations are also indicative of the relationship 
between the two types of measure i.e. computer recorded evaluative valences and pencil and paper 
questionnaire ratings.
(b ) inconsistent valences across testing sessions
An analysis of ‘error’ or inconsistent evaluations across trials was carried out. An erroneous response 
was defined as one in which participants indicated both an “important” and “not important” valence to 
the same value object. Unlike in experiment 1, in which participants had a dichotomous choice between 
valence ratings i.e. “not important” or “important”, in the present experiment, participants responded 
on a Likert-type scale; condition one had 5 response options and in condition two had 9 options.
100% accuracy between trials would therefore be more difficult to achieve. To allow for minor 
fluctuations in scale usage across trials, a consistent response was operationalised as one in which the 
second valence of a particular value item was equal to the first valence, plus or minus one scale point.
The error rate across the 56 value items ranged from 0 to 50% and the mean was 15.2% (SD =
13.5) judgements, for condition 1. For condition 2, the mean error rate was 12.9% (range = 0 to 
50%; SD = 12.9). The error rate was therefore greater in condition 1 which had 5 response options. 
However, the difference was not reliable (t=. 680, df = 58, ns). Furthermore, in both conditions, the
88
rate of inconsistent responses was higher than the maximum acceptable level of 10% proposed by 
Fazio (1990).
Correlation between response speed & percentage of errors
According to Fazio’s model (Fazio et al, 1986; Fazio, 1990), it would be expected that response 
latencies for inconsistently evaluated value objects would be longer as no automatic, easily accessible 
evaluative response exists in memory. Significantly more time should be required, reflecting more 
deliberate processing. An analysis was carried out to investigate whether those participants who had 
responded on average more quickly had made more inconsistent responses. The mean response 
latency across all value trials and the percentage of inconsistent responses were correlated for each 
subject.
in condition 1, the correlation was significant (r = .31, n=30, p = .05), suggesting that the longer 
participants took in general to respond to value items, the fewer inconsistent responses they made. 
Participants may have believed that the experiment was testing the consistency of their response and 
as a result their decision criteria may have become stricter as they spent time checking that their 
reported valences were consistent across trials of a particular value item. However, in condition 2, 
there was no significant correlation (r= .219, n=30, ns.).
Discussion
Although no significant difference between response latencies was found between testing sessions, the 
mean response latencies were higher for condition 2, which involved 9 as opposed to 5 response 
options, suggesting that the increased number of response options increased the time it took 
respondents to select a specific rating.
As in study 1, correlations between response latency and absolute questionnaire scores and extremity 
scores were insignificant, suggesting that the addition of more response options during the latency 
trials had little effect on this measure of construct validity. In addition, latency estimates of associative 
strength did not correlate significantly with extremity estimates.
There was no significant correlation between speed and percentage of inconsistent responses except in 
condition one. It is unclear why such strategic processes would have affected only this condition. The 
greater number of response options available in condition two may have lead to an increased likelihood
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that a given latency score reflected indecision concerning the specific numerical response that was 
most representative of value strength. Fazio (1995) suggests that 5 options is the optimum number of 
response options, with more options producing unreliable latency data.
Studies 1 & 2: General Discussion
In study 2, the mean response latencies were significantly higher than in study 1, as would be expected 
given the more demanding nature of the task. Given the increased number of response options, it is 
not surprising that subjects took longer to identify the appropriate option to reflect the importance of 
their particular values. However, only in study 1 were response latencies significantly shorter in the 
second latency trial, which possibly reflected subjects’, growing familiarity with the task. Response 
latencies were not significantly different in the two latency trials in study two for either condition 1 or 
condition 2. This finding may have resulted from the fact that response latencies not only reflected 
value strength, but also subjects’ decisions about the exact level of importance they should assign to 
each. Due to the greater number of choices, there is less chance that responses to the a particular 
vaiue on the first latency trial would be easily recalled in order to be repeated later.
The results of studies 1 and 2 provide significant but moderate levels of reliability, It is inherently 
difficult to assess the reliability of accessibility measures since measuring a value would increase its 
accessibility and therefore alter latencies of response during iater phases. The results of both 
experiments provide significant estimates of the test-retest reliability of response latency. Making 
modifications to the procedure in experiment two did not have a significant impact on reliability 
estimates. The largest test-retest reliability was for study 1 condition 2, which involved a dichotic 
response task with value descriptors.
In both studies, the response latencies did not significantly correlate with either the raw questionnaire 
scores of the SVI or the corresponding extremity scores. This brings into question the appropriateness 
of response latency as a measure of associative strength. Practically, it means that without an 
alternative measure to verify responses, one cannot be certain that a person who holds a weak 
evaluation of a given value will not respond erroneously quickly, and positively. But the valences 
recorded at the latency trials could function as a validity check.
However, whilst the reported correlations are modest, they are consistent with and even better than 
some previous findings examining the relationship. For example, Powell & Fazio (1984) reported a
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correlation of .20, whilst Houston & Fazio (1989) reported a correlation of .21. In the light of these 
findings, the results are not out of the ordinary. Similarly, Krosnick (1989) demonstrates that response 
latency measures for target attitude objects correlate positively and significantly with 12 other indices 
of attitude strength although correlations do not exceed +. 5.
The lack of correlation between response latency and SVI extremity scores may also indicate that the 
two measures are not tapping the same underlying construct. Attitude accessibility is not assumed to 
be a simple reflection of attitude extremity. Fazio (1995), with reference to attitudes states that the 
concept of accessibility suggests the quality of an attitude and refers to those variables concerned with 
the representation of the attitude in memory. In contrast, extremity is more appropriately considered 
an antecedent of attitude strength rather than an indicator of the same. Hence the findings may reflect 
exactly the same problem that prompted research into an additional measure of value strength.
Extrapolating to values, a more comprehensive evaluation of convergent validity might be to introduce 
a measure that also refers to the qualities of the value per se. Future studies could include a 
measurement of associated affect, cognition and degree of ambivalence. Alternatively, indirect 
measures of accessibility such as self-reports asking participants how often they think/talk about 
particular values could be used. The varying degrees to which response latency has been correlated 
with questionnaire measures can be re-interpreted in terms of the instability of the latter as a measure 
of attitude strength.
In addition, it could be argued that correlations between latency scores and valences on the 
corresponding latency tasks provide a more accurate representation of construct validity since both 
measures are taken at the same time. In study 1 this relationship was significant for both conditions 
whilst in study 2, only the results of condition 1 provided significant correlations. The lack of significant 
correlations with the 9-valence condition may reflect the inappropriateness of using 9 response options 
in latency measurement (cf. Fazio, 1995).
Fazio et al (1990) compared the valence of latency responses, to a self-report measure and found an 
inconsistency rate of 7.3% over 100 objects. Fazio reported that an error rate that does not exceed 
10% is adequate (cf Fazio, 1990). The levels reported in the present research suggest that 
participants were operating from a level well below maximum accuracy.
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The overall lack of a relationship between speed of response and rate of inconsistent responding was 
unexpected, it is often the case with reaction time measures that the faster participants respond on 
average, the more inconsistent evaluations they make. However, an examination of the response 
characteristics of participants revealed that this pattern was only evident for study 2, condition 1, which 
involved five response options and did not occur in condition 2 or in study 1 involving a dichotomous 
choice.
This brings into question the prediction that individuals will take more time to evaluate weak or 
ambivalent values, as Fazio (1986) has found is the case with attitudes. Response latencies for 
inconsistently evaluated value objects would be longer, as no automatic, easily accessible, evaluative 
response exists in memory. Significantly more time should be required reflecting more deliberative 
processing. The implication is that these responses may reflect genuine error or inaccuracy, as 
exemplified in fast-guess responding. Although the relation between speed and accuracy is not linear, 
the faster individuals respond, the more likeiy it is that they will make an error. The decision criterion 
adopted may have been relatively lenient. Rather than reflecting and deliberating about their 
responses, participants may have been less cautious, responding without adequate thought leading 
them to be inconsistent in their responses. The ideal situation during response latency tasks is for 
subjects to commit very few errors while responding as quickly as possible. The instructions given did 
aim to encourage both accuracy and speed, but especially accuracy.
The results appear to indicate that weak values will not always be reflected in slow response times. 
Quick responses may indicate weak attitudes and / or carelessness in people. This causes difficulties in 
interpretation. Slow responses may reflect (a) a judgment that the value is not important 
(inconsequential), (b) an attitude that is ambivalent, or (c) a carefully considered, middie-of-the road 
position.
Analysis of individual’s value ratings revealed very few negative ratings, suggesting that few people 
considered the values to be unimportant. This may reflect the belief that values are inherently positive 
entities. Respondents tended to end-pile their ratings, assigning very high ratings to all of the values. 
The lack of differentiation between value importance may have obscured the relationships between 
values and response latency,, which depend, in part, on the variability of the values measurement. 
Consequently, low correlations may not reflect weak relationships but instead result simply because the 
value measurements did not vary to a sufficient extent to detect their influence.
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To avoid this problem, study 2 employed the least-most procedure in which respondents were asked to 
scan the list of values and pick both the most and least important value before rating the values on an 
interval scale. The assumption was that this would result in respondents making a comparison whilst 
overcoming the problem of time and difficulty associated with ranking. Given that this problem persisted 
in study 2, the rank-then-rate procedure might be an alternative method of alleviating this problem in 
future studies. Respondents are asked to rank the set of values in order of importance. Following the 
ranking task, respondents are asked to go back and rate their values on some sort of interval scale. 
The goal is to have respondents compare and contrast the values in the ranking task and with this 
information fresh in memory, provide interval level data in the rating procedure. This procedure would 
ideally result in more differentiated reported value rating than a standard rating procedure.
Of course, it could not be ruled out that sub-optimal testing procedures couid offer an alternative 
explanation for the weak test-retest correlations. While, to the best of our knowledge every precaution 
was taken to adhere to the prescribed procedural conditions and instructions, it is possible that poor 
reliability is not inherent to response latency measures in general but is a reflection of the procedures 
employed here.
The purpose of these studies was to investigate the nature of the value importance-accessibility 
relationship assuming that response latency data would provide an index of value accessibility.
However, reliability estimates were found to be low but acceptable and future research is needed to 
verify results regarding construct validity. These results hint at the possible usefulness of response 
latency in investigation of the information processing associated with values and attitudes. One way of 
assessing whether value accessibility is a measure of value strength is to assess the documented 
impact of increased accessibility on the consequences of value strength i.e. increased correlations 
between values and attitudes and effects on information processing. As stated in chapter 1, research 
has demonstrated that increased attitude accessibility is associated, for example, with judgements 
concerning related attitudes (e.g. Fazio & Williams, 1986) and resistance to counter persuasion (e.g. 
Houston & Fazio, 1989). If values are conceptualised as structurally comparable to more general 
attitudes, then it is likely that these consequences apply equally to both values and attitudes. These 
ideas are examined in the following studies
CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3
Introduction
Whilst studies 1 and 2 investigated the internal structure of values i.e. the strength of the associative 
link between a ‘value object’ and its evaluation in memory, study 3 examines the external structure of 
values specifically their hierarchical links to attitudes. As discussed in chapter 1, section 3, both value 
and attitude theorists have discussed the linkages between values and other cognitive structures (i.e. 
other values, beliefs and attitudes) within an individual's memory e.g. Rokeach (1973); Pratkanis 
(1989); Feather (1990), Rajecki (1990). Eagly & Chaiken (1993) suggest that attitudes become linked 
to one another when one attitude implies another psychologically as a result of logical analyses; by 
observing a conjunction between two attitude objects and through observations of covariation between 
attitudinal positions. This link is frequently considered hierarchical, although Katz & Hass (1988) 
provide evidence of a bi-directional value-attitude relationship.
The accessibility of related cognitive constructs is said to increase as a result of the activation of 
related structures (Sherman, 1987). This can occur through priming which makes a specific construct 
more accessible in memory (Sherman, 1987). Once a construct is activated, a process of automatic 
spreading activation takes place that activates targets and associated stimuli and facilitates the 
retrieval of related concepts (Katz & Hass, 1988). This process is comparable to the process proposed 
by Fazio (1995) for the elicitation of evaluative responses from the presentation of a value object. This 
is the principle on which the “domino theory" is based (see Rajecki, 1990; Eagly & Kulsea, 1997; Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1998).
There are a number of empirical studies demonstrating that construct activation leads to increases in 
the accessibility of related structures. For example, Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1976) demonstrated that 
response time to a test word is faster when the word is immediately preceded in the test list by a 
closely related word then when the test word is preceded by an unrelated word. Dovidio, Evans and 
Tyler (1986) found that priming subjects with racial categories (Black or White) shortened response 
times to identify traits that are stereotypically attributed to these groups. They concluded that the 
primed concept became more accessible and then acted as a mental filter through which the later 
events were processed or recalled. Similarly, Tourangeau, Rasinski & D’Andrade (1991) provided an 
empirical demonstration of the effect of belief primes on attitude accessibility using response latency
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measurement. Respondents were timed as they answered attitude questions about abortion and 
welfare. Responses to agree/disagree items were faster when an item followed another item from the 
same ‘topical cluster’. They concluded that retrieving beliefs relevant to one question could activate 
linked beliefs and thereby facilitate answers to related questions.
Overview Of Present Study
The present study examines the idea that the induced cognitive availability of a particular value would 
produce a corresponding increase in the accessibility of a semantically related attitude as proposed by 
Katz & Hass (1988). However, in the Katz & Hass study, no measure was taken of attitude accessibility. 
In the present experiment, respondents are timed as they respond to a ‘good’/’bad’ enquiry about the 
connotation of an attitude. The aim is to provide evidence that activating a target value could increase 
the accessibility of a related attitude. Such changes in accessibility would be manifesed in reduced 
response times to attitude items which follow a related value prime.
There was a three-second interval between subjects’ responses to the attitudinal statement and the 
presentation of the next value prime. Both the presence of the unrelated filler items and the three- 
second delay was assumed to prevent carry-over priming effects from earlier values. Priming effects 
are thought to decrease with wider gaps between a prime and a stimulus since the gap interferes with 
encoding of the stimulus in terms of the prime (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). As a resuit, attitude items were 
presented immediately after the value primes.
Hypotheses
The central prediction concerned the effect of the primed value on response times to related attitudes.
It was hypothesised that reaction time would vary according to whether a value prime was related or 
unrelated to a subsequent attitude object. The fastest responses were predicted to occur when the 
attitude followed a value related to the attitude object and the slowest when the target followed 
semantically unrelated prime. This would lead to the further retrieval of evaluations related to the prime 
i.e. the prime and the attitude evaluation sharing the same valence.
in addition, the personal importance ascribed to a particular value is predicted to influence the extent 
to which it could serve as an effective prime. The degree, to which a specific value is considered to hold 
personal significance, rather than its mere endorsement, has been shown to influence its hierarchical 
relationship to attitudes (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Katz & Hass, 1988; Homer & Kahle, 1988; Seiigman &
95
Katz, 1996). For this reason, it is predicted that for those attitudes preceded by a related value prime, 
an individual’s response time will be quickest when vaiue primes are rated by participants as 
‘important’ as opposed to ‘not important’. It is predicted that the extent of value importance will have 
no effect on the response latencies to attitude items preceded by an unrelated value prime.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 60 Rotarians, from Redcar Rotary Club, UK. Ages ranged from 35 to 65 years of age. 
This included 35 males and 25 females. Subjects took part in the experiment on a voluntary basis.
Stimuli (see APPENDIX C)
Stimuli consisted of eight attitude items. In addition each attitude was paired with one semantically 
related value item and one semantically unrelated value item. All value items were taken from the SVI 
(Schwartz, 1996).
Procedure
Pre-test
In order to seiect the related and unrelated vaiue items to be paired with each attitude item, a pre-test 
was carried out using a group of 20 Rotarians who did not take part in the main experiment. Firstly, a 
pool of attitude items was developed covering a range of topics. The number of attitude items was 
restricted to eight in order to avoid participant fatigue. An effort was made to select attitudes which 
were unambiguous, and about which individuals would react spontaneously. To reduce possible 
variation in response times caused by different item lengths, all the attitude items were similar in length 
(within three letters).
Next, for each attitude item, three value items whose endorsement was considered to be consistent 
with that of the attitude and would suggest positive evaluation of the attitude i.e. a ‘good’ connotation * 
were chosen. These were the ‘related’ values. A further three value items were selected whose 
endorsement was seen to be unrelated to that of the attitude.
Each attitude item was then presented in turn to each subject in the pre-test, along with the three 
semantically ‘related’ value items and three semantically 'unrelated’ value items. For each attitude item, 
subjects were asked to choose from the three ‘related’ values, that which they considered to be most
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‘related’ to the attitude item. Next, from the selection of 3 value items, they were asked to choose that 
which they considered to be.the most ‘unrelated’.
Taken across all subjects for each attitude item, the value most frequently regarded as related and that 
value item most frequently judged to be ‘unrelated’ were retained. The other items were disregarded. 
This resulted in two attitude-value pairings for each attitude item i.e. one in which the value was 
semantically related to the attitude and one in which the value was semantically unrelated.
Conceptually, these value items then functioned as the ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ value primes in the 
main experiment.
M a in  e x p e rim e n t
items were presented one at a time on an IBM compatible computer. The value prime was presented 
first for one second and was immediately followed by its corresponding attitude item. The computer 
timed the delay between presentation of the attitude item and the point at which the subject indicated 
their response. The response valence was also recorded. Subjects were instructed to respond as 
accurately and as quickly as possible to each stimulus (see Appendix C).
Respondents were lead to believe that the experiment involved word recognition. They were told they 
should try to remember the phrase that flashed on the screen in lower-case script since they would be 
required to identify it later. Respondents were then told that a statement would appear in the centre of 
the screen in capitals. They were told to press one of two marked keys, one key to indicate that the 
connotation of the phrase was ‘good’ (positive / favourable) and another to indicate that the phrase 
was ‘bad’ (negative/unfavourable). After receiving the instructions both verbally and via an instruction 
sheet, subjects completed four practice trials in order to become familiar with the nature of the task 
and the response keys. When subjects had demonstrated that they could respond to the evaluative 
enquiry in less than 5 seconds, the experiment began.
For each condition, the eight attitude items were split into two groups. In condition 1, each of the four 
attitude items in the first group was preceded by its corresponding related value (as identified in the 
pre-test). By contrast, each of the attitude items in the second group was preceded by its 
corresponding unrelated value item. This pattern was reversed for subjects in condition 2  so that those 
attitude items, which were preceded by a related value in condition 1 , were preceded by an unrelated 
value in condition 2  and vice versa. The order of these attitude items was then mixed so that each 
subject was presented with a related value-attitude pairing followed an unrelated value-attitude pairing.
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The aim of this design was to help control for effects of differences inherent in the attitude items 
themselves, which might confound response latencies.
A three second interval was left between the subject’s response to each attitude item and the 
presentation of the next value prime. After completing the latency task, subjects completed a word 
recognition task in which they were asked to identify the value items presented by the computer out of 
a list of eight values. In each case, there were four items present, namely those which formed the 
related value-attitude pairings. These results are irrelevant to the present investigation and were not 
analysed.
Finally, subjects were asked to categorise the eight values that had appeared during the response 
latency task into two groups in terms of their importance to them as ‘guiding principles in your life'. 
Specifically, out of the list of eight values, subjects were asked to choose four values, which they 
regarded as the “least important values" and four, which they regarded as the “most important 
values”. This method was chosen to avoid respondents end-piling the values and not differentiating 
between their relative importance. Finally, subjects were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
Raw response latencies were transformed in two ways before the data analysis was performed.
O u tlie rs
Before carrying out the main analysis, outliers were removed from the response latency data.
Extremely slow response times were reset to 5 seconds per participant and extremely quick responses, 
shorter than 0.25 seconds, were treated as missing.
S kew ness
A reciprocal transformation of the latency scores was also performed to help eliminate distributional 
problems prior to analysis. As participants could take less than 10 0 0 ms to respond to some objects, 
the constant 1 was added to each latency before reciprocation (cf. Fazio, et al, 1986). Transformed 
latencies were used in all subsequent analyses.
The main analysis examined reaction times to target items, specifically it was predicted that response 
latencies would be smallest for:
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1 . Those attitude items preceded by a related value prime, compared to those preceded by an 
unrelated value prime.
2. Those attitude items preceded by a related vaiue prime rated as important, as opposed to 
unimportant by the respondent. (The importance of unrelated value primes was not expected 
to influence response latencies to their corresponding attitude items.)
T h re e - fa c to r m ix e d  ANO VA
In order to rule out the possibility that a 2 -way interaction between prime type and response latencies 
was due to the specific values used in each condition (rather than, as predicted, their ‘reiatedness’ to 
the attitude items which they preceded), a 3-factor mixed ANOVA was carried out which took this 
between subjects factor into account.
It was an A x (B x C) design with three treatment factors. The between subjects factor was the subject 
condition (1or 2 ). There were two within subjects factors, each with two levels, namely, subjects' 
perceptions of value importance (important/ not important) and type of prime (related/unrelated). This 
resulted in four within subject variables, each variable containing the data for a combination of value 
importance and type of prime. These variables were: related/ important; related/ not important; 
unrelated/ important and unrelated/ not important.
Tests of within subject effects revealed a significant main effect of type of value prime, F (3 ,1 7 4 ) =  
27.44, p ~ 0 , suggesting that the extent to which a value prime was semantically related to an attitude 
item influences response latencies to that item. There was no significant effect for the prime vs. 
experimental condition interaction, F (3 ,1 7 4 ) =  .205, ns., which suggests that the main effect of vaiue 
prime was independent of the experimental condition. This was confirmed in a tests of between 
subjects effects which revealed no significant effect of experimental condition, F (1, 58) =  .0, ns.
Since the 3-factor mixed ANOVA revealed an effect of type of prime but no effect of the experimental 
group, this between subjects factor was ignored and the data were collapsed over both experimental 
groups. A 2 -factor within subjects ANOVA was carried out in order to examine the effects of prime type 
at its specific levels.
The factor ‘reiatedness’ was found to be significant, F =  (1,59) =  42.02, p ~  0 . Likewise, the factor of 
‘importance’ was found to be significant, F =  ( 1 ,59) =  8 .6 6 , p =  .005. Furthermore, there was found
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to be a significant interaction between these two factors, F (1,59) =  14.66, p ~  0 . This interaction is 
illustrated in the graph overleaf (Figure 1 ).
As can be seen in Figure 1 , the mean response latency for attitude items preceded by a related value 
prime is smaller (M =2.43s, SD =  1.6 8 ) than that for those proceeded by an unrelated value prime 
(M =3 ,47s, SD—1.34). A t-test revealed that this difference was highly significant, t=7 .30, n=60, p~0. 
This suggests that the related value primes increased the response latencies of related attitudinal 
judgments.
Figure 1
Mean response latency as a function of relatedness of prime and value importance2
type of prime
In addition, in the related value prime conditions, those values judged to be personally important by 
participants are associated with quicker response times (M =2.22s, SD=2.07) than those judged to be 
not important (M =2.63s, S D =1 .15). This difference was found to be highly significant, t=4 .27, n=60, 
p~0. In the unrelated value prime conditions, this pattern is not visible and there is only a very 
marginal difference in response latencies with the mean for important value primes being 3.48s
2 Results collapsed across both experiments
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(S D =1 .38) and that for unimportant primes, being slightly slower, M =3.48s (S D = 1 .32). As predicted 
this difference was not found to be statistically significant, t= . 917, n=60, ns.
Discussion
In line with predictions, mean reaction times to attitude items were significantly influenced by the 
‘relatedness’ of preceding value primes. Participants were significantly faster in making attitudinal 
judgments to those items preceded by a related value prime. This finding was interpreted as evidence 
that the activation of values through priming techniques, increased the accessibility of semantically 
related attitudes.
These results also confirm that attitudes and values might, be stored in a related network in memory. 
This finding is consistent with the empirical research of other theorists, such as Sherman (1987) with 
regard to general memorial constructs and those of Katz & Hass (1988) with regard to links between 
values and attitudes. Unlike the research of Katz & Hass (1988), however, this study measures attitude 
accessibility directly through response latency techniques. Furthermore, it presents evidence that the 
importance assigned to a particular value can influence its ability to activate a related attitude. The 
effect of the related value primes was found to be strongest for those value primes judged to be “most 
important” to the respondent. This finding is consistent with the work of previous research, which 
suggests that hierarchical links between values and attitudes exist for those values seen as personally 
important (e.g. Rokeach, 1967).
In order to avoid the problem of all value primes being rated as highly important by respondents, the 
present study asked participants to categorise half the value primes as being the ‘most important’ and 
half as ‘least important’. This allocation did not allow the possibility that the respondent’s subjective 
evaluations of these values might not be amenable to such a division. For example, a respondent might 
wish to place either more or less than four items in each category. However, debriefing did not reveal 
this issue to be considered problematic to respondents. Feedback during the task suggested that it is 
likely that the majority of subjects mentally ranked the values in order of importance and then used 
these ranking in order to divide the list of values into ‘most important’ and ‘least important’ groupings.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 4 
PERSUASION: THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Over the past 30 years, persuasion and attitude change have been among the most thoroughly 
investigated topics in social psychology (Thompson, Kruglanski, & Spiegal, 2 0 0 0 ). Recent research has 
developed from two major theoretical frameworks: the elaboration likelihood model (or ELM, e.g. Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model (or HSM, Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989). Whereas previous research had shown little conceptual coherence, these dual-process 
models have provided a comprehensive theory to explain earlier ambiguous findings. They emphasise 
the processes that mediate attitude change and explain how the effects of the same variable couid vary 
according to the situation and produce the same persuasion outcome by different processes in 
different circumstances.
Despite differing in some respects, the ELM and HSM both share the fundamental assumption that 
persuasion occurs via two qualitatively different "routes” or “modes". In the ELM these are the 'central' 
and ‘peripheral’ routes and in the HSM, the ‘systematic’ and ‘heuristic’ modes. Referring to the ELM 
specifically, attitude changes that result mostly from the processing of issue-relevant arguments 
(central route) are thought to show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of behaviour, and 
greater resistance to counter-persuasion than attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral cues 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
The probability that a recipient will critically evaluate the arguments (i.e. the elaboration likelihood) is 
determined by both motivation and ability. When motivation and/or ability to process the message are 
relatively low, persuasion is more likely to occur as a result of simple inferences or associations based 
on peripheral cues in the persuasion context (e.g. credibility of source) to assess the validity of an 
argumentation rather than careful scrutiny of issue-relevant information (the central route to 
persuasion).
Variables can affect argument processing in a relatively objective or in a relatively biased manner. 
Relatively objective processing occurs when the variable either motivates or enables subjects to see the 
strengths of cogent arguments and the flaws in specious ones, or inhibits them from doing so. 
Relatively biased processing is thought to occur when the variable either motivates or enables subjects
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to generate a particular kind of thought in response to a message, or inhibits a particular kind of 
thought
The ELM suggests that if a manipulation enhances argument processing in a relatively objective ■ 
manner, then subjects should show greater differentiation of strong from weak arguments. A message 
with strong arguments^hould tend to produce more agreement when it is scrutinised carefully than 
when scrutiny is low. The joint operation of these processes would resuit in people showing greater 
attitudinal differentiation of strong from weak arguments when processing is high rather than low. If 
argument processing is disrupted, due to reduced motivation or ability, argument quality should be a 
less important determinant of persuasion, in addition to subjects’ attitudes being more differentiated 
when argument processing is high rather then low, subjects’ thoughts should also show greater 
differentiation of arguments when processing is high rather than low. As processing increases, attitudes 
are more responsive to manipulations of argument quality and as processing decreases are less 
responsive.
The ELM suggests that although people aim to hold ‘correct’ attitudes, the amount and nature of 
elaboration in which they are motivated or able to engage to evaluate a message varies according to 
individual and situational factors (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Variables can affect the amount and 
direction of attitude change by (a ) serving as persuasive arguments, (b ) serving as peripherai cues, 
and/or (c) affecting the extent or direction of issue and argument elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). Using cognitive response analysis and manipulations of argument strength, the ELM provides a 
broad framework for understanding the processes of persuasive communication (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986) and the effects of communicator, message and audience can all be analysed from this 
perspective.
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The literature regarding a causal link between values and attitudes is extensive. Both the importance of 
values and their relevance to attitudes have been shown to be important factors in predicting attitude 
valence (e.g. Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988) and their resistance to persuasion (e.g. Ostrom & Brock,
1968). Attitude theorists have exploited this hierarchical relationship in order to induce attitude change 
through persuasive communications.
Effective persuasive appeals often contain arguments that address or invoke the values to which the 
issue is commonly linked. For example, Eagly & Kulsea (1997) discuss a study on abortion in which the 
content of persuasive appeals was derived from the arguments most commonly associated with pro-life 
and pro-choice groups, namely in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  and s e /f-d e te rm in is m , as opposed to s a n c tity  o f life  
and tra d itio n a l fa m ily  va lu e s. In addition to presenting value-based arguments, some persuasive 
techniques have involved simply activating the values associated with the desired attitude by increasing 
their accessibility. For example, research by Katz & Hass (1988) demonstrated that priming one of the 
values relevant to attitudes towards blacks, by asking them to respond to a set of items assessing 
these values, caused attitude changes consistent with these values.
The effect of alerting subjects to the value basis of particular attitudes has been shown to be most 
effective to the extent that values are judged to be personally important to the individual. In a study by 
Ostrom & Brock (1968), subjects rated the extent to which various values were reflected in aspects of 
a topic. Subjects were then presented with a counter-attitudinal message. Subjects who had previously 
judged the values as being personally important were significantly more influenced by this message 
than those who had rated the values as unimportant. This finding suggests that it is the association of 
a persuasive message with important values, which can influence the extent of attitude change, rather 
than the mere endorsement of a value, which may be relatively unimportant to the individual.
Successful persuasion has been shown to occur by increasing the accessibility of values related to the 
persuasive topic, whether this is through their implication within the persuasive message itself and/or 
through the manipulation of value accessibility. There has been little empirical investigation, however, 
into the mechanisms whereby this persuasion occurs. What is uncertain is the process underlying 
attitude change. Does a peripheral process induce change or does the accessibility precipitate central
Study 4
Introduction
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route processing whereby the change is dependent on the cognitive elaboration of the persuasive 
message?
Drawing on the theoretical assumptions of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
Fabrigar et al (1998) suggest that, like other variables, attitude accessibility could function to 
determine the extent of message elaboration in three ways depending on motivation and ability to 
elaborate. When motivation and/or ability to process a persuasive message are low, accessibility couid 
determine the likelihood that an attitude would come spontaneously to mind. The attitude would then 
act as a peripheral cue for accepting the advocacy, if it is consistent with the value, or rejecting it, if it is 
inconsistent. Alternatively, when motivation and ability to elaborate are high, accessibility could control 
the likelihood that the attitude would come to mind and consequently Was elaboration in an attitude­
relevant direction. However, in many cases motivation and ability are moderate and accessibility could 
determine the extent to which a person elaborates the appeal. If accessibility were high, any attitude 
change would therefore result from the careful elaboration of the arguments’ merits. In contrast, 
change for attitudes low in accessibility may result from reliance on simple peripheral cues.
Fabrigar et al (1998) have provided empirical support for the hypothesis that the extent to which 
particular attitudes are accessible in memory influences persuasion by determining the extent to which 
people elaborate on persuasive messages, in one experiment, the accessibility of attitudes towards 
nuclear power was measured using response latencies. Participants were then presented with a 
persuasive message containing either strong or weak arguments in favour of nuclear power. In a 
second experiment, attitudes towards vegetarianism were experimentally manipulated by varying the 
number of times participants expressed their attitudes towards vegetarianism. Participants then read a 
pro-vegetarian persuasive message that contained either strong or weak arguments. In both 
experiments, argument quality was found to have a greater impact on persuasion when attitudes were 
high in accessibility than when their accessibility was low suggesting that heightened attitude 
accessibility leads to the enhanced elaboration of persuasive messages on such topics.
It is plausible that, as with attitudinal priming, one effect of value priming is to determine the extent of 
elaboration of persuasive appeals. Due to hierarchical links between values and attitudes, increasing 
value accessibility couid lead to an increase in the accessibility of related attitudes. This is the process 
examined in study 3. Following Fabrigar et ai (1998), this in turn, could lead to the increased 
elaboration of persuasive appeals when vaiue accessibility is high compared to when it is low.
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There have been a number of studies which suggest that a value prime could act as a ‘peripheral cue’ 
to precipitate attitude change. The study described earlier by Katz & Hass (1989) suggests that the 
activation of a value may strengthen those aspects of an attitude that are associated with the value 
without the presentation of a persuasive message. However, it is probable that although a value prime 
may draw attention to value-relevant information, some elaboration would be necessary in order for 
subjects to draw correct conclusions during a persuasion attempt (Eagly & Kulsea, 1997). Similarly, in 
his discussion of construct accessibility, Sherman (1987) suggests that although attention to a 
stimulus can be drawn automatically by a value prime, the processing of the message can be highly 
effortful and controlled. Increased value accessibility may therefore, motivate individuals to focus 
attention on relevant information in the persuasive message and critically elaborate on it.
The study outlined above, by Fabrigar et al (1998) suggests that increasing the accessibility of an 
attitude can influence attitude change due to the enhanced scrutiny of persuasive arguments related to 
that attitude. Attitude change in the direction of the persuasive appeals is more likely when argument 
quality is strong rather than weak. There is both theoretical and empirical evidence that, due to links 
between values and attitudes within the cognitive system, attitude change could similarly be induced by 
the activation of a related value. The increased accessibility of a particular value would result in the 
corresponding activation and increased accessibility of the more specific, related attitude. This in turn 
would lead to the increased elaboration of persuasive arguments, resulting in the acceptance of good 
quality arguments and the rejection of weak arguments.
Overview Of Study
R e se a rch  A im s
The aim of this research is to explore one corollary of the conceptualisation of values -  the process of 
attitude change. This is explored by assessing the interaction between the effects of value accessibility 
and argument quality. Elaboration is assessed through a manipulation of argument quality. It is 
hypothesised that variations in levels of elaboration resulting from accessibility will manifest themselves 
by producing an interaction between increased value accessibility and heightened argument quality. 
Specifically, it is expected that the enhanced persuasive impact of strong arguments, relative to weak 
arguments, would be greater when value accessibility is high compared to when it is low.
The accessibility of values is varied through a manipulation of the frequency of value expression. This 
manipulation is chosen because^ firstly, it is similar to that used by Fabrigar et al (1998) and secondly, 
it is the same as that used by Fazio (1995) to manipulate attitude accessibility. Consequently it fits the
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conceptualisation of values adopted for the present study as associations between a ‘value object’ and 
its evaluation in memory, it is assumed that priming the target value (and therefore raising its cognitive 
availability) will raise the accessibility of theoretically corresponding attitudes. This will result in the 
increased or decreased endorsement of the persuasive message depending on whether the arguments 
are strong or weak. Furthermore, this affect will be mediated by individual ratings of value importance.
This study includes two experiments, which focus on attitudes towards two political issues, namely the 
introduction of a national identity card (experiment 1 ) and the prosecution of war criminals (experiment 
2). A value survey, the SVI (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), contains questions tapping participants’ 
endorsement of values relevant to these issues. The content of persuasive appeals is written 
systematically to invoke these values. In experiment 1, the message in favour of the introduction of a 
national identity card appeals to the value of in d iv id u a l fre e d o m , it was believed that attitudes 
sympathetic to the introduction of national identity cards would be negatively correlated with the 
endorsement of this value. In experiment 2, the message in favour of the prosecution of war criminals 
appeals to the value of s o c ia l ju s tic e . It is predicted that attitudes sympathetic to the prosecution of war 
criminals will be positively correlated with the value of s o c ia l ju s tic e . It is assumed that values of s o c ia l 
ju s tic e  and in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  constitute values of high importance to the majority of individuals and in 
fact, Van Deth & Scarbrough (1995, p 35) propose that the values of freedom and justice are 
“banners under which one can fight in all circumstances”.
According to Eagly & Kulsea (1997), effective persuasive communication by systematic processing 
presumes that messages are ‘understandable’ and are presented in situations that do not restrict 
recipient’s ability to process them. It is expected that in the current study, these conditions will be met. 
The persuasive messages are relatively undemanding, there are no time pressures for task completion 
and an effort is made to keep distraction to a minimum.
Based on the logic just described, a number of specific predictions are developed. It is expected that 
increasing value accessibility will be associated with a greater impact of argument quality on post­
message attitudes. Since the passages highlight their link to the messages, it is assumed that 
recipients will be motivated to elaborate the persuasive messages. This should occur because due to 
spreading activation, participants in the low value accessibility condition should have related attitudes 
that are lower in accessibility and should engage in relatively little elaboration of the persuasive 
message. Thus, they should be only modestly influenced by argument strength in the message, in 
contrast, participants in the high accessibility condition should have related attitudes that are higher in
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accessibility and should engage in greater elaboration of the persuasive message and thus they should 
be more influenced by the strength of the arguments.
The SVI defines social justice as “correcting injustice, care for the weak”. This descriptor is quite 
vague. The term is used more specifically, in the context of this experiment, to refer to the 
administration of the law according to accepted principles. This interpretation is seen as being 
compatible with the broad accepted definition of justice as “to treat or judge fairly”(The Collins Concise 
English Dictionary, McLeod & Hanks, 1982). For example, using Eagly & Chaiken’s (1993) terminology, 
psychological links could be based on the observation that people involved in upholding the law and 
achieving social justice generally support crime prosecution. In this sense, s o c ia l ju s tic e  could be 
conceptualised as the more abstract and general ‘attitude’ in the hierarchy encompassing related 
attitude objects (e.g. war crime prosecution). Heightened arousal of the s o c ia l ju s tic e  concept through 
repeated activation would, by means of spreading activation, arouse the related attitude in the 
cognitive network.
The study was a 2 (value accessibility: high vs. low) x 2 (argument quality: high vs. low) factorial 
design. In each experiment, subjects are assigned to one of four experimental conditions, namely, high 
accessibility/strong argument condition; high accessibility/weak argument condition; low 
accessibility/strong argument condition and low accessibility/weak argument condition.
it is expected that high value accessibility will be associated with a greater impact of argument quality 
on post-message attitudes regardless of whether the message was counter-attitudinal (as in 
experiment 1) or pro-attitudina! (as in experiment 2 ) following Fabrigar et al (1998). Specifically,
1 . There would be a main effect of value accessibility i.e. attitude change would be greater for 
those subjects in the high accessibility condition.
2. There would be a main effect of argument quality i.e., attitude change would be highest for 
those subjects in the strong argument condition
3. There would be an interaction effect for value accessibility and argument quality i.e. attitude 
change would be highest for those subjects in the high accessibility, good quality argument 
condition.
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Method
P a rtic ip a n ts
Participants were 160 sixth form students from a sixth form college in London (76 males and 84 
females). Ages ranged from 17 to 19 years. Students took part in the experiment as part of a 
requirement for a general studies course.
M e a su re s  (s e e  A p p e n d ix  D )
A ttitu d in a l S u rv e y
This contained thirty attitude objects, (one target attitude item and twenty-nine filler items). Items were 
selected from a range of topics including education, culture, the law, health, science and technology, 
politics and morality. The same survey was used in both experiments and administered to subjects in all 
four experimental conditions. The target attitude object for experiment 1 ( “A national ID card encoding 
personal information (e.g. photo, fingerprint, criminal and bank details, passport, driving licence”) 
should be introduced by the Government”) was presented in the 24th position’. For experiment 2 the 
attitude object ( “the prosecution of war criminais is a positive policy”) was presented in 23rd position. 
Subjects were required to respond using a five-point Likert type scale anchored by the points “strongly 
disagree” to “strongly agree”.
V a lue  s u rv e y s
For each experiment two value surveys were produced, one for subjects in the low accessibility 
condition and one for subjects in the high accessibility condition. The items contained in all surveys 
were taken from two dimensions of the S.VJ (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990). The surveys contained both 
the specific target item being explored and the filier items consisted of alt other values contained in the 
motivational dimension from which the target value was derived plus those in the opposing dimension. 
For experiment 1, the target value was in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  whilst for experiment 2 it was s o c ia l ju s tic e . 
Each measure asked subjects to report their values on 9-point scales with different end points (i.e. 
disapprove/approve, bad/good, unnecessary/necessary, inappropriate/appropriate, and foolish/wise). 
For the high accessibility conditions the target item was listed five times, once in each semantic 
differential scale. For the low accessibility conditions the target item appeared only in the first 
desirability scaie. For both conditions, the remaining value items were distributed randomly between all 
five scales.
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R e a d a b ility  T e st
This was identical for subjects in all four conditions. This section contained questions tapping various 
stylistic aspects of the text. In addition, one question acted as a manipulation test of argument quality 
asking participants to rate how persuasive they found the arguments contained in the article. The last 
question also asked subjects to rate their attitudes towards the persuasion issue on a 5-point scale. 
This question was identical to that presented earlier in the attitudinal survey.
P e rs u a s iv e  m e ssa g e
Two booklets were produced. One which contained a fictional editorial on the introduction of national 
identity cards (experiment 1 ) and one containing a fictional editorial on the prosecution of war 
criminals (experiment 2). The first page of each booklet provided a cover story suggesting that the 
purpose of the task was to assess the quality of samples of writing. The following page contained the 
one-page editorial arguing in favour of each proposal in which the arguments developed from a pre­
test (see below) were embedded.
P ro c e d u re .
Pre-test: A pre-test, based on that proposed by Petty & Cacioppo (1986) was conducted on a group of 
20 undergraduate students in order to construct the persuasive arguments. A pool of intuitively strong 
and weak arguments was developed on both the issue of the introduction of a national identity card 
and also on the prosecution of war criminals. Some arguments related to their corresponding target 
values i.e. in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  and s o c ia l ju s tic e , whereas others were unrelated. Participants were 
asked to think carefully about the arguments and rate each on three scales of 1 to 5 according to their 
persuasiveness. For example, they were asked, “to what extent do you feel the communication was 
convincing?" “To what extent do you fee! the communication made its point effectively”?
For each argument, the two scores across each subjects were averaged to produce an overall rating of 
persuasiveness. The four strongest arguments, with a mean rating of 4.05 (related to the target 
value) and the four weakest arguments, with a mean of 1.85 (unrelated to the target value) were 
selected. For example, for experiment 1 a strong argument was “ identity cards represent a major 
intrusion into the privacy of the individual”. An example of a weak argument was “ transactions would 
be slowed down if people forgot or mislaid their cards”. In experiment 2, an example of a strong 
argument was “war crime trials are based on the fundamental principles of justice and go beyond 
national laws or legislative bodies”. An example of a weak argument was “war crime trials encourage
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public awareness of the past since many of the trials involve crimes committed during the Second World 
War”. These arguments were embedded within the editorials.
Main study: The sessions were conducted in groups ranging from 10  to 15 people. Participants were 
given a cover story similar to that of Fabrigar et al. (1998). Specifically they were told that the purpose 
of the experiment was to evaluate the quality of various written passages. The experiment consisted of 
five stages: (1 ) an attitudinal survey; (2 ) a value survey; (3 ) filler task (4 ) presentation of an editorial 
(persuasive message) and (5 ) readability survey.
Firstly all participants completed the attitudinal survey. The survey contained one item relating directly 
to the target issue of each experiment. The survey was presented as part of an ostensibly separate 
task for a different researcher. Secondly, all participants completed one of two Value Surveys that acted 
as the priming manipulation. The accessibility of the target value was experimentaily manipulated by 
having half of the participants express their evaluations of the target value five times (high accessibility 
condition) and the other half express their evaluation only once (low accessibility condition). Numerous 
experiments have shown that as the frequency of expressing an attitude increases, the accessibility of 
that attitude is enhanced (see Fazio, 1995). It is assumed that, due to conceptual similarities between 
values and attitudes, manipulating the frequency of value expression would produce a comparable 
effect on vaiue accessibility.
On completion of the value survey, participants completed a short cognitive filler task unrelated to the 
experiment. Next, all participants were given a booklet. The first page of the booklet provided the cover 
story suggesting that the purpose of the task was to assess the quality of samples of writing. On the 
following page participants were presented with a one-page editorial arguing in favour of either the 
introduction of national identity cards (experiment 1 ) or the prosecution of war criminals (experiment 
2 ).
Half the participants in each accessibility condition were randomly assigned to receive a version of the 
editorial that was strong and convincing when people thought carefully about the information (strong 
argument condition). The other half of the participants received a version that contained arguments 
that were weak and unconvincing (weak argument condition). This resulted in four experimental 
conditions for each experiment (high accessibility, strong argument condition; high accessibility, weak 
argument condition; low accessibility, strong argument condition and low accessibility, weak argument 
condition). The strong and weak versions of the message also differed in relation to the target
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variables. The strong arguments were all related to the target values of in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  (experiment
1 ) and s o c ia l ju s tic e  (experiment 2 ), whilst the weak arguments were unrelated to these values.
Following the presentation of the persuasive message, participants completed a survey concerning 
stylistic aspects of the article. One question acted as a manipulation check for argument quality -  
subjects were asked to rate how convincing they found the arguments in. the editorial to be.
Participants were then asked to respond to an enquiry concerning their attitude towards the 
persuasion issue in order to assess any attitudinal change that may have occurred. Finally, subjects 
were debriefed.
Results
A ttitu d e  C hange
The effects of both value manipulation and argument quality on the extent of attitude change and more 
specifically, the elaboration of persuasive messages were examined. If the experimental manipulation of 
value accessibility was successful in influencing the extent of elaboration of the persuasive message, 
then a significant interaction between value accessibility and argument quality should be obtained for 
attitude change. To test this, a 2  (value accessibility: high vs. low) x 2  (argument quality: strong vs. 
weak) ANOVA was conducted on attitude change.
For experiment 1 , participants were asked the extent to which they agreed with the introduction of a 
national identity card. The persuasive message presented arguments against its introduction.
Therefore, an attitude change toward a more negative attitude concerning identity card introduction 
was coded as a positive change, and an attitude change toward a more negative attitude was coded as 
a negative change. For experiment 2, participants were asked the extent to-which they agreed with the 
prosecution of war criminals. The persuasive message presented arguments for their prosecution. 
Therefore an attitude change toward a more positive attitude was coded as a positive change and an 
attitude change toward a more negative attitude was coded as a negative change. The results of each 
experiment were analysed separately.
Experiment 1: The Introduction of National Identity Cards
The mean attitude change for strong arguments was .42 (SD =  .93) and for weak arguments was .21 
(SD =  1.23). The results of the ANOVA, however, revealed that the main effect for argument quality 
was not significant, F ( 1 , 7 6 )=  3.11 , ns, suggesting that strong arguments in favour of the
introduction of national identity cards did not produce significantly more favourable attitudes than did 
weak arguments.
The mean attitude change for high accessibility (M =  .325, S D =1 .27) was higher than that for low 
accessibility (M =  .225, SD =  1.03), as predicted. However, there was no significant main effect for 
value accessibility, F (1 ,7 6 )=  .154, ns. This suggests that the value prime had no significant effect on 
attitude change.
For subjects in the high accessibility conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was 
strong was .65 (SD =  1.42) and when argument quality was weak was .029 (SD =  1.03). For those in 
the two low accessibility conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was 
.35(SD = 1 .0 4 ) and when argument quality was weak was .1 (SD =  1.02). The predicted interaction 
between value accessibility and argument quality was also not reliable F (1 ,7 6 )= . 615, ns. It was 
assumed that priming a given value would raise the accessibility of the theoretically corresponding 
attitude and result in increased attitude change. However, this would only occur to the extent the 
participants perceived the value as being personally important. However, even when vaiue strength was 
treated as a covariate, the interaction remained insignificant F (1, 7 5 )=  .664, ns. This may be because 
most subjects perceived in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  to be important or supremely important or alternatively, 
that identity cards are not related to the value of in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  in the way assumed.
Figure 2 : The Introduction of National Identity Cards 
Attitude change as a function of value accessibility & argument quality
weak arguments 
strong arguments
Value Accessibility
The means associated with this interaction are shown in figure 2 above. As can be seen in the figure, 
when value accessibility is low, there is a difference in the extent of attitude change for strong and
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weak arguments, with strong arguments producing more attitude change than weak arguments as 
would be expected if some message elaboration had taken place. When value accessibility is high, 
strong arguments result in greater attitude change but decreased attitude change for weak arguments, 
suggesting that these arguments were considered weak and so their elaboration resulted in lower 
levels of persuasion. This pattern suggests that, despite a lack of statistical significance, increased 
value accessibility may, to a limited degree, have promoted some message elaboration, although the F- 
ratio suggests that this effect must be weak.
Experiment 2: The prosecution of War Criminals
The mean attitude change for strong arguments was .73 (SD =  1.28) and for weak arguments was .28 
(SD =  1 .20). The results of the analysis revealed that the main effect for argument quality was not 
significant, F ( 1 , 76 )=3 .42 , ns, suggesting that the strong arguments in favour of war crime 
prosecution did not produce significantly more attitude change than weak arguments. The mean 
attitude change for high accessibility was .700 (S D = 1 .38) and for low accessibility was .200 (SD =
1.04). Nevertheless, the main effect for value accessibility was not significant, F (1 ,76 )=3 .42 , ns, 
suggesting that the prime had little effect on persuasion.
For high accessibility conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was good was 1.05 
(SD =  1.50) and when argument quality was weak was .35 (SD =  1.18). For low accessibility 
conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was .35(SD =  1.23) and when 
argument quality was weak was .05 (S D =  .83). The predicted interaction between value manipulation 
and argument quality was also not significant F (1 ,7 6 )= . 548, ns. Likewise, when value strength was 
treated as a covariate, the significance of the interaction remained insignificant F (1 ,7 6 )=  .728, ns. 
This relationship is illustrated in figure 3 below:
Figure 3: The Prosecution of War Criminals 
Attitude change as a function of value accessibility & argument quality
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D  weak arguments 
D  strong arguments0.0
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Value Accessiblity
As can be seen in the figure, when value accessibility is low, there is the suggestion of a difference in 
the extent of attitude change for strong and weak arguments although this is not significant. This 
suggests that there may be some elaboration of message arguments with weak arguments being 
associated, on average, with less attitude change than strong arguments.
This pattern becomes more pronounced when accessibility is high, when strong arguments produced a 
greater increase in attitude change than did weak arguments. So, although the difference was not 
significant, participants in the high value accessibility condition appear to have engaged in more 
extensive scrutiny of the persuasive message than participants in the low accessibility group.
To sum up, none of the main effects for either experiment or the interaction effects are significant. 
However, despite the study being based on relatively few cases ( 2 0  in each condition) the analyses did 
revea! a general tendency for attitude change to be greater when argument quality was strong and 
more particularly when value accessibility was high.
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Analysis of both experiments in the present study showed only a tendency that increasing the 
accessibility of a target value would lead to increased attitude change towards a semantically related 
issue due to the increased elaboration of persuasive arguments. In each experiment, the quality of the 
arguments contained in the persuasive message did not have a significant impact on the extent to 
which people were persuaded. Likewise, the manipulation of value accessibility did not significantly 
affect the level of attitude change. More importantly, there were no interaction effects of value 
accessibility and argument quality, even when individual ratings of value importance were taken into 
consideration. However, despite a lack of statistical significance, consistent with the initial expectations, 
the analyses did reveal tendencies for attitude change to be greatest when argument quality was 
strong and value accessibility was high. The lack of significance in these analyses may be due, in part, 
to the small sample size in each condition. However, it is possible that a number of other factors were 
suppressing the effect of the value prime.
Although it is possible that repeated value expression might not have effectively raised value 
accessibility, this possibility is thought to be unlikely since it is well documented in the accessibility 
literature that the level of construct accessibility is increased by the recent and frequent activation of a 
construct. Furthermore, a number of theorists have successfully induced attitude change using similar 
methods to manipulate attitude accessibility (e.g. Fazio et al, 1982; Poweil & Fazio, 1984).
it is more plausible that increased value accessibility may not have activated the corresponding 
attitude. The values and attitudes were selected on the basis of a pilot study in which subjects indicated 
an association of the value primes with the corresponding attitude items. However, there may have 
been individual differences in this perceived association. The value would induce a particular attitude 
only to the extent that subjects perceived that the attitude offered an appropriate way to express the 
value.
The Value-Justification Hypothesis (Eiser, 1987), states that people with opposing attitudes towards an 
issue appeal to different general values to explain their attitudes. This is reflected in individual 
differences in the perception of how relevant various values are to a particular attitudinal issue. 
Furthermore these differences are likeiy to occur over and above differences that individuals place on 
the importance of values. Likewise, McGrath (1985) suggests that in social issues, proponents of both
Discussion
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sides often discuss the righteousness of their attitudinal stance by appealing to different values and 
such issues may become ‘social dilemmas’.
This principle is illustrated empirically in a study by Kristiansen & Zanna (1988) in which subjects 
completed measures of their attitudes towards abortion and nuclear weapons. They ranked both the 
importance of 18 values (Rokeach, 1967) and the relevance of each towards both issues. It was found 
that subjects with negative attitudes and those with positive attitudes differed in the values they 
regarded as relevant to each issue. For example, subjects who favoured nuclear weapons regarded 
national security as more relevant in comparison to subjects opposed to nuclear weapons who 
perceived ‘wisdom’ as a more relevant value. These effects were found to be independent of 
differences in value importance. Although these studies concern individuals with attitudes in different 
halves of the attitude continuum, it is possible that individuals with attitudes of the same valence also 
see a number of values as being relevant to a particular attitude issue.
in the present study, it is conceivable that values other than in d iv id u a l fre e d o m  and s o c ia lju s tic e  may 
have been influential in participants’ attitudes towards the introduction of national identity cards and 
the prosecution of war criminals respectively. For example, an attitude against the introduction of 
national identity cards may, for some individuals, have derived its strength from the value of in d iv id u a l 
fre e d o m . However, those in favour may have focused on the values of s o c ia l o rd e r { since many forms 
of crime depend on individuals claiming to be someone else (e.g. tax evasion) and verification by police 
would be made easier or n a tio n a l s e c u rity ) ID cards would help avoid illegal immigration).
Whilst an attitude in favour of the prosecution of war criminals may derive its strength from inter- 
attitudinal links to the value of s o c ia l ju s tic e , values such as a  w o rld  a t p e a ce , n a tio n a l s e c u rity  and 
s o c ia l o rd e r, may be equally salient. An argument in favour of war crime prosecution is that prosecution 
would demonstrate that war atrocities would be punished and would, as a result, discourage future 
crimes. Attitudes opposing it may result from the endorsement of the value of fo rg iv e n e s s  (the 
prosecution of elderly suspects may generate feelings of sympathy since many were generally very 
young, junior and possibly in fear of the consequences of non-co-operation). Specific relevant cases 
may be brought to mind such as the case of General Pinochet, whose prosecution, Margaret Thatcher 
opposed as a result of his help during the Falklands conflict. In this case, the values of lo y a lty , 
fo rg iv e n e s s , re c ip ro c a tio n  o f fa v o u rs  an d  tru e  frie n d s h ip  may have been salient. Unfortunately, the data 
collected does not enable a judgement to be made as to whether such factors influenced participants in 
the present study.
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It is also possible that individuals with opposing views may see the same values as relevant but 
interpret their implications for the attitude issue in different ways. For example, s o c ia l ju s tic e  could be 
seen as relevant to issues regarding the prosecution of war criminals but could imply that prosecution 
is due to unfair trial procedures and false prosecutions. For some individuals, the value of fo rg iv e n e s s  
rather than s o c ia lju s tic e  may have been more prominent in the issue related to the prosecution of war 
criminals. So, the value manipulation may have failed to raise the attitudes related to the persuasive 
arguments and in addition, personal perceptions of the relevance of particular values to the persuasion 
issues may have varied.
in future studies, subjects could be asked to indicate the extent to which particular values are relevant 
to a particular attitude. It would be expected that those subjects who rated the target value as both 
personally important and as relevant to the attitude issue would be significantly more influenced by the 
manipulation of value accessibility and significantly more or less influenced by argument quality 
depending on whether elaboration was predicted.
In addition, although the manipulation of value accessibility may have been successful in increasing the 
value accessibility and activating the structurally related attitude, this value may not have functioned as 
a direct determinant of attitude change. The initial attitude that existed even prior to reception of the 
message is another potentially available basis for judgement (Sherman, 1987). The topics were likely 
to be of low personal relevance to the majority of students and this may have resuited in low levels of 
motivation to process the related persuasive arguments irrespective of the priming manipulation.
Finally, initial attitudes towards the two attitude topics were mixed in terms of both extremity and 
valence. Ceiling effects existed for those individuals whose initial attitudes were of the same valence as 
the persuasive communication. For example, in experiment 1 in which the persuasive arguments were 
against the introduction of a national identity card, the initial attitudes of 23% of subjects were already 
negative and this imposed a limit on potential attitude change, which could be indicated following the 
persuasive communications. Similarly, in experiment 2, in which persuasive arguments were in favour of 
the prosecution of war crimes, 24% subjects expressed initial attitudes in favour of prosecution. This 
problem could be avoided in future studies by choosing an attitude topic in which there was consensus 
of opinion for the majority of subjects and the persuasive arguments were designed to persuade 
subjects to change attitude valence.
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Introduction
Study 5 was a conceptual replication of study 4. In this study however, the target attitude concerned 
university tuition fees. This issue was selected since it was believed to be of personal relevance and 
interest to sixth form students, many of who would continue onto further education, it was predicted 
that, due to the negative financial implications of tuition fees, there would be near universal opposition 
to the fees.
In addition to a change of topic, there were a number of procedural modifications. Firstly, whereas in 
the previous study, value primes had been selected during a pilot study as relevant to the attitude 
issue, using a separate sample of students, the present study takes into consideration individual 
differences in perceived value relevance. Participants are asked to rate these values according to their 
relevance to tuition fees. Secondly, unlike in the procedure described by Fabrigar et al (1998), no filler 
task was included in the study. It was believed that the filler task used in study 4 might have weakened 
the effect of the value manipulation. Indeed, Sherman (1987) stresses that the effect of increased 
accessibility decreases with the time lag between a prime and its target. Study 5 consisted of two 
experiments. The attitude topic was the same for both experiments, but the value primes differed. In 
experiment 1 , the value primes were s o c ia l ju s tic e  and e q u a lity , whilst in experiment 2 , the prime was 
the value of su cce ss.
H y p o th e se s  
It is predicted that:
1 . Increased value accessibility would lead to the increased elaboration of persuasive 
arguments. This would manifest itself by the differential impact of strong and weak 
arguments.
2. This effect wouid be mediated by the individual ratings of value importance and relevance to 
the attitude issue.
3. There would be a main effect of argument quality, with more positive attitude change 
occurring for strong argument conditions and significantly less positive attitude change 
occurring for weak argument conditions.
CHAPTER 6: STUDY 5 •
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Method
P a rtic ip a n ts .
Participants were 120 sixth form students (63 males, 57 females) from a local college. Ages ranged 
from 17 to 19 years. Students took part in the experiment as part of a general studies course.
M e a su re s  (se e s  A p p e n d ix  E )
P re -te s t a ttitu d in a l S u rve y.
Attitudes were measured by having subjects report their attitudes towards twelve attitude objects on a 
“News Opinion Survey” which included a question relating to attitudes towards tuition fees. Subjects 
were required to respond using a five-point scale anchored by the points “completely disagree” to 
“completely agree”.
P o s t-te s t a ttitu d in a l m e a su re  
The second attitudinal survey contained questions related to further education, which contained an 
identical question relating to tuition fees as the pre-test attitudinal survey. This was presented as part 
of an ostensibly different survey for the head of sixth form studies.
V alue s u rv e y
There were four versions of the Value Survey developed. For each experiment, one low accessibility 
version (in which the value prime appeared only once) and one high accessibility version (in which the 
value prime appeared five times). The items contained in the value survey were taken from two 
dimensions of the Schwartz Vaiue Inventory (S.V.l) (Schwartz and Bilsky 1990), namely a ch ie ve m e n t 
and b e n e vo le n ce . The survey contained the specific values used in the accessibility manipulation, as 
well other ‘filler’ items. For example, for experiment 1 , the target values were e q u a lity  and  s o c ia l 
ju s tic e , both from the b e n e vo le n ce  dimension, whilst for experiment 2  the vaiue of s u cce ss  was taken 
from the dimension of a c h ie ve m e n t The questionnaire contained semantic differential items. The 
number of times that a given object or issue appeared on the questionnaire (each time followed by a 
different semantic differential scale) was varied experimentally, one in the tow accessibility condition 
and five in the high accessibility condition, in order to induce the subjects to rehearse the association 
between an object and an evaluation.
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R e a d a b ility  T e st
This was the same as that used in study 4 with the omission of the question relating to the attitude 
issues. It contained questions tapping various stylistic aspects of the text.
V alue R e le va n ce  M e a su re
A value relevance scale was developed in which subjects rated the relevance of all values contained in 
the value survey according to the attitudinal issues relevant to each experiment. Ratings were made on 
a 5-point scale anchored b y - 2  (completely irrelevant) to + 2  (completely relevant).
P ro c e d u re .
Pre-test: A pre-test, based on the procedure proposed by Petty & Cacioppo (1986), was conducted on 
a group of 20 undergraduate students in order to construct the persuasive arguments. A pool of 
intuitively strong and weak arguments was developed in favour of university tuition fees. For experiment 
1 , these arguments were based on the values of s o c ia l ju s tic e  and e q u a lity  a n d  h r  experiment 2 ; the 
arguments were based on the value of s u cce ss . Participants were asked to think carefully about the 
arguments and to rate each on two scales ranging from 1 to 5 according to their persuaiveness. They 
were asked, “To what extent do you feel the communication was convincing?” “To what extent do you 
feel the communications made its point effectively?”
For each argument the scores across subjects were averaged to produce an overall persuasiveness 
rating. The four strongest arguments (mean — 4.15) relating to the target value and the four weakest 
(mean =  2.33) arguments were selected. For example, in experiment 1 , arguments were based on the 
values of s o c ia l ju s tic e  an d  e q u a lity . An example of a strong argument is “university education is a 
fantastic opportunity for any individual. It is therefore reasonable that students make a contribution 
towards its cost”. An example of a weak argument is “university education benefits most students. It 
seems reasonable that all students should make a contribution to the cost”. In experiment 2 , 
arguments appealed to the values of a ch ie ve m e n t an d  su cce ss . An example of a strong argument is “It 
is the students themselves who will benefit directly from their university education -  earning as much 
as 50% more on average then a non-graduate in later life. The payment of tuition fees is therefore an 
extremely worthwhile investment". An example of a weak argument is “Graduates may benefit directly 
from their university education. Some graduates earn up to 15% more than non-graduates in later 
life”.
Main study: The study was a 2 (value accessibility: high vs. low) x 2 (argument quality: high vs. low) 
factorial design. The sessions were conducted in groups ranging from 1 0  to 15 people. Participants 
were given a cover story similar to that of Fabrigar et al. (1998). Specifically they were told that the 
purpose of the experiment was to evaluate the quality of various written passages. The experiment 
consisted of six stages: (1 ) an attitudinal survey; (2 ) a value survey; (3 ) test of relevance (4 ) 
presentation of an editorial (persuasive message); (5 ) readability survey; and ( 6 ) repeated attitudinal 
survey.
Firstly, all participants completed the attitudinal survey assessing their attitudes on a number of recent 
news events, including one questions relating to the attitude issue. All measures used five-point scales. 
Secondly, participants completed the appropriate Value Survey for each experiment. For each 
experiment, half of the participants were randomly assigned to low value accessibility group by the 
random distribution of test booklets. Because the instructions and procedure were identical for ail 
conditions, more than one condition was run simultaneously during an experimental session. These 
people received a version of the survey that contained just one measure of the target value(s) (.s o c ia l 
ju s tic e  and e q u a /ity fo r experiment 1 and su cc e ss  fo r experiment 2). The other half of the participants 
(i.e. the high accessibility group) received a version of the survey in which four additional measures of 
the target value were embedded among the survey. Each of these measures asked subjects to report 
their values on scales with different end points (i.e. disapprove/approve, bad/good, 
unnecessary/necessary, inappropriate/appropriate, foolish/wise).
On completion of the value survey, all participants completed a booklet containing the editorial 
concerning student tuition fees. The first page of the booklet provided the cover story that the purpose 
of the task was to assess the quality of samples of writing. On the following page, participants were 
presented with a one-page editorial arguing in favour of tuition fees. Half the participants were 
randomly assigned to receive a version of the editorial that was strong and convincing. The other half 
of the participants were randomly assigned to receive a version that contained arguments that were 
weak and unconvincing.
Following the message, participants completed a seven-item survey concerning stylistic aspects of the 
article in which respondents had to choose from a number of response options. One question acted as 
a manipulation for argument quality -  subjects were asked to rate how convincing they found the 
arguments in the editorial to be. Finally participants were asked to complete an attitudinal survey 
concerning further education, which contained a question concerning their attitudes towards tuition
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fees. The survey was presented as part of an ostensibly separate task for a different researcher. Finally 
participants were debriefed as to the nature of the study.
Results
The effects of both value accessibility and argument quality on the extent of attitude change and more 
specifically, the elaboration of persuasive messages are investigated. The effects of value importance 
and relevance are also examined as confounding factors in this process. If the experimental 
manipulation of value accessibility was successful in influencing the extent of elaboration of the 
persuasive message, then a significant interaction between value accessibility and argument quality 
should be obtained for attitude change. To test this, a 2 (value accessibility: high vs. low) x 2 
(argument quality: strong vs. weak) ANOVA was conducted.
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with university tuition fees. The 
persuasive message presented arguments in favour of tuition fees. Therefore, change towards a more 
positive attitude was coded as a positive change, and an attitude change toward a more negative 
attitude was coded as a negative change.
Experiment 1
A ttitu d e  ch a n g e
As predicted, the majority (72.8 % ) of respondents had an initial negative attitude towards tuition fees 
(i.e. scale ratings of - 2  or - 1 ). There was a positive increase in attitudes in the direction of the 
persuasive message for 45.6% of subjects whilst only 4.9% had a shift in attitudes towards more 
unfavourable attitudes. However, not all change indicated a shift from initial negative to positive 
attitudes.
A rg u m e n t q u a lity  m a in  e ffe c t
The mean attitude change for strong arguments was .775 (SD =  .93) and for weak arguments was 
.300 (SD =  .53). The results of the analysis revealed that this difference was significant. There was a 
significant main effect for argument quality, F (1 ,7 6 )=  8.25, p <  .05, suggesting that strong 
arguments in favour of an increase in tuition fees produced significantly more favourable attitudes than 
did weak arguments. When both importance and relevance were treated as covariates, this effect was 
found to be stronger, F (1, 7 4 )=  7.31, p < .  05.
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A rg u m e n t q u a lity  m a n ip u la tio n  ch e ck
A T-test was carried out to compare individuals’ mean Positivity ratings for both ‘strong’ arguments 
and ‘weak’ arguments, t =  3.01; df =  9; p <  0.05. These results suggest that the argument quality 
manipulation had been successful; ‘strong’ arguments were perceived to be more persuasive than 
‘weak’ arguments.
A c c e s s ib ility  m a in  e ffe c t
The mean attitude change for the high accessibility condition was .650 (SD=. 78) and for low 
accessibility was .425 (SD =  .80). However, no significant main effect for value accessibility was found, 
F (1, 7 6 )=  1.85, ns. This suggests that the value prime had no significant effect on attitude change. 
Likewise, when both importance and relevance were treated as covariates, accessibility was found to 
have no significant effect F (1 ,7 4 )=  1.82, ns.
In te ra c tio n  e ffe c ts
For high accessibility conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was 1.05 
(SD =  .83) and when argument quality was weak was .25 (SD =  .47). For low accessibility conditions, 
the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was .50 (SD =  .97) and when argument 
quality was weak was .35 (SD =  .59). The predicted interaction between value manipulation and 
argument quality was nearly significant F ( 1 , 7 6 )=  3.86, p =  .053. However, when both importance 
and relevance were treated as covariates, quality was found to have a stronger effect F (1, 7 4 )=  4.05, 
p <  .05. The cell means associated with this interaction are shown in figure 4 below.
Figure 4. Attitude change as a function of value accessibility & argument quality1
1 In this figure, both value relevance and value importance are treated as covariates.
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Figure 1 clearly illustrates the interaction effect of accessibility and argument strength on level of 
attitude change. Argument strength has a major effect on attitude change as shown by the difference in 
level of attitude change for both strong and weak arguments. The mean attitude change for strong 
arguments is significantly higher than that for weak arguments (t =  2.45; df =  79; p <  .025). This 
pattern is especially evident in the high accessibility condition (t =  2.92; df =  39; p <  .025) compared 
to the low accessibility condition (t =  1.98; df = 3 9 ; ns).
Increased accessibility does enhance attitude change for strong arguments but actually causes a 
decrease in attitude change for weak arguments. The mean attitude change for the high accessibility, 
strong argument condition was found to be significantly greater than that for the high accessibility, 
weak argument condition (t =  2.64; df =  39; p <  ,05). The pattern of observed persuasion means 
suggests that, as predicted, objective central processing of the persuasive message had occurred.
R e la tiv e  V a ria n ce  a c c o u n te d  fo r  b y  b o th  c o v a ria te s
In the above analyses, the reported partial Eta squared values for the two factors differed. The value 
for relevance was .059 and that for importance was .015. This suggests that the relevance of the value 
primes accounted for greater variance in these effects than did their perceived personal importance.
Experiment 2
A ttitu d e  ch a n g e
As predicted, the majority (73.8 % ) of respondents had an initial negative attitude towards tuition fees. 
There was a positive increase in attitudes in the direction of the persuasive message for 53.1 %  of 
subjects, although not al! change indicated a shift from negative to positive attitudes.
M a in  e ffe c t o f A rg u m e n t q u a lity
The mean attitude change for strong arguments was .933 (S D = 1 .17) and for weak arguments was 
.425 (SD =  .8 8 ). The results of the ANOVA revealed that the main effect for argument quality was 
significant, F ( 1 , 7 6 )=  5.10, p <  .05 suggesting that strong arguments in favour of an increase in 
tuition fees did produce significantly more favourable attitudes than did weak arguments. When value 
importance and relevance were included in the interaction, the effect of argument quality decreased, 
although it was found to be close to significance F (1 ,7 6 )=  3.72, p =  .058.
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M a n ip u la tio n  ch e ck
A T-test was carried out to compare individuals’ mean Positivity ratings for both ‘strong’ arguments 
and ‘weak’ arguments, t =  2.86; df =  9; p <  0.05. These results suggest that the argument quality 
manipulation had been successful; ‘strong’ arguments were perceived to be more persuasive than 
‘weak’ arguments.
M a in  e ffe c t o f a c c e s s ib ility
The mean attitude change for high accessibility was .875 (S D =1 .05) and for low accessibility was .483 
(SD =  1.18). The main effect for vaiue accessibility was not significant, F (1 ,7 6 )=  3.03, ns. This 
suggests that the value prime had no significant effect on attitude change. Again, this main effect did 
not reach significance when value importance and relevance were treated as covariates, F ( 1 , 7 4 )=  
2.84, ns.
In te ra c tio n  e ffe c ts
For high accessibility conditions, the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was 1 .35 
(SD =  1.04) and when argument quality was weak was .40 (S D =  .83). For low accessibility conditions, 
the mean attitude change when argument quality was strong was .52 (1.18) and when argument 
quality was weak was .45 (SD =  .94). The predicted interaction between vaiue manipulation and 
argument quality was not quite significant F (1 ,7 6 )=  3.85, ns. However, when both importance and 
relevance were treated as covariates, a significant interaction was found between argument quality and 
accessibitity level, F (1 ,7 4 )=  4.45, p <  .05.
Value Accessibility
Figure 5: Attitude change as a function of value accessibility & argument quality2
2 As In figure 1, both value relevance and value importance are treated as covariates.
126
The means associated with this interaction are shown in figure 5 above. For high accessibility 
conditions, attitude change is in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. Value accessibility was 
found to enhance message processing with attitude change being significantly greater for the high 
accessibility condition than the low accessibility condition (t =  3.01 ; df =  79; p <  .05). Subjects' 
attitudes showed more discrimination of strong from weak arguments in the high accessibility condition. 
Participants in the strong argument condition showed, on average, a greater decrease in post message 
attitudes (indicating persuasion) then those in the weak argument condition and this difference was 
found to be significant (t =  .326; df =  9; p <  .05). Furthermore, the pattern of ‘no-difference’ in 
means for low accessibility is in line with predictions i.e. argument quality has little effect on the extent 
of attitude change when value accessibility was low.
R e la tiv e  V a ria n ce  a c c o u n te d  fo r  b y  b o th  c o v a ria te s
In the above analyses, the reported partial Eta squared values for the two factors differed. The value 
for relevance was .020 and that for importance was .016. This suggests that, as in experiment 1, the 
relevance of the value primes accounted for relatively more variance in these effects than did their 
perceived personal importance.
Discussion
It was hypothesised that increases in accessibility would be associated with either more or less 
persuasion, depending on whether the persuasive message was weak or strong when ratings of value 
relevance and value importance were treated as covariates. In both experiment 1 and experiment 2  
these predictions were confirmed.
In both experiments main effects of argument quality were significant suggesting that participants 
elaborated on the persuasive arguments irrespective of the accessibility level. This suggests that 
subjects had both the motivation (and ability) to elaborate on the arguments, which may have been 
due to their personal relevance. No main effects of accessibility were found which suggests that the 
value manipulation alone was not sufficient to produce attitude change.
However the significant interaction effects of accessibility and quality suggest that increased 
accessibility did function to increase attitude change indirectly through the increased elaboration of 
persuasive arguments. The pattern of results suggests that this elaboration was objective as would be 
predicted by the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) in situations of moderate motivation and ability to
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elaborate. Despite the recorded attitude change, many subjects still held attitudes rated as 
unfavourable towards tuition fees. One explanation is that based on their current financial position and 
knowledge of the financial struggles of university students, many participants would strongly resist 
paying tuition fees, as was illustrated in the analysis of initial attitude ratings.
The value manipulations in the current study are assumed to increase their awareness that these 
attitudes conflict with important values such as e q u a lity  And s o c ia l ju s tic e , in experiment 1 and 
a ch ie ve m e n t a n d  su cce ss  i n experiment 2. However, this realisation may have been insufficient to 
motivate participants to change their attitudes in a value-congruent direction. So, despite the primed 
values being rated as important in the abstract, other motives may have contributed to the attitudinal 
judgements.
Specifically, the ‘secular’ value of w e a lth  may have been pitted against the ‘sacred’ values of e q u a lity  
and s o c ia l ju s tic e  (see Tetlock, 1986). This may have reduced possible attitude change. This theory is 
supported by the fact that more attitude change occurred in experiment 2 , which contained arguments 
for the value of su cce ss , which is of personally relevance and constitutes a more ‘secular’ value 
concern. Value conflict may have resulted in ambivalent attitudes and therefore lowered attitude 
change. Students are presumably motivated to gain the best educational experience; however, most 
students would be biased against the idea of paying tuition fees.
The effects of the current study have resulted from one of two processes. Firstly the values may have 
been retrieved and used to respond to attitude items or alternatively, as predicted, activation may have 
spread from the values to a related attitude directly related to the subsequent persuasion issue. As 
discussed earlier, although there are both empirical and theoretical grounds for predicting that the 
manipulation of value accessibility would influence the extent of message elaboration through the 
activation of related attitudes, no assessment of attitude accessibility following this manipulation was 
taken and so this presumption remains untested.
The presentation of a value prime is hypothesised to resuit in that value is made more accessible in an 
individual’s mind. If the attitude judgement were made shortly after the processing of a value-relevant 
persuasive message, those factors that are most salient and accessible in memory (i.e. the value) 
would then determine the attitudinal judgement. Information would be accepted if it is value-consistent 
and rejected if it were inconsistent with the value (Sherman, 1987). By temporarily heightening value 
accessibility through priming techniques, a given value may therefore b ia s  subsequent processing in 
the direction implied by the value. However, this suggests a more peripheral route to persuasion and
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the fact that there was a main effect of argument quality suggest that some elaboration of the 
arguments did in fact occur. Presumably, given the relevant nature of the persuasive message, 
subjects were motivated to engage in the objective scrutiny of the persuasive arguments as illustrated 
previously.
Studies 4 and 5: General Discussion
Following changes in methodology introduced to study 5, the manipulation of value accessibility was 
found to have a significant effect on the amount of elaboration of a semantically reiated persuasive 
message. This suggests that both individual differences in the perception of value relevance and 
importance of a message to a persuasive appeal are significant factors in this process. This finding is in 
line with other theorists (Ostrom & Brock, 1968; Kristiansen & Zanna, (1988).
The failure to find significant interaction effects in both experiments of study 4 was possibly the result 
of both a lack of motivation for subjects to elaborate the persuasive message and a failure to take 
individual perceptions of value relevance and importance into account, in Fabrigar et al’s (1998) study 
(from which both studies 4 and 5 were derived) the elaboration of attitude change was manipulated 
directly (as opposed to indirectly through the manipulation of a related value) by varying levels of 
attitude accessibility. Both the prime and the persuasion topic involved attitudes towards vegetarianism 
and so individual perceptions of the prime’s relevance were irrelevant.
The persuasive mechanisms involved in studies 4 and 5 and that of Fabrigar et al (1998) could be re­
conceptualised within an a ttitu d e  fu n c tio n  framework, since the value prime may have also manipulated 
the functional basis of related attitudes. Research suggests that attitudes serve one or more of four 
functions: the knowledge, ego-defensive, utilitarian and value-expressive function. The value-expressive 
function is said to exist in attitudes that express central values and the self-concept (Katz, 1960).
A number of moderating variables have been identified which determine the functions served by 
attitudinal change and expression, namely: ( 1 ) properties inherent in the attitude; ( 2 )  situational 
demands and (3 ) dispositional tendencies of persons holding attitudes (Jamieson and Zanna, 1989). 
Although an attitude may be inherently linked to a particular attitude function, research has 
demonstrated that attitude function can be experimentally manipulated by raising the accessibility of a 
particular basis of an attitude, such as a value (so long as the attitude object has the potential to serve 
a particular function), in the present study it is assumed that attitudes towards the social issues
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explored have the potential to serve a value-expressive function and raising the accessibility of values 
to which they are likely to be linked in an individual’s mind will have activated this value-expressive 
motivation.
Like attitude accessibility, attitude function is thought to moderate the impact of persuasive messages 
on attitudes (Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956). The “matching hypothesis” of persuasion 
suggests that a persuasive message should elicit more attitude change when the message targets the 
motivation that underlies the attitudes than when it targets an irrelevant motivation. Therefore if 
attitudes are value-expressive, priming a value (and therefore raising its accessibility) should elicit the 
corresponding motivation and this should affect participants’ receptiveness towards different 
persuasive messages. Specifically, people should be more persuaded by a message that highlights the 
ability of an attitude to promote a salient value than by a message that highlights a different value or 
function.
Indeed although Katz (1960) originally suggested that either changing the values themselves or 
breaking the value-attitude link should change value-expressive attitudes, other researchers have used 
attitude change techniques similar to those used to manipulate value accessibility. For example, Maio 
and Olson (1995) exposed participants to different versions of posters that concerned donating money 
to cancer research. In a condition, which primed the value-expressive function, the poster associated 
altruism with donating, in a second condition the ‘utilitarian’ condition was primed in which the utility of 
cancer research was emphasised. Participants were found to show a stronger relationship between 
their values and attitudes towards donation in the value-priming condition than they did in a ‘utilitarian’ 
condition.
In the same way as the manipulation of value accessibility is supposed to activate related attitudes by a 
process of spreading activation, attitudes serving a value-expressive function are thought to derive 
from inter-attitudinal structure (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Such attitudes are linked to values in a 
hierarchy since individuals develop attitudes that are consistent with their values in order to express 
and act on values that are important to them. Maio & Olson ( 2 0 0 0 ), in their Functional-Structural 
model, suggest that it is likely that attitude functions influence attitude structure and vice versa. This 
link between attitude accessibility and function is recognised by Fazio (1989 ,2000 ) who suggests that 
the most functional attitudes are those that are highly accessible. It is also relevant that both Fabrigar 
et al (1998) and Petty & Wegener (1998), in discussing how attitude accessibility and functional- 
matching respectively influence persuasion, suggest that it is by making a connection to the self salient.
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In a study using similar methodology to that of Fabrigar et ai (1998), Petty & Wegener (1998) tested 
the hypothesis that message arguments that match the functional basis of an attitude receive greater 
scrutiny. They manipulated the strength of matching versus mismatching information in messages 
about new consumer products. They found that information matching arguments received greater 
scrutiny than mismatches and found an interaction between match and argument strength. The results 
of Petty & Wegener’s study suggest, then, that functional matching might influence persuasion by the 
same processes, as attitude accessibility. Drawing on the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), Petty & 
Wegener (1998) explain this effect using the same principles as advocated both here and in Fabrigar 
et al (1998). They suggest that when motivation and ability are neither high nor low, functional 
matching might prompt people to carefully scrutinise the message. Both increased accessibility and 
functional matching might, therefore, be seen as equivalent in terms of their persuasive impact.
The extent of attitude change could be said to be determined by individual differences in the perceived 
relevance of target values to the attitudinal issue or, alternatively, due to the ‘functional match’ 
between message arguments and the functional basis of individual’s attitudes towards the persuasion 
topic. However, recent research by Maio & Olson (2000) suggests that all attitude functions can be 
seen to be vaiue-expressive in the sense that they all serve a different type of “goal-expressive 
attitude”.
The persuasion issues of studies 4 and 5 may have been based on a number of values (or attitude 
functions) as supported by the significant effect of the perceived relevance of the value primes to the 
attitude issue in study 5). For example, when asked to indicate their attitude toward the prosecution of 
war criminals, in study 4, participants might have thought about the importance of s o c ia l ju s tic e  due to 
the value prime. On the other hand, they may have considered whether prosecution would benefit them 
by protecting them from violent criminals or whether the setting up of war crime tribunals would result 
in personal debt due to an increase in taxes. Irrespective of priming manipulations, the chronic 
accessibility of such values (or attitude functions) may have impacted on individual evaluations of the 
persuasive issues and the resulting attitudes. The primed value alone may not have provided an 
adequate basis for extensive attitude change. Moreover, it may not be that only the target value was 
activated but also related values might have become readily available for subsequent attitude 
evaluations. Sherman (1987) suggests that during priming, a specific stimulus or a 'g e n e ra l c a te g o ry ', 
or 'w a y  o f th in k in g  'may become more accessible in memory.
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As discussed in chapter 1, section 4, in terms of attitude structure, an attitude may be based on a 
range of more abstract ‘higher -o rd e r ’ attitudes and values and may exist within an associative 
memory network, in a horizontal as well as a vertical structure (Rajecki, 1990; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). 
Even in the event of one value-attitude path being activated, the attitude may still be resistant to 
change to its associations to other cognitive constructs to which it is anchored since attitudes may 
have a number of sources.
An individual might be in favour of a particular persuasion issue on the basis of one value (or attitude 
function) but against the issue on the grounds of another, therefore holding an ambivalent attitude. 
Whilst Eagly & Kulsea (1997) suggest that the consequence of such ambivalence may be vulnerability 
to persuasive arguments in the form of vaiue-based persuasive appeals directed at either side of the 
issue. However, it is equally plausible that conflicting beliefs may also function to restrict attitude 
change since attitudes held within an extensive inter-attitudinal network are thought to be resistant to 
change.
Ostrom (1989) suggests that if a persuasive communication focuses on a specific subset of arguments 
(e.g. the economic, rather than the social consequences of a policy), then the strongest experimental 
effects should be restricted to that one belief or subset of beiiefs. In reference to the current studies, 
the effects of the value manipulation might appear most clearly on attitudes that tap the s p e c ific  beliefs 
presented in the persuasive communication. The results of study 4, for example, may have been more 
significant if the attitude item that assessed the fairness or justice of war crime prosecution and in 
study 5, condition 1, the extent to which an increase in tuition fees is ‘just’, since in both studies, value 
manipulation primed the value of s o c ia l ju s tic e . Since attitude measurement was restricted to a single 
question, which was used to tap general evaluations of each attitude issue, any more specific change 
may have gone undetected. That is, attitude change may have been restricted to the domain of beliefs 
related to the value prime and may not have generalised to the overall attitudinal evaluation.
As discussed earlier, the current studies and that of Fabrigar et al (1998) predict that accessibility 
manipulations result in objective central-route processing of persuasive messages. However, a number 
of studies involving the manipulation of value functions have demonstrated that increased value 
accessibility could function as a p e rip h e ra l cu e  fo r  accepting a persuasive argument. In fact, DeBono 
(1987, p. 280) states, “by definition, functional theories conceive of attitude change as a peripheral 
route process”. These conflicting findings could be explained by two factors: (1 ) levels of motivation 
and ability to elaborate and ( 2 ) the nature of the experimental manipulations.
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Firstly, the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggests that a variable can determine the level of 
persuasion resulting from a persuasive communication in one of two ways depending on a recipient’s 
level of motivation and ability. Attitude change might result from peripheral, rather than central, 
processes if the individual had neither sufficient ability nor motivation to elaborate the persuasive 
message. In such cases, the primed value might act as a peripheral cue for accepting the attitudinal 
position if it is consistent with the value or rejecting it if it is incompatible with its endorsement.
Secondly, with reference to the type of value manipulations used, the functional theorists have often 
manipulated the value-expressive function by raising the accessibility of either values in general or 
alternatively, specific individual value(s). The priming process does not merely raise the accessibility of 
target values but it also indicates to the subject the attitudinal position required in order to achieve 
value-attitude consistency. For example in a study by DeBono (1987), in addition to raising the 
accessibility of the attitude-relevant values, the content of the prime informed subjects that a different 
attitude better reflected an important underlying value. Similarly, in the study outlined earlier by Maio & 
Olson, (1995), the value-expressive function, was primed by explicitly associating altruism with 
donating during the poster presentation. In this sense, the prime functioned in a similar way to the 
persuasive arguments in the current studies.
Value priming techniques that result in peripheral processing presumably rely on the existing value- 
attitude link in memory or, by invoking this link in the prime. Since individuals would presumably need 
to be aware of a direct link between the value and attitudes this would be more likely to the extent that 
either the link is self-evident, such as a link between the value of h o n e s ty  and  attitudes towards telling 
lies, or is well-established such as-the link between abortion and the s a n c tity  o f life . Alternatively, 
individuals would need to engage in some elaboration of the persuasion topic in the absence of a 
persuasive argument, a possibility acknowledged by Petty & Cacioppo, (1986). Eagly & Kulsea (1997) 
suggest that analysis of the values commonly associated with attitudes on environmental issues often 
have opposite implications for evaluative responding. For example, although the e g o is tic v a h a  may 
predictably encourage anti-preservation attitudes, when individuals’ environmental attitudes arise from 
their concerns for personal health and safety, this value may foster favourable attitudes towards 
restricting some environmentally harmful actions.
As the previous discussion illustrates, the persuasion process is complex. Attitude change can depend 
on a variety of moderating conditions (motivation and ability to elaborate) and variables (value
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relevance and importance). A lack of attitude change may not necessarily indicate a failure in the value 
manipulation to increase the accessibility of the related attitude or moreover, to influence the level of 
persuasive elaboration. It may mean that the information in the persuasive message was weighed up 
and considered insufficient to cause change.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS
OVERVIEW
I have proposed in this thesis that a vaiue can be conceptualised as an 'attitude object’ and a linked 
evaluation of that object in memory. The strength of this link represents one form of value accessibility 
and can be indexed using response latency techniques. A second source of value accessibility is said to 
result from links between values and related cognitive structures in memory. It is suggested that 
increasing this accessibility via repeated vaiue expression can in turn, (as predicted by theories of 
spreading activation) increase the accessibility of semantically related attitudes. Lastly, it is proposed 
that this process represents one mechanism whereby values may influence the processing of a related 
persuasive message. The increased accessibility will increase that of those attitudes perceived to be 
relevant to the value. The extent of this accessibility, in turn will determine the extent of attitude 
elaboration of the persuasive message.
The results of the present studies provide some support for these ideas. In this chapter, the major 
findings associated with the predictions iaid out in the introduction are firstly reassessed (section 1 ), 
as well as some reasons for apparent discrepancies in the findings. Next a number of theoretical 
questions raised by the current research are discussed, along with their implications for future 
research (section 2). The limitations of this research are then examined (section 3) and some 
conclusions are drawn (section 4).
SECTION 1: CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Based on the broad lines of reasoning outlined in chapter 1, a number of questions were posed and 
addressed in the subsequent chapters. These questions can be answered by reference to the 
experimental findings, which emerged in the research.
1 . is response latency a reliable and valid measure of value strength?
In studies 1 and 2  it was predicted that the speed at which individuals respond to inquiries about vaiue 
importance (as operationalised by measures of response latency) would be positively correlated with
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subsequent ratings of value importance during this latency task and on subsequent importance ratings 
on the SVI (Schwartz, 199b).
The experimental findings partially confirmed this prediction. In both studies, measures of value 
accessibility were positively correlated across testing sessions. The correlations suggest moderate 
reliability. However, evidence for the construct validity of response latency as a measure of vaiue 
strength was less clear. Although no correlation between response latency and vaiue strength, as 
measured by the SVI, was found, a relationship was found between response latency and respondents’ 
ratings of value importance during this latency assessment. Despite attempts to control respondents’ 
concentration and task comprehension (through instructions and practice trials), participants’ attention 
may have lapsed at some points during the experiment, particularly in study 2  which involved 
responding to 112 value items without a break. Some participants may have experienced boredom and 
therefore responded in a lackadaisical manner. However, there are several other explanations for the 
weak correlation between the two measures, which suggest that low correlations are not necessarily 
indicative of the weakness of response latency as a measure of value strength.
Firstly, insignificant correlations between response valences from the latency tasks and SVI responses 
may be illustrate instability in individuals' value ratings. Given this fact, it is not surprising that response 
latency and SVI responses were similarly weak. Inconsistent responding could result from inaccuracies 
in survey measurement due to pressures of social desirability. Participants’ may have responded 
according to what they believed “ought” to be important in their lives and this is more iikely to be a 
factor affecting SVI completion than latency valences since no time constraint was imposed on 
individuals and more cognitive elaboration was therefore possible.
Secondly, as discussed in chapter 1, section 2 there has been much debate concerning the 
dimensional nature of attitude strength and, due to the structural conceptualisation of values adopted 
in this thesis, vaiue strength. Research has examined whether different dimensions (e.g. importance, 
accessibility) can be considered representative of one underlying strength construct (e.g. Raden,
1985; Petty & Krosnick, 1998). The lack of correlation between these two measures is possibly the 
result of divergent properties of the two dimensions.
However, it must be noted that these two explanations do not account for the findings of Gilchrist 
(1996), of a significant positive relationship between the importance ascribed to values and the speed 
at which respondents are able to indicate the perceived importance of these values. Also, if values are
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accepted as object-evaluation associations then it follows that Fazio’s findings of the construct validity 
of response latency measurement should also apply as equally to values as to other memorial 
associations (c.f. Fazio, 1995) including values.
An implication for this current research is that the construct validity of response latency measurement 
could be tested against an alternative measure of value strength. In order to control for the effects of 
differences between properties of value strength, the validity of response latency as a measure of vaiue 
accessibility could be assessed, in addition to response latency techniques, value accessibility could be 
measured by self-report (e.g. “how easily/quickly does your evaluation of a particular value come to 
mind?’’) or using an indirect measure, asking individuals how often they think or talk about the value. It 
is assumed that the more accessible the value is, the more the individual will report thinking about it.
An ‘operative measure’ of accessibility, such as, a progressive demasking procedure like that employed 
by Grainger & Segui (1990) could also be used as an alternative measure of vaiue accessibility. This 
procedure, involves “masking” pixels on the computer screen, which are randomly reconfigured until 
the name of the value, which initially is unrecognisable, is recognised by the subject. The response 
latency between the appearance of the first pixel, until recognition would act as an index of 
accessibility, in brief, despite the initial weak evidence for the construct validity of response latency as a 
measure of strength, it is proposed that this idea should not be abandoned and further work is 
needed.
What is often considered to be of interest in terms of the measurement of value strength is not the 
rating of value strength per se but the consequences of this strength. In order to determine response 
latency’s potential as a measure of value strength, future research couid assess the extent to which 
response latency measures can predict such spin-offs such as the activation of related constructs in 
memory and attitude change. This latter issue is addressed in the following studies.
2. Does the activation of a value influence the accessibility of semantically related attitudes?
It was predicted that activating a value in an individual’s mind using priming techniques, would raise the 
accessibility of semantically related attitudes. This would be visible in the differentiation of mean 
response times to individuals’ evaluative judgements of attitudes following a related value compared to 
those following an unrelated value prime. The results of study 3 confirmed this hypothesis.
Theoretically, these findings are supportive of models of associative networks in memory and are
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compatible with the idea that the activation of a ‘higher-level’ attitude can activate a semantically 
related "lower-level” attitude through a process of spreading activation (e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Future research could examine links between values and other cognitive constructs in memory. For 
example, it is possible that the activation of related constructs through priming would be strongest for 
other values. Schwartz (1996) suggests that values exist in a value structure and are distinguished by 
the type of motivational goal they express. Each value type is defined in terms of its central goal, and 
specific single values that primarily represent it. The model specifies a set of dynamic relationships 
between ten different motivational types. These types are located in a circular structure of value 
systems with types located in opposing directions postulated to be in conflict and those whose values 
may be attained simultaneously in a compatible manner are located near to each other. It is probable 
that response latencies should be quicker when values are presented in their motivational domains.
The evidence discussed earlier by Katz and Hass (1988), suggests that the causal relationship 
between values and attitudes may be bi-directional. Priming social vaiues influenced the expression of 
racial attitudes and likewise, priming racial attitudes influenced the expression of social values. These 
findings are consistent with Rokeach’s (1973) assertion that changes in any element of the self- 
concept-value-attitude-belief hierarchy would result in change in the other elements. However, Rokeach 
suggested that the influence of values or attitudes would be stronger than the influence of attitudes or 
values. A future study couid examine this relationship using the same methodology employed in study 3 
to determine whether the presentation of an attitude prime would decrease response times to 
semantically related values. If the interactions were indeed two-way, then the activation of an attitude 
would be expected to activate any values from which the attitude is derived or related with the result of 
decreasing response latencies to enquiries about the strength of these values.
This study concerned semantic links between values and attitudes. The evaluative links between vaiues 
and attitudes could also be examined using the same methodology, in the study discussed earlier by 
Tourangeau, Rasinski & D’Andrade, (1991), the evaluative ‘distance’ between successive belief items 
on individuals' ratings on the pro-con dimension, was found to be significantly correlated with reaction 
times for questions on attitudes towards welfare. This idea of evaluative distance could be examined in 
terms of links between values and attitudes. It is possible that, holding semantic similarity constant, 
values and attitudes that are matched in terms of both valence and the extremity have stronger links 
within the associative network than those for whom reported valence and extremity are more disparate.
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One connotation of the conceptualisation of values introduced in this thesis, concerns its implication for 
persuasion, specifically, the degree to which values function like attitudes in the persuasion process. 
Confirmation of this fact would provide evidence for the primary thesis that like attitudes, values can be 
considered object-evaluation links in memory. Studies 4 and 5 explored a variation of the ideas put 
forward by Fabrigar et at (1998), nameiy the impact of value (as opposed to attitude) accessibility on 
the elaboration of persuasive appeals. Value accessibility was manipulated by varying the number of 
times participants rated target values. It was hypothesised that increased value accessibility would be 
associated with either more or less persuasion, depending on whether the persuasive message was 
weak or strong.
The results of study 4 found no reliable evidence for this effect. However, although the interactions 
were small and not statistically reliable the pattern of results was in line with the theoretical predictions. 
Furthermore, after a number of methodological modifications were made, the results of study 5 
indicated that when individual ratings of value relevance and vaiue importance were taken into 
consideration, as predicted, value accessibility did act to determine the extent of message elaboration. 
Specifically, when accessibility was high, there was more differentiation in the effects of argument 
quality, than when accessibility was low.
The significance of vaiue relevance supports one possible explanation for the unexpected findings in 
study 4. If, as was suggested, the primed values were not perceived as directly relevant to the 
persuasion issues, then it is not surprising that the manipulation of accessibility did not predict the 
extent of message elaboration. It is likely that people interpret the effects of information about attitudes 
in the context of any number of values, which may or may not include the target value and may differ 
from person to person. To the extent that a particular value is made accessible and is perceived as 
relevant, there is an increased chance that, for any individual, the issue will be interpreted and 
analysed in terms of this value.
Presumably, a direct interaction between accessibility and argument quality would occur when values 
and attitudes are directly and intuitively linked in an individual’s mind (that are, therefore, by nature, 
more relevant). Rajecki (1990) implies that ‘higher-level’ attitudes are often linked to lower level 
attitudes in a chain. Depending on an attitude's position in the chain, it may be more or less closely 
linked to the target ‘higher-order’ attitude. Some values may have more obvious implications for
3. How does value accessibility influence persuasion?
139
attitudinal responses in the same way that some attitudes may have more direct links to behaviour. For 
example, it has been shown that attitudes towards recycling have more direct implications for recycling 
behaviour than do attitudes towards the environment. In a similar way, the value of honesty would have 
more direct implications for attitudes towards behaving honestly than to attitudes towards tax evasion 
in which honesty is one of a number of possible contributing factors and possibly regarded as an 
indirect component, it is worth noting that value accessibility would, in natural persuasion contexts, 
possibly be related to value relevance in that it is only those values that are seen as relevant to a 
particular situation which would automatically come to mind and influence subsequent decisions.
The significance of value importance implies that making a value more accessible will not cause most 
people to shift their attitudes in the direction of the value. Rather it suggests that if the target vaiue is 
more important to the individual than the competing values and perceived as relevant to the issue, the 
attitudes tended to be consistent with that vaiue, whereas if it is less important, or relevant the attitude 
will probably reflect other value priorities. An individual will not interpret an attitude in light of an 
activated value if they do not regard the value as relevant.
In study 5, priming s o d a !ju s tic e  did not increase the likelihood that people endorsed the social justice 
position. Rather, it increased the likelihood that the position endorsed was consistent with the 
importance of this value. If s o c ia l ju s tic e  m s  important, individuals tended to endorse the related 
position i.e. favourable attitudes towards tuition fees. Only if s o c ia l ju s tic e  was unimportant, did people 
endorse the soda! justice position.
This discussion illustrates the complexity of attitude change processes, which can be seen to depend 
on a variety of moderating conditions. Future work could consider further the psychological conditions 
that must be satisfied in order to accurately translate general values into specific attitudes. This 
research found support for three possible requirements, namely, value accessibility, relevance and 
importance.
SECTION 2 : QUESTIONS RAISED
There are three interrelated questions, which were raised by the current research. The first concerns 
the relationship between the dimensions of value importance and value accessibility. The second is a 
more general issue concerning the structural nature of values and their current status within the social
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psychological literature. The third question concerns the influence of context on the dimensions of 
value importance and value accessibility. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
1 . What is the relationship between value importance and value accessibility?
In studies 1 and 2 it was predicted that value importance and value accessibility would be positively 
correlated. This relationship was expected since value accessibility might be determined, at least 
partially, by value importance (or vice versa). The frequency of activation of a construct is said to 
determine its chronic accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981) and it was predicted that an important 
determinant of the frequency with which a value is activated is its importance i.e. important values are 
likely to be activated more frequently in an individual’s mind than unimportant values.
There is both theoretical and empirical support for such a prediction within the attitudinal literature. 
Krosnick (1989) hypothesised that important attitudes may be more accessible in memory and may 
therefore come to mind more frequently in the course of social perception. On the other hand, people 
may use their ease of retrieving an attitude from memory as a basis for inferring its importance. 
Fabrigar et al (1998) proposed that attitudes that are highly accessible might come to mind 
spontaneously and therefore imply to the individual that they have hedonic consequences. Bassili 
(1996) also suggested that attitude accessibility (indexed by response latency) could sometimes 
mediate meta-attitudinal judgments of attitude importance.
The relationship between attitude importance and accessibility has been confirmed by a number of 
empirical studies. For example, Roese & Olson, (1994) manipulated attitude accessibility by varying the 
frequency of attitude expression. Repeated expression was found to result in both reduced response 
latencies (i.e. enhanced attitude accessibility) and increased perceived attitude importance. The effect 
of repeated expression on latencies remained reliable when importance ratings were controlled, but the 
effect of repeated expression on importance disappeared when latencies were controlled. However, 
Powell & Fazio (1984) reported that, when repeated expression of attitudes involves judgements of 
attitude valence, they appear to affect only attitude accessibility but not actual attitude ratings or their 
extremity.
If values are conceptualised as a type of abstract attitude objects then it follows that, in the same way 
as attitude importance and accessibility are related, value accessibility would be related to value 
importance. However, although these concepts are related, they may not be synonymous. There are
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possibly factors other than value importance that would lead people to think in terms of particular * 
values and therefore increase their accessibility. Values may be activated in memory but not typically 
judged as important as guiding principles. In addition, not all values, which are considered important, 
may be chronically accessible.
As discussed in chapter 1, individuals do not live in one domain and important values within the family 
or at work may differ from those thought to be generally important to the individual. At work an 
individual might be required to abide by a code of professional standards that emphasise values that 
they might not ordinarily rate as important as guiding principles. It is also possible that some people 
regularly behave in ways that conflict with their values such as the values of punctuality or equality.
They may also justify their behaviour by appealing to values that are consistent with their behaviour, 
but are not actually perceived as important in their value systems (e.g. Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988). In 
such cases, individuals couid conceivably spend substantial amounts of time thinking in terms of these 
unimportant values, which may, as a result, become chronically accessible. Similarly, the experimental 
manipulation of accessibility, used in studies 4 and 5, may have temporarily raised the accessibility of 
the values of s o c ia l ju s tic e  and  su cce ss , but the importance of these values, as guiding principles in the 
participants’ lives might not have been increased.
Likewise, it is also possible that unimportant values are activated automaticaily if these values are 
linked to related attitudes that are activated frequently. For example, proponents of abortion may be 
aware of both sides of the abortion debate (e.g. Pratkanis, 1989) based on the values of in d iv id u a l 
fre e d o m  and s a n c tity  o f life , and both values may be frequently activated in their minds although 
individuals are likely to ascribe importance to only one of these values or to give another example, 
individuals in the armed forces may normally rate the value of the sanctity of life as extremely 
important, in situations of warfare. However, the value of n a tio n a l s e c u rity  m y  become more 
accessible, and their behaviour may reflect this.
The research reviewed brings into question the purity of the value accessibility manipulations used in 
studies 4 and 5. The results of study 5 provided evidence that when a value is primed this leads to the 
increased elaboration of a relevant persuasive message. However, no measure was taken of value 
accessibility, it is plausible then, that these manipulations served to increase value importance rather 
than value accessibility. Alternatively value accessibility may have been increased as predicted and this 
may have simultaneously increased individuals’ perceptions of value importance. Alternative 
manipulations of value accessibility may act to increase value accessibility in such a way that the
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salience of value importance is not altered since they do not involve rating the values on evaluative 
scales.
For example, some theorists have used subliminal priming manipulations to increase construct 
accessibility. Because neither involve expressions of value importance, they may be more likely to 
represent relatively "pure” accessibility effects. The use of such techniques in future research, would 
demonstrate whether increases in the accessibility of values are necessarily associated with increases 
in value importance.
To date, value research has focused on the measurement of value importance. This thesis has 
examined another aspect of value strength i.e. accessibility, if values are analogous to attitudes in 
terms of their structure, this suggests that the findings of other attitudinal dimensions may be 
applicable to values. A number of other properties of values have already been examined, namely, 
ambivalence (the extent to which one’s reactions to a value object are evaiuatively mixed) and 
confidence (the certainty with which an individual holds a value) e.g. Tetlock, (1986). It is possible that 
accessibility is correlated more strongly with these other aspects of value strength. For example, it is 
recognised likely it would take longer to report the importance of those values about which an 
individual has conflicting feelings. Future empirical work is needed to examine this possibility.
2. Are values synonymous with attitudes in terms of structure?
In the psychological literature, value structure has been conceptualised in a number of different ways 
(see chapter 1 , section 1). In this thesis, values are taken to consist of an association between an 
object and its evaluation in memory (cf. Fazio, 1986). Although the present studies do not involve a 
direct investigation of value structure, the results do provide some insight into the plausibility of this 
value conceptualisation.
The validity of response latency as a measure of value strength would suggest that, as with attitudes, 
values consist of object-evaluation associations in an individual’s mind. As discussed, analysis of the 
results of study 2  found moderate test-retest reliability and partial support for the construct validity of 
response latency as a measure of value strength. There was a significant relationship between 
response latency and respondents’ ratings of value importance during the latency assessments. It is 
suggested that further work is necessary in order to determine if value accessibility, as measured by 
response latency techniques, accesses the same aspect of value strength as more traditional value
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strength measures. However, in terms of evidence for the structural conceptualisation of individual 
attitudes, the present research does provide some promising evidence that values might be considered 
object-evaluation links in an individual’s cognitive system, comparable to the structure of attitudes 
proposed by Fazio et ai (1982).
In terms of external value structure, studies 3 and 5 are consistent with previous theory and research 
suggesting the existence of hierarchical links between values and attitudes in an individual’s cognitive 
system (e.g. Rokeach, 1967; Katz & Hass, 1988). Study 3 found evidence that the activation of 
important values leads to the raised accessibility of semantically related attitudes as indicated by 
shorter response times to judgements regarding these attitudes. Study 5 found evidence, which 
suggests that increasing value accessibility through repeated value expression might lead to the 
activation (and increased accessibility) of semantically related attitudes, which in turn, as Fabrigar et al 
(1998) discovered, leads to greater elaboration of related persuasive appeals.
The internal and external aspects of value structure can be seen to relate to two types of spreading 
activation, firstly, between elements of an individual value i.e. between a value object and an evaluation 
of that object and secondly, between values and other cognitive structures, such as attitudes. This 
conceptualisation mirrors that of Eagly & Chaiken (1998) in their discussion of intra- and inter- 
attitudinal strength and of Feather (1990) who suggests that vaiue strength depends on both their 
association with strong affective reactions along an evaluative continuum and secondly, the centrality of 
their position within the cognitive affective belief system i.e. the number and strength of links to other 
cognitive structures.
If value accessibility is defined as the extent to which a value is readily available in memory, then it 
could be divided into two types corresponding to the two types of value strength: (a ) internal 
accessibility -  dependent on the strength of the association between the value object and its 
evaluation in memory, and (b ) external accessibility -  the number and strength of links between a 
particular vaiue and other constructs. In this sense, Fazio's (1986 ) definition of (attitude) accessibility 
could be is seen as too narrow since it applies only to one source of accessibility i.e. internal structure.
Despite the structural similarities between the value and attitude concepts, it is proposed that the 
concept of values is worth pursuing independently to that of attitudes, due to the distinctive nature of 
values. Values are more than abstract attitudes; there are a number of other specific qualities which
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values are routinely held to possess. They are limited in number, refer to abstract goals and may also 
lack a cognitive basis unlike attitudes (cf. Maio & Olson, 1998).
3. What are the contextual issues in value accessibility and the vaiue-attitude relationship?
Value strength has typically been conceptualised in terms of the importance of particular values. More 
recently, this conceptualisation has been expanded to include the extent to which these values are 
thought to be important in their influence on thoughts about particular issues (e.g. Seligman & Katz,
1996, see chapter 1, section 1 ). The relative importance of values has been shown to change 
depending on the context in which their importance is rated. As a result, the importance to an individual 
of a particular value as a general guiding principle in their life may not predict an attitude toward an 
issue as well as the importance of that value in the way the individual thinks about the specific issue. 
That is, an individual may interpret the importance of a particular value within the constraints of a 
particular attitudinal or behavioural context.
It is plausible that, in the same way that value importance is context sensitive, so too is value 
accessibility. On the one hand, chronic levels of value accessibility might be independent of any 
particular attitudinal issue. For example, general value accessibility might be reflected in the ease with 
which an individual can decide how important a value is as a guiding principle in their lives. On the 
other hand, it may be the case that the immediate situation (e.g. the presentation of an attitude issue) 
will cause a particular value(s) to be accessed. For example, thinking about deforestation may cause 
an individual to think about the value p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily 
the case that those values that are generally more accessible (i.e. those whose chronic accessibility is 
..high) will be highly accessible when thinking about a particular issue. In fact it is conceivable that an 
individual’s perception of the immediate situation couid influence the accessibility of values 
independent of their chronic level of accessibility. In other words, specific values can be primed in 
certain situations resulting in situational influences so that temporary levels of accessibility become 
more influential over and above chronic levels of accessibility.
This situation can be regarded as specific to values rather than to more general attitudes. Attitudes 
typically refer to evaluations of specific attitude objects to which they relate. This suggests that in the 
same way as vaiue importance has been shown to be more predictive when measured in a specific 
context, temporary accessibility i.e. the accessibility of a vaiue at any particular moment in time, is likely 
to influence subsequent attitudes or behaviour irrespective of levels of chronic accessibility.
As discussed in chapter 1, Seligman & Katz (1996) suggest that individuals need both a stable value 
system but also to be able to respond flexibly according to the situation. Which values are consulted in 
a particular situation is likely to depend not only on value importance, but also on value relevance, it is 
proposed that this relevance may be determined by the temporary accessibility of particular values in a 
specific situation. Only values, which are relevant, will be activated and therefore made more 
accessible. This accessibility may result in those particular values being considered important in that 
particular context. Although relative rankings of value importance remain stable (Rokeach, 1973), 
value relevance (and therefore accessibility) is variable at any one point in time. Which values are 
relevant are ‘highlighted* and therefore become more accessible for any cognitive processing which is 
subsequently required.
When making decisions, or, in times of extreme value conflict, individuals may use the chronic 
accessibility of vaiues or value importance as a guide. However, on a more regular basis, it is the 
temporary accessibility of an individual's values, determined by the context, which is likely to guide 
attitudes and subsequent behaviour. For example, the priming process used in studies 4 and 5 would 
increase such temporary accessibility. An implication for the present thesis is that stronger effects may 
have been obtained if individuals had rated the values in terms of their importance in the light of the 
persuasion issue. This would have served the same function as the value relevance check since 
important values would be those perceived to be relevant in that particular context.
For this reason, it is possible that the value accessibility manipulation used in studies 4 and 5 would 
have had more impact on levels of attitude change than would the chronic levels of accessibility 
typically associated with those values. Fabrigar et al (1998) found comparable results when attitude 
accessibility was either manipulated or measured using response latency techniques. Perhaps future 
studies could also measure value accessibility using response latency techniques in order to determine 
whether, as Fabrigar et al found was the case with attitudes, chronic as well as temporary levels of 
(value) accessibility determined the elaboration of subsequent related persuasive messages.
It is also possible that measuring value importance within a particular context might decrease problems 
associated with inconsistent ratings across value measures in studies 1 and 2 . Some degree of 
instability may have resulted from the intrinsically abstract nature of values. Individuals may consider 
the importance of values within different contexts and therefore come to different conclusions 
regarding their importance, particularly following any elaboration that may have occurred between
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completion of the two value measures. This process would also result in decreased correlations 
between response latencies and later survey measures of value importance. If value importance was 
assessed within the context of a particular attitude issue, such inconsistent responding might be 
avoided.
SECTION 3: LIMITATIONS
Reflection on the methodology used in the current studies revealed a number of issues that are cause 
for caution when interpreting the experimental results. Firstly, following Fabrigar et al ( 1 998), it was 
assumed that participant levels of motivation and ability in studies 3 and 4 were moderate. If the 
postulates of the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1 986) are accepted, then the findings of central route 
processing in study 5 are compatible with such an assumption. However, in neither study were levels of 
motivation or ability assessed. This is particularly problematic since the ELM has been criticised for 
being unfaisifiable (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) since some variables have been found to have multiple 
effects (i.e. encouraging either central or peripheral processing, and biased or objective processing 
depending on contextual factors). Such an assumption of moderate ability/motivation may, therefore, 
mask other potentially confounding factors. In order to validate these suppositions, future studies, 
should, therefore, introduce a measure of these variables.
Secondly, the difficulties associated with response latency measurement are well documented.
Response latency could be criticised for being too dependent on having perfect experimental conditions 
with highly motivated subjects. According to Luce (1986, p.51), “Much of the art of running a good 
reaction-time experiment centres on gaining the cooperation of subjects in maintaining a high level of 
attention when actually running the experiment". Although in the studies reported, every effort was 
made it cannot be certain that these conditions were met.
Furthermore, it was assumed that the presentation of value primes and corresponding attitudes in 
study 3 could be treated as separate trials with no carry-over effects between each value-attitude 
pairing. A three second interval was left between the presentation of an attitude item and the 
presentation of the next value prime. Since it is established that the effects of primes are short-lived 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991), it was assumed that this time lag would prevent the value primes altering 
response times to other attitude items. However, to take account of this possibility, response times on 
future studies could be adjusted for individuals’ general baseline speed of responding by using filler 
trials. Although there was no reason to suspect that the priming manipulation had the potential to
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affect the decision criteria used by respondents, baseline latencies could be compared across 
experimental conditions. Significant differences would suggest that the manipulation of prime-attitude 
relevance affected participant decision criteria and may therefore have determined response latencies 
(cf. Fazio, 1995).
in general, the problem with response latency measures is that, as Fazio (1995) remarks, they are 
“unquestionably noisy” (p.95) and “extraordinarily messy” (p.75). It is stressed however, that, if used 
appropriately and interpreted carefully, they can be very informative. ‘Noise’ is thought to result from a 
number of sources. On a particular latency trial, individuals’ typically respond at different rates since 
their attention may wander or they might be confused about which response best represents their 
evaluation. As a result, whilst some subjects may reflect and deliberate about a response, leading to 
longer latencies, others may be more apathetic in their responses, resulting in shorter latencies. 
Keeping subjects’ attention and co-operation during response latency tasks is therefore essential 
(Fazio, 1995). Boredom and motivation levels need to be controlled.
As directed by Fazio (1995), the instructions given to subjects can assist in this task. In the current 
studies, subjects were asked to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible. They are also given 
practice trials in order to familiarise them with the task requirements and develop their reaction times 
to an acceptable baseline level, thereby increasing the chance that they would remain constant across 
target trials.
In general, the faster individuals respond during a latency task, the more likely it is that they will make a 
mistake (Fazio, 1995). In the current thesis, it was found that subjects made a large number of errors, 
responding inconsistently between testing sessions (a  mean of 1 2 . 0 2  in study 1 with a dichotic 
response format and a mean of 14.05 in study 2 when the number of response options was 
increased). This may have resulted from the fact that, despite instructions to be as accurate as 
possible, they had focused on responding quickly and so their decisions concerning the 
appropriateness of their responses had become sloppy. The ideal is that subjects commit very few 
errors while responding as quickly as possible.
With the exception of the 5-response option condition in study 2, there was no relationship between 
response speed and the number of errors made. This could reflect the fact that subjects were unable 
to make such judgements and perhaps do not have, as Bassili’s (1996) research suggests (see 
chapter 1), readily available summaries of the extent of their endorsement of particular values. In
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everyday life, individuals are not typically required to make an assessment of the importance of 
particular values, except in situations involving explicit value trade-offs. Furthermore, in study 2, where 
subjects had to decide, not only whether a value was personally ‘important’ or ‘not important’, but 
which particular scale position (e.g. 6 , 7 or 8 ) was most representative of the exact level of value 
importance. This task may have proved too difficult in the absence of any particular context, leading to 
ambiguity and inconsistent responses.
SECTION 4: CONCLUSION
Despite the accepted importance of the roie played by values, empirical attention has been limited 
compared to their potential importance (Flomer & Kahle, 1988). However, it is proposed that in the 
current thesis extends the body of knowledge within the field of value research through an investigation 
of one dimension of value strength -  value accessibility. Firstly, the research applies response latency 
techniques to the measurement of value strength, which, to the author’s knowledge, has not previously 
been done except in an unpublished dissertation by Gilchrist (1996). Future research is needed to 
provide construct validity for response latency measurement using values.
However, despite the ambiguous findings, the idea of response latency is appealing as “latency 
measures appear to provide reliable and valid indications of associative strength in memory (Fazio,
1995, p.94). In addition, Bassili (1996) has discussed the advantages of such operative measures 
with regard to attitudes, which can presumably be extrapolated to its use in the measurement of 
individual values. Response latency has been used extensively within attitudinal research, using not 
only computer-generated text although this is the most straight-forward and popular but also in the 
context of computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) technology. Furthermore, the cognitive 
representation of constructs in memory is difficult to investigate using other techniques.
The fact that the extent of message elaboration and attitude change was predicted by the differential 
accessibility of values suggests that it is worth exploring properties of values other than importance, 
and investigating their role in the value-attitude relationship. It is unlikely that attitudes are merely an 
expression of values. The current research provides support for the role of a number of other 
variables. It is proposed that although value accessibility is important, values may only influence 
attitudes to the extent that they are perceived as relevant and important. However, in natural settings, 
only relevant values would likely come to mind in any particular situation irrespective of their levels of 
accessibility.
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The finding that value accessibility has an effect on the extent of message elaboration suggests a 
number of consequences for the nature of attitude change, in particular, their temporal persistence, 
resistance and ability to predict behaviour. Petty & Cacioppo (1986) conclude that attitude changes 
that result from high levels of issue-relevant cognitive activity on dimensions central to the attitude 
object are stronger than changes that are accompanied by little issue-relevant thought. A question for 
future research concerns the relative role of accessibility or importance in the prediction of attitudes. 
There are circumstances under which each would be more likely to provide accurate prediction of 
attitude change.
The findings of the present thesis are compatible with the definition of values proposed by Feather 
(1990), although he is not explicit concerning the internal structure of individual values. He suggested 
that value importance involves both the relation of values to affect and the centrality of values, as 
indicated by their hierarchical location in the total system of beliefs, attitudes and values. These two 
relationships could be seen as analogous to both internal accessibility (as examined in studies 1 and
2) and external accessibility (as confirmed by study 3).
In addition, Feather suggests that other aspects of importance relate to current needs of the individual 
and to the immediate situation. This suggestion is consistent with the findings of study 5 concerning 
the significance of value relevance in the value-attitude relationship. He states that, due to this broad 
definition of the meaning of vaiue importance, research is needed, which investigates the affective basis 
of values more directly. It is proposed that questionnaire measures may be inadequate since 
researchers may become “trapped in some kind of semantic circle, of exploring the meaning of 
relations between words and not going beyond the semantic space". The current thesis, by introducing 
response latency as a measure of value strength, has gone some way to fulfilling these goals.
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A COMFORTABLE LIFE
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
SALVATION
COURAGEOUS
IMAGINATIVE
CHEERFUL
SELF-CONTROLLED
INTELLECTUAL
APPENDIX A (i)
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A COMFORTABLE LIFE 
(a  prosperous life)
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 
(lasting contribution)
SALVATION 
(saved, eternal life)
COURAGEOUS 
(daring, creative)
IMAGINATIVE
(restrained, self-disciplined)
CHEERFUL 
(lighthearted, joyful)
SELF-CONTROLLED 
(restrained, self-discipiined)
INTELLECTUAL 
(intelligent, reflective)
APPENDIX A (ii)
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"EQUALITY1 
"INNER HARMONY"
"SOCIAL POWER"
"PLEASURE"
"FREEDOM"
"SENSE OF BELONGING”
"SOCIAL ORDER"
"AN EXCITING LIFE"
"MEANING IN LIFE”
"POLITENESS"
“WEALTH"
"NATIONAL SECURITY1 
"SELF RESPECT'
"RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS” 
"CREATIVITY"
"A WORLD AT PEACE"
"RESPECT FOR TRADITION" 
"MATURE LOVE" 
"SELF-DISCIPLINE"
"PRIVACY"
"FAMILY SECURITY"
"SOCIAL RECOGNITION"
"UNITY WITH NATURE"
"A VARIED LIFE"
"WISDOM"
"AUTHORITY"
"TRUE FRIENDSHIP"
"A WORLD OF BEAUTY"
"SOCIAL JUSTICE"
"INDEPENDENT1
"MODERATE"
"LOYAL"
"AMBITIOUS"
"BROADMINDED"
"HUMBLE"
"DARING"
"PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT1 
"INFLUENTIAL"
"HONOURING OF PARENTS” 
"CHOOSING OWN GOALS" 
"HEALTHY1 
"CAPABLE"
"ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE" 
"HONEST1
"PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE"
"OBEDIENT1
"INTELLIGENT1
"HELPFUL"
"ENJOYING LIFE"
"RESPONSIBLE"
"CURIOUS"
"FORGIVING"
"SUCCESSFUL"
"CLEAN"
"SELF-INDULGENT1
"DETACHMENT1
"BROADMINDED"
“HUMBLE"
"DARING"
APPENDIX A (iii)
EQUALITY
(equal opportunity for all)
INNER HARMONY 
(at peace with myself)
SOCIAL POWER 
(control over others)
PLEASURE
(gratification of desire)
FREEDOM
(freedom of action and thought)
SENSE OF BELONGING 
(feeling that others care about me)
SOCIAL ORDER 
(stability of society)
AN EXCITING LIFE 
(stimulating experience)
MEANING IN LIFE 
(seeing purpose in life)
POLITENESS
(courtesy, good manners)
WEALTH
(material possessions, money)
NATIONAL SECURITY 
(protecting the nation from enemies)
SELF RESPECT
(belief in one's own worth)
RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS 
(avoidance of indebtedness)
CREATIVITY
(uniqueness, imagination)
A WORLD AT PEACE 
(free of war and conflict)
RESPECT FOR TRADITION 
(preserving time-honoured customs)
MATURE LOVE
(deep emotional and spiritual intimacy) 
SELF-DISCIPLINE
(self-restraint, resistance to temptation) 
PRIVACY
(the right to have a private sphere)
FAMILY SECURITY 
(safety for loved ones)
SOCIAL RECOGNITION 
(respect, approval by others)
UNITY WITH NATURE 
(fitting in to nature)
A VARIED LIFE
(filled with challenge, novelty and change) 
WISDOM
(a mature understanding of life) 
AUTHORITY
(the right to lead or command)
TRUE FRIENDSHIP 
(dose, supportive friends)
A WORLD OF BEAUTY 
(beauty of nature and the arts)
SOCIAL JUSTICE
(correcting injustice, care for the weak)
INDEPENDENT 
(self-reliant, self-sufficient)
MODERATE
(avoiding extremes of feeling and action) 
LOYAL
(faithful to my friends, group)
AMBITIOUS
(aspiring, hard-working)
BROADMINDED
(toierant of different ideas and beliefs) 
HUMBLE
(modest, self-effacing)
DARING
(seeking adventure, risk)
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
(Preserving Nature)
INFLUENTIAL
(Having An Impact On People And Events)
HONOURING OF PARENTS 
(Showing Respect)
CHOOSING OWN GOALS 
(Selecting Own Purpose)
HEALTHY
(Not Being Sick, Physically Or Mentally) 
CAPABLE
(Competent, Effective, Efficient)
ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE 
(submitting to circumstances)
HONEST
(genuine, sincere)
PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE 
(saving face)
OBEDIENT
(dutiful, meeting obligations)
INTELLIGENT 
(logical thinking)
HELPFUL
(working for the welfare of others) 
ENJOYING LIFE
(enjoying food, leisure, sex,-etc.)
RESPONSIBLE 
(dependable, reliable)
RESPONSIBLE 
(dependable, reliable)
CURIOUS
(interested in everything, exploring) 
FORGIVING
(willing to pardon others)
SUCCESSFUL 
(achieving goals)
CLEAN
(neat and tidy)
SELF-INDULGENT 
(doing pleasant things)
DETACHMENT 
(from worldly concerns)
156
INSTRUCTIONS
This is a simple value measurement task. There are no right or wrong answers.
•  Rest your hands comfortably above the response keys
• A series of words or phrases will appear one at a time in the middle of the computer screen.
•  Your task is to press one of the following two keys to indicate your judgment of the target word as a 
GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE.
Not important +  Important
•  Try to:
1. Be accurate and not in such a hurry that you regret a decision.
2. Respond as quickly as possible
3. Concentrate until the end of the task.
APPENDIX A (v)
T h a n k  Y o u
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APPENDIX A (vi)
INSTRUCTIONS
This is a simple word association task. There are no right or wrong answers.
•  Rest your hands comfortably above the response keys
•  A series of words or phrases will appear one at a time in the middle of the computer screen. Under
each word will be a description of the word in brackets.
•  Your task is to press one of the following two keys to indicate your judgment of the target word as a
GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE.
Not important +  Important
•  Try to:
4. Be accurate and not in such a hurry that you regret a decision.
5. Respond as quickly as possible
6 . Concentrate until the end of the task.
T h a n k  Y o u
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A COMFORTABLE LIFE 
(a prosperous life)
A SENSE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT 
(lasting contribution)
SALVATION 
(saved, eternal life)
COURAGEOUS 
(daring, creative)
IMAGINATIVE
(restrained, self-disciplined)
CHEERFUL 
(lighthearted, joyful)
SELF-CONTROLLED 
(restrained, self-disciplined)
INTELLECTUAL 
(intelligent, reflective)
APPENDIX B (i)
HONEST"
(genuine, sincere)"
EQUALITY”
(equal opportunity for all)"
FORGIVING”
(willing to pardon others)" 
INDEPENDENT"
(self-reliant, self-sufficient)" 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT" 
(preserving nature)"
FAMILY SECURITY"
(safety for loved ones)"
TRUE FRIENDSHIP"
(close, supportive friends)"
INNER HARMONY"
(at peace with myself)"
PLEASURE"
(gratification of desire)"
SOCIAL POWER"
(control over others)"
PLEASURE"
(gratification of desire)1 
FREEDOM1
(freedom of action and thought)1 
MEANING IN LIFE"
(seeing meaning in life)1 
SENSE OF BELONGING1 
(feeling that others care about me)" 
SOCIAL ORDER"
(stability of society)1 
SOCIAL RECOGNITION1 
(respect, approval by others)1 
AN EXCITING LIFE"
(stimulating experience)"
MATURE LOVE"
(deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)1 
BROADMINDED"
(tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)" 
MEANING IN LIFE"
(seeing purpose in life)"
POLITENESS"
(courtesy, good manners)’1 
WEALTH"
(material possessions, money)" 
NATIONAL SECURITY"
(protecting the nation from enemies)1 
SELF RESPECT"
(belief in one’s own worth)'1 
RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS1 
(avoidance of indebtedness)1 
CREATIVITY”
(uniqueness, imagination)1 
LOYAL”
(faithful to my friends, group)1 
A WORLD AT PEACE”
(free of war and conflict)"
RESPECT FOR TRADITION”
(preserving time-honoured traditions)1
"MATURE LOVE"
"(deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)" 
"SELF-DISCIPLiNE"
"(self-restraint, resistance to temptation)" 
"HUMBLE"
"(modest, self-effacing)1'
"PRIVACY"
"(the right to have a private sphere)" 
"FAMILY SECURITY"
"(safety for loved ones)"
"SOCIAL RECOGNITION"
"(respect, approval by others)" 
"HONOURING OF PARENTS"
“(showing respect)"
"UNITY WITH NATURE"
"(fitting in to nature)"
"A VARIED LIFE"
"(filled with challenge, novelty and change)" 
"WISDOM"
"(a mature understanding of life)" 
"AUTHORITY"
"(the right to lead or command)"
"TRUE FRIENDSHIP"
"(dose, supportive friends)"
"NATIONAL SECURITY"
"(proteding the nation from enemies)" 
"SELF-INDULGENT’
"(doing pleasant things)"
"A WORLD OF BEAUTY"
"(beauty of nature and the arts)1 
"SOCIAL JUSTICE"
"(correding. injustice, care for the weak)" 
"INDEPENDENT1 
" (self-reliant, self-sufficient)1 
"MODERATE1
"(avoiding extremes of feeling and adion)1 
"DARING"
"(seeking adventure, risk)1 
"LOYAL1
"(faithful to my friends, qroup)1 
"PRIVACY"
"(the right to have a private sphere)1 
"SOCIAL ORDER1 
"(stability of society)1’
"AMBITIOUS1
"(aspiring, hard-working)1 
"BROADMINDED"
"(tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)1 
"HUMBLE1
"(modest, self-effacing)1 
"DETACHMENT 
"(from worldly goods)1 
"DARING"
"(seeking adventure, risk)"
"WISDOM"
"(a mature understanding of life)1 
"PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
"(preserving nature)1 
"INFLUENTIAL1
"(having an impact on people and events)1
"HONOURING OF PARENTS"
"(showing respect)"
"UNITY WITH NATURE"
"(fitting in to nature)"
"CHOOSING OWN GOALS"
"(selecting own purpose)"
"HEALTHY"
"(not being sick, physically or mentally)1 
"CAPABLE"
"(competent, effective, efficient)" 
"ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE" 
"(submitting to circumstances)"
"SELF RESPECT"
"(belief in one's own worth)"
"FREEDOM"
"(freedom of action and thought)"
"HONEST1
"(genuine, sincere)"
"POLITENESS"
"(courtesy, good manners)"
"CLEAN"
"(neat and tidy)"
"SOCIAL JUSTICE"
"(correcting injustice, care for the weak)" 
“INTELLIGENT'
"(logical thinking)"
"PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE"
"(saving face)"
"OBEDIENT'
"(dutiful, meeting obligations)"
"A WORLD OF BEAUTY"
"(beauty of nature and the arts)"
"CURIOUS"
"(interested in everything, exploring)"
"A WORLD AT PEACE"
"(free of war and conflict)"
"A VARIED LIFE"
"(filled with challenge, novelty and change)" 
"HELPFUL"
"(working for the welfare of others)" 
"INTELLIGENT"
"(logical thinking)"
"INNER HARMONY"
"(at peace with myself)"
"INFLUENTIAL"
"(having an impact on people and events)" 
"SELF-DISCIPLINE"
"(self-restraint, resistance to temptation)" 
"SOCIAL POWER”
"(control over others)"
"MODERATE"
"(avoiding extremes of feeling and action)" 
"HELPFUL"
"(working for the welfare of others)" 
"ENJOYING LIFE"
"(enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc.)" 
"CHOOSING OWN GOALS"
"(selecting own purpose)"
"HEALTHY"
"(not being sick, physically or mentally)"
"CAPABLE"
"(competent, effective, efficient)" 
"SUCCESSFUL"
"(achieving goais)"
"ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE" 
"(submitting to circumstances)" 
"PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE" 
"(saving face)"
"RESPONSIBLE"
"(dependable, reliable)"
"CURIOUS"
"(interested in everything, exploring)" 
"FORGIVING"
"(willing to pardon others)"
"EQUALITY"
"(equal opportunity for all)"
"AN EXCITING LIFE"
"(stimulating experience)" 
"SUCCESSFUL"
"(achieving goals)"
"CLEAN"
"(neat and tidy)"
"SELF-INDULGENT1 
"(doing pleasant things)"
"SENSE OF BELONGING"
"(feeling that others care about me)1' 
"AMBITIOUS"
"(aspiring, hard-working)"
"AUTHORITY"
"(the right to lead or command)" 
"CREATIVITY"
"(uniqueness, imagination)"
"DETACHMENT1
"(from worldly goods)"
"ENJOYING LIFE"
"(enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc.)1 
"WEALTH1
"(material possessions, money)" 
"RESPECT FOR TRADITION"
"(preserving time-honoured traditions)" 
"OBEDIENT1
"(dutiful, meeting obligations)" 
"RECIPROCATION OF FAVOURS" 
"(avoidance of indebtedness)" 
"RESPONSIBLE"
"(dependable, reliable)"
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This is a simple word association task. There are no right or wrong answers.
• Rest your hands comfortably above the response keys
• A series of words will appear one at a time in the middle of the computer screen. Under each word 
will be a description of the word in brackets.
• Your task is to press one of the following keys to indicate your judgment of the target word as a 
GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE.
Use:
- - .....................................................not at all important
......................................................slightly important
0 ......................................................moderately important
+  ...................................................... very important
+ +  .............. ...................................... supremely important
Try to:
Be accurate and not in such a hurry that you regret a decision.
Respond as quickly as possible
- Concentrate until the end of the task.
APPENDIX B (iii)
INSTRUCTIONS
T h a n k  Y o u
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This is a simple word association task. There are no right or wrong answers.
• Rest your hands comfortably above the response keys
• A series of words will appear one at a time in the middle of the computer screen. Under each word 
will be a description of the word in brackets.
• Your task is to press one of the following keys to indicate your judgment of the target word as a 
GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE.
APPENDIX B (iv)
INSTRUCTIONS
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use:
- 1 ........................................................opposed to
0 .........................................................not at all important
 6.........................................................very important
 7.........................................................of supreme importance
OR
any of the scale points in between 
Try to:
- Be accurate and not in such a hurry that you regret a decision. 
Respond as quickly as possible
- Concentrate until the end of the task.
T h a n k  Y o u
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VOLUNTEERNG FOR A NEEDY CAUSE
Related value: “Helpful”
Unrelated value: “Protecting the environment”
DISARMAMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Related Value: “a world at peace”
Unrelated vaiue: “CHOOSING OWN GOALS”
REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS
Related Value: “SOCIAL JUSTICE”
Unrelated Value: “unity with nature"
ACCEPTING ETHNIC MINORITIES
Related Value: “EQUALITY”
Unrelated Value: “a world of beauty”
RECYCLING OF WASTE
Related Value: “protecting the environment”
Unrelated Value: “HUMBLE”
OWNING UP IF UNDERCHARGED
Related Value: "HONESTY”
Unrelated Value: "clean”
ABORTION ON DEMAND
Related Value: “individual freedom”
Unrelated Value: “TRUE FRIENDSHIP”
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY GAYS
Related Vaiue: “Broadminded”
Unrelated Value: “WEALTH”
APPENDIX C (i)
RESULTS OF PRE-TEST STUDY 3
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INSTRUCTIONS
A word or phrase will appear in the centre of the screen in SMALL CASE letters -  try to remember it. It 
will disappear from the screen quickly.
Next, a statement will appear in CAPITAL LETTERS. You are asked whether the statement intent is 
GOOD or BAD. You reply using the 2 keys:
\  I
Bad Good
When you press a key, the word will disappear and then the whole process will start again.
Example
forgiving
(you should try to remember this word)
WALKING RATHER THAN TAKING THE BUS 
(you should decide if this is a good or bad thing )
You must respond QUICKLY -  do not spend too long considering the answer
APPENDIX C (ii)
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APPENDIX C (iii)
Unrelated Value Prime: “protecting the environment”
Attitude item: VOLUNTEERNG FOR A NEEDY CAUSE
Related Value Prime: "a world at peace”
Attitude item: DISARNAMAMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Unrelated Value Prime: “unity with nature"
Attitude Item: REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS
Related Value Prime: “"equality”
Attitude item: ACCEPTING ETHNIC MINORITIES
Unrelated Value Prime: “humble”
Attitude Item: “RECYCLING OF WASTE
Related Value Prime: “honesty”
Attitude Item: “OWNING UP IF UNDERCHARGED
Unrelated value Prime: “true friendship”
Attitude Item: ABORTION ON DEMAND
Related Value Prime: “broadminded”
Attitude item: ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY GAYS
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APPENDIX C (iv)
Related Value Prime: “Helpfui"
Attitude item: VOLUNTEERNG FOR A NEEDY CAUSE
Unrelated Value Prime: “choosing own goals”
Attitude item: DISARNAMAMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Related Value Prime: “social justice”
Attitude Item: REHABILITATION OF PRISONERS
Unrelated Value Prime: “a world of beauty”
Attitude Item: ACCEPTING ETHNIC MINORITIES
Related Value Prime: “protecting the environment”
Attitude item: “RECYCLING OF WASTE
Unrelated Value Prime: “clean”
Attitude Item: “OWNING UP IF UNDERCHARGED
Related value Prime: “individual freedom”
Attitude Item: ABORTION ON DEMAND
Unrelated Value Prime: “wealth”
Attitude item: ADOPTION OF CHILDREN BY GAYS
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WORD RECOGNITION TASK
Please tick the words or phrases that you recognise seeing in lower-case during the experiment.
APPENDIX C (v)
□ Broadminded
□ Clean
□ Humble
□ Health
□ Choosing own goals
□ Individual freedom
□ Equality
□ Unity with nature
□ True friendship
□ Excitement
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APPENDIX C (vi)
Please list the following 4 values in order of their importance as GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN YOUR LIFE
A WORLD AT PEACE 
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
BROADMINDED
Most
□
□
□
□
Least
□
□
□
□
VALUE IMPORTANCE SURVEY
THANK-YOU FOR YOUR HELP
171
Part A 
ATTITUDINAL SURVEY
This questionnaire is part of a research project on student attitudes. Similar projects are being 
conducted in other universities to perform a comparison of students’ attitudes. There are 30 questions 
about your attitudes.
You are asked to rate how important each attitude is for you as a guiding principle in YOUR life, using 
the scale provided. Try to distinguish as much as possible between the attitudes by using al! the 
numbers. Please try to answer as honestly as possible, there are no right or wrong responses.
The rating scale we want to use runs:
- 2  - 1  0  1  2
APPENDIX D (i)
strongly disagree neither agree agree strongly agree
disagree nor disagree
Circle the number opposite the attitude, according to the scale above
1. State funding of the arts should be abolished.
- 2 - 1  0 1 2
2. The Latin language should be put on the national curriculum
- 2 - 1  0  1 2
3. Co-education is preferable to single-sex education
- 2 - 1  0  1 2
4. Contact sports such as rugby boxing should be abolished-
-2 - 1  0  1 2
5. Parents should have the right to smack their children-
-2 - 1  0  1 2
6. Nursery education should be provided by the state free of charge
-2 - 1  0  1 2
7. The death penalty should be introduced for murder
-2 - 1 0  1 2
8. A curfew should be introduced for children under ten years of age when unaccompanied by an
adult
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
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9. It is an individual’s right to choose what drugs to use
-2 - 1 0  1 2
10. Britain’s licensing laws are outdated and draconian
-2 - 1 0  1 2
11. Mandatory prison sentences should be imposed for third convictions of burglary
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
12. Sex offending could be cured by the chemical castration of offenders
-2 - 1 0  1 2
13. Complementary medicine (e.g. acupuncture) should be provided by the N.H.S.
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
14. Contraception should be freely available at any age
- 2 - 1 0 1 2
15. The benefits of genetic engineering outweigh the dangers
-2 - 1 0  1 2
16. State funding for space exploration should be increased
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
17. Global warming is the biggest danger facing the modern world
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
18. In the interests of society as a whole, we should censor the Internet
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
19. The government should promote privatised healthcare
-2 - 1 0  1 2
20. National service should be reintroduced in Britain
-2 - 1 0  1 2
21. A maximum limit should be set on all salaries
-2 - 1 0  1 2
22. Community work should be made compulsory for al! able recipients of welfare.
- 2 - 1 0  1 2
23. The prosecution of war criminals is a good thing
-2 - 1 0  1 2
24. A National ID card encoding personal information (e.g. photo, fingerprint, criminal and bank details, 
passport, driving license) should be introduced by the Government
. - 2 - 1 0  1 2
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25. Abortion should always be allowed on demand
-2 - 1 0  1 2
26. Begging in public places by those genuinely in need should be tolerated
-2 - 1 0  1 2
27. Gambling should be banned for the under 21 ’s
-2 - 1 0  1 2
28. Homosexual coupies should be allowed to adopt children
-2 - 1 0  1 2
29. Voluntary euthanasia should be made legal
-2 - 1 0  1 2
30. The idea of life-long marriage is outdated
-2 - 1 0  1 2
T H A N K - Y O U
174
This questionnaire is part of a research project examining student values. There are five sections.
Please try to answer all questions as honestly as possible. Do not spend too much time thinking about 
any one question, there are no right and wrong answers. All questions will be entirely anonymous and 
the information you give will be treated with complete confidentiality.
APPENDIX D (ii)
THE VALUES SURVEY
THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP.
Part A
Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are opposed to the principles that guide you. Use 7 for any value of supreme 
importance as a guiding principle in your life. Use 0 if a value is not at all important to you, and 6 if a 
value is very important to you.
Creativity (uniqueness, imagination)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Daring (seeking adventure, risk)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Enjoying Life (enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc.)
- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Humble (modest, self-effacing)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Politeness (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family Security (safety for loved ones)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part B
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are undesirable. Use 7 for any value of which is supremely desirable. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all desirable, and 6 if a value is very desirable. Circle the number opposite the value, 
according to the scale above.
175
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A Varied Life (filled with challenge, novelty and change)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pleasure ... (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Accepting My Portion in Life (submitting to circumstances)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
National Security (protecting the nation from enemies)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part C
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale below.
-1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if you never think about the value. Use 7 for any value which you always think about. Use 0 for 
a value which you rarely think about, and 6 for a value which you frequently think about.
Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
An Exciting Life (stimulating experience)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Self-Discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Order (stability of society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part D
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are unimportant. Use 7 for any value of supreme importance. Use 0 if a value is 
not at all important and 6 for any value you consider to be very important. Circle the number opposite 
the value, according to the scale above.
Curious (interested in everything, exploring)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Respect for Tradition (preserving time-honoured customs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honouring of Parents and elders (showing respect)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Clean (neat and tidy)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Healthy (not being sick, physically or mentally)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part E
Please rate how FOOLISH / WISE each of the following values are by circling a number 
according to the scale below.
-1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values which you consider foolish. Use 7 for any value you consider wise. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all wise and 6 if a value is extremely wise.
Choosing Own Goals (selecting own purpose)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling and action 
-1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 '
Reciprocation of Favours (avoidance of indebtedness)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Self Respect (belief in one’s own worth)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sense of Belonging (feeling that others care about me)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please fill in your :Sex ...... Age
Course.........................................
First Language ............................
THANK-YOU
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THE VALUES SURVEY
This questionnaire is part of a cross-nationai research project on human values and their evaluation in 
which the University of Surrey is taking part. The overall aim is to provide a comparison of peoples’ 
values, based on a theory of a universal structure of values.
There are five sections. Please try to answer ail questions as honestly as possible. Do not spend too 
much time thinking about any one question, there are no right and wrong answers. All questions will be 
entirely anonymous and the information you give will be treated with complete confidentiality.
Thank you very much for your help.
Part A
Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below.
-1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are opposed to the principles that guide you. Use 7 for any value of supreme 
importance as a guiding principle in your life. Use 0 if a value is not at all important to you, and 6 if a 
value is very important to you.
APPENDIX D (iii)
Creativity (uniqueness, imagination)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Daring (seeking adventure, risk)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Enjoying Life (enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc0
- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Humble (modest, self-effacing)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Politeness (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family Security (safety for loved ones)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part B
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Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number 
using the scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if any values are undesirable. Use 7 for any value of which is supremely desirable. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all desirable, and 6 if a value is very desirable. Circle the number opposite the value, 
according to the scale above.
A Varied Life (filled with challenge, novelty and change)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pleasure (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Accepting My Portion in Life (submitting to circumstances)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
National Security (protecting the nation from enemies)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part C
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if you never think about the value. Use 7 for any value which you always think about. Use 0 for 
a value which you rarely think about, and 6 for a value which you frequently think about.
Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
An Exciting Life (stimulating experience)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Devout (holding to religious faith and belief)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Self-Discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Order (stability of society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part D
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values are by circling a number using
the scale below.
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-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if any values are unimportant. Use 7 for any vaiue of supreme importance. Use 0 if a value is
not at all important and 6 for any value you consider to be very important. Circle the number opposite
the value, according to the scale above.
Curious (interested in everything, exploring)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Respect for Tradition (preserving time-honoured customs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honouring of Parents and elders (showing respect)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Clean (neat and tidy)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Healthy (not being sick, physically or mentally)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part E
Please rate how FOOLISH / WISE each of the following values are by circling a number 
according to the scale below.
-1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if any values which you consider foolish. Use 7 for any vaiue you consider wise. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all wise and 6 if a value is extremely wise.
Choosing Own Goals (selecting own purpose)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling and action 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reciprocation of Favours (avoidance of indebtedness) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Freedom (freedom of action and thought)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Self Respect (belief in one’s own worth)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sense of Belonging (feeling that others care about me) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please fill in your ;Sex ....  Age..............
Course  ..........................................
First Language .................. ..........................
T H A N K - Y O U
180
THE VALUES SURVEY
This questionnaire is part of a cross-national research project on human values and their evaluation in 
which the University of Surrey is taking part. The overall aim is to provide a comparison of peoples’ 
values, based on a theory of a universal structure of values.
APPENDIX D (iv)
There are five sections. Please try to answer ail questions as honestly as possible. Do not spend too 
much time thinking about any one question, there are no right and wrong answers. All questions will be 
entirely anonymous and the information you give will be treated with complete confidentiality.
Thank you very much for your help.
Part A
Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are opposed to the principles that guide you. Use 7 for any value of supreme 
importance as a guiding principle in your life. Use 0 if a value is not at all important to you, and 6 if a 
value is very important to you.
Pleasure (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Justice (correctinq injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Successful (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Power (control over others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Broadminded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) 
- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Helpful (working for the welfare of others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part B
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number 
using the scale below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Use -1 if any values are undesirable. Use 7 for any value of which is supremely desirable. Use 0 if a
value is not at all desirable, and 6 if a value is very desirable. Circle the number opposite the value,
according to the scale above.
Enjoying Life (enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc.)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Capable (competent, effective, efficient)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Authority (the right to lead or command)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honest (genuine, sincere)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unity With Nature (fitting in to nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part C
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values according to the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if you never think about the value. Use 7 for any value which you always think about. Use 0 for 
a value which you rarely think about, and 6 for a value which you frequently think about.
Social Justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ambitious (aspiring, hard-working)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wealth (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mature Love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Protecting the Environment (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part D
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values are by circling a number using
the scale below.
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Use -1 if any values are unimportant. Use 7 for any value of supreme importance. Use 0 if a value is 
not at all important and 6 for any value you consider to be very important. Circle the number opposite 
the value, according to the scale above.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Influential (having an impact on people and events)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Preserving My Public Image (saving face)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loyal (faithful to my friends, group)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
True Friendship (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Justice (correctinq injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part E
Please rate how unnecessary / necessary important each of the following values are FOOLISH 
/ WISE by circling a number according to the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if any values which you consider foolish. Use 7 for any value you consider wise. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all wise and 6 if a value is extremely wise.
Intelligent (logical thinking)
Social Recognition (respect, approval by others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Equality (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Responsible (dependable, reliable)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A World of Beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please fill in your ;Sex ....  Age..............
Course................................ .......................
First Language
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This questionnaire is part of a cross-national research project on human values and their evaluation in 
which the University of Surrey is taking part. The overall aim is to provide a comparison of peoples’ 
values, based on a theory of a universal structure of values.
There are five sections. Please try to answer all questions as honestly as possible. Do not spend too 
much time thinking about any one question, there are no right and wrong answers. All questions will be 
entirely anonymous and the information you give will be treated with complete confidentiality.
Thank you very much for your help.
Part A
Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scaie below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values are opposed to the principles that guide you. Use 7 for any vaiue of supreme 
importance as a guiding principle in your life. Use 0 if a value is not at all important to you, and 6 if a 
value is very important to you.
Pleasure (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Successful (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Power (control over others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Broadminded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Helpful (working for the welfare of others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part B
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number 
using the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
APPENDIX D (v)
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Use -1 if any values are undesirable. Use 7 for any value of which is supremely desirable. Use 0 if a
value is not at all desirable, and 6 if a value is very desirable. Circle the number opposite the value,
according to the scale above.
Enjoying Life (enjoying food, leisure, sex, etc.)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Capable (competent, effective, efficient)
- 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Authority (the right to lead or command)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Honest (genuine, sincere)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unity With Nature (fitting in to nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PartC
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values according to the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Use-1 if you never think about the value. Use 7 for any value which you always think about. Use 0 for 
a value which you rarely think about, and 6 for a value which you frequently think about.
Ambitious (aspiring, hard-working)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wealth (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Forgiving (willing to pardon others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mature Love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy) 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Protecting the Environment (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part D
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below.
-1 0 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
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Use-1 if any values are unimportant. Use 7 for any value of supreme importance. Use 0 if a value is
not at all important and 6 for any value you consider to be very important. Circle the number opposite
the value, according to the scale above.
influential (having an impact on people and events)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Preserving My Public Image (saving face)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Loyal (faithful to my friends, group)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
True Friendship (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part E
Please rate how unnecessary / necessary important each of the following values are FOOLISH 
/ WISE by circling a number according to the scaie below.
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use -1 if any values which you consider foolish. Use 7 for any value you consider wise. Use 0 if a 
value is not at all wise and 6 if a value is extremely wise.
Intelligent (logical thinking)
Social Recognition (respect, approval by others)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Equality (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Responsible (dependable, reliable)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Social Justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A World of Beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please fill in your :Sex ...... Age
Course  .............................
First Language .............................
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APPENDIX D (vi)
A R T I C L E  R E A D A B I L I T Y
The purpose of the following task is to assess the quality of samples of writing.
Overleaf is an extract from an article concerning the Introduction of a National Identity Card. Your task 
is to read the passage carefully and then complete the questions overleaf. There are no right or wrong 
answers; it is your opinion, which counts.
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One recent initiative by the British Government is the idea of introducing National Identity cards. In May 
last year they released a green paper for discussion concerning a card which would feature a huge 
range of information including photographic images, retina and fingerprint records, signature, bank and 
credit details and criminal record. This card would also replace the current driving license and 
passport.
National identity cards have however received a number of criticisms.
Firstly, identity cards would represent a major intrusion by the government into the privacy of the 
individual and would greatly increase state control. We value our liberties strongly and should be wary 
of any attempt to undermine them. The chance of losing all forms of identification together would be 
high and immensely inconvenient. The police are always technologically less advanced than criminals, 
as credit card fraud and on-line financial crime suggests. If criminals did obtain card-reading 
technology, they would gain access to all parts of our lives via a stolen card and impersonation would 
become much easier.
If a voluntary identity card was introduced, - in order to solicit public support before card-holding 
became compulsory - suspicion would fall on those who did not carry them - an infringement of civil 
liberties. With separate cards we have a choice about whether and when to carry them, and which ones 
to take out with us.
Smart-card technology is so advanced as to be dangerous; we would have no idea what information 
was contained on our ID cards that could be read by others, and no choice about how much 
information to declare. Employers and the police could discriminate against us on the basis of hidden 
facts that we should have the right to keep hidden.
There seems to be a fair bit of dissent among the various factions in all parties. However, the public 
does have its chance to air its views until the 30th September. So take your opportunity to voice your 
concerns over the introduction of ID cards before it alters your life for good.
APPENDIX D (vii)
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One recent initiative by the British Government is the idea of introducing National Identity cards. In May 
last year they released a green paper for discussion concerning a card which would feature a huge 
range of information including photographic images, retina and fingerprint records, signature, bank and 
credit details and criminal record. This card would also replace the current driving license and 
passport.
National identity cards have however received a number of criticisms.
The cost of introducing 60 million smart cards and vast numbers of card-reading machines would be 
enormous. As well as financial difficulties, the administration involved in producing identity cards would 
be immense and some transactions could be slowed down if people forget or mislay their cards.
In order to be effective, card-carrying would have to be compulsory (as with the road-tax disc) and 
failure to produce it would be a crime. Enforcing this policy would use up valuable police and court 
time. The national identity card would become just another bit of plastic that you have got to carry 
around. It could easily get confused with other cards (AA card, Tesco Club card, video card etc.)
There seems to be a fair bit of dissent among the various factions in all parties. However, the public 
does have its chance to air its views until the 30th September. So take your opportunity to voice our 
concerns over the introduction of ID cards by writing before the additional bureaucracy and red tape 
affects you.
APPENDIX D (viii)
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The prosecution of war criminals has traditionally concentrated on suspected Nazi camp guards and 
civilian officers responsible for millions of deaths during the Second World War. A lot of evidence was 
lost in the chaotic post-war period or was hidden behind the Iron Curtain. Since the fall of communism 
in the 1980’s it is now possible to identify many more suspects. However, more recent atrocities in 
Rwanda and Bosnia and the prosecution of ‘current’ criminals has opened up the debate about the war 
crime trials.
War crime trials are based on fundamental principles of justice and go far beyond national laws or 
legislative bodies. Morally they are essential.
No matters how long ago war crimes - such as participation in genocide, torture and murderous 
reprisals against civilians - took place we must never forget them, if evidence for war crimes during the 
Second World War had come to light immediately, suspects would definitely have been prosecuted.
They should not escape justice simply because of the time lapse. Age is no defence.
Trials are in the interests of surviving victims, Victims are among those most in favour of prosecution, 
and we should not make assumptions about whether they can cope with the pain of testifying. Many 
have had to live with horrifying memories for years, and to see justice done would achieve a cathartic 
closure.
Crimes such as participation in genocide, torture and murderous reprisals against civilians are 
abhorrent. Justice should be pursued without considering excuses such as age, rank or fear of 
consequences as excuses for perpetrating appalling and sickening atrocities. We owe justice to the 
victims to ensure that perpetrators of war crimes do not go unpunished.
APPENDIX D (ix)
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The prosecution of war criminals has traditionally concentrated on suspected Nazi camp guards and 
civilian officers responsible for many deaths during the Second World War. Often they were not German 
were able to evade prosecution after 1945 by settling around the world, while evidence was lost in the 
chaotic postwar period or was hidden behind the Iron Curtain. Since the fall of communism in the 
1980's it is now possible to identify many more suspects. However, more recent atrocities in Rwanda 
and Bosnia and the prosecution of ‘current’ criminals have opened up the debate about the war crime 
trials. Furthermore, war crime trials may also encourage public awareness of the past since many of the 
trials involve crimes committed during the Second World War.
War crime trials may act as a possible deterrent to potential war criminals who worry that they too 
might be caught and face trial. With the terrible genocide in recent years, it is important to prosecute 
past war criminals to show that such atrocities will never go unpunished.
The prosecution of war criminals may also improve international relations through cooperation and 
partnership on independent tribunals. It may also foster a sense of a united International community 
working together to uphold a moral and humane code of behaviour. Trials represent an opportunity to 
show moral superiority i.e. that some states are more civilized than others and that there are 
standards to be aspired to.
APPENDIX D (ix)
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Please answer the following questions in the spaces provided by ticking the relevant box. There are no 
right or wrong answers; it is your opinion, which we are interested in.
1. From the text how old would you estimate the writer to be?
□ Under 25 years
□ 25 -45 years
□ Over 45 years
□ it is impossible to tell
2. In your opinion, does the style of the text suggest it was written by:
□ A male
□ A female
□ It is impossible to tell?
3. Which of the following do you think is the source of the article
□ Newspaper
□ Periodical
□ Letter
□ Radio transcript
□ It is impossible to tell
4. Is the text written by a native English speaker?
□ Yes
□ No
□ It is impossible to tell
5. Do you think that the writing is grammatically correct?
□ Yes
□ No
6. How convincing do you consider the arguments in the editorial to be?
□ Extremely convincing
□ Convincing
□ Very convincing
□ A little convincing
□ Not at all convincing
7. Do you think the article was written by:
□ A journalist
□ A scientist
□ A politician?
□ It is impossible to tell
APPENDIX D (xi)
READABILITY SURVEY
THANK-YOU
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NEWS ITEM OPINION SURVEY
Below are statements about topics that have been in the news over the past few months. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements by circling a number on each of 
the scales below.
1. People in London have recently been urged by the Government not to give directly to beggars but to 
donate money to official charities.
Most beggars want money to pay for alcohol and cigarettes or for more serious drugs. We 
should not therefore give them money to feed these addictions:
APPENDIX E (I)
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
We have a duty to help beggars by giving money to them on the streets as well as through 
charities:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
It is the responsibility of the Government and Social Services to provide and keep people from 
needing to beg:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
2. As was recently in the news, Sarah Payne, aged 8 was recently sexually assaulted and murdered, 
whilst out playing. This has raised extensive debate over the issue of publicising the names and 
addresses of known paedophiles and sex offenders. To what extent so you agree with the following?
The public needs to be informed of the whereabouts of sex offenders after they are released 
from prison so that they can take the necessary precautions:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
The publication of sex offender registers stigmatises offenders who have been successfully 
rehabilitated and no longer pose a problem to society:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
A register of past sex offenders will enable the police to pursue leads to new crimes more quickly and 
eliminate suspects:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
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3. There have recently been widespread student demonstrations against the cost of a university 
education. To what extent so you agree with the following?
It is right that students should pay university tuition fees:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
A graduate tax should be introduce to help fund university education:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
More scholarships shouid be made available for students of exceptional academic ability.
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
4. The private lives of actors, singers, and sports personalities are constantly subjected to media 
scrutiny especially in the tabloid papers. There is current debate over the rights of the press versus 
those of famous individuals. To what extent so you agree with the following?
Public exposure is one of the prices of fame and power. Celebrities realise this from the start 
and if they do not tike it they should not enter the public sphere:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
Intrusive photographs of celebrities or "kiss and tell” stories from their alleged lovers should 
be banned:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
As long as we keep buying, in our millions, the papers and magazines containing such stories, 
it is hypocritical to criticise the media for its intrusion:
Completely Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Completely disagree
THANK-YOU
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PART 1
Please rate how important each of the following vaiues are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
APPENDIX E (ii)
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD AT PEACE (free of conflict and war)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 2
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below:
Undesirable -1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7  Extremely Desirable
Slightly Desirable Desirable
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
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PART 3
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale beiow:
Never ___________________________________________________ All the time
-1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7
Occasionally Frequently
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
INTELLIGENT (logical thinking)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for ail)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 4
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values is by circling a number using the 
scale below:
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 - 4  5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
WEALTH (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for ail)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual love)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 5
Please rate the extent to which you DISRESPECT/RESPECT an individual with the following values are by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
Disrespect - 1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7  Extremely Respect
Do not Respect Slightly Respect Respect
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOCIAL ORDER (stability in society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PRIVACY (the right to have a private life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLEASE FILL IN  YOUR
Sex: ____
A aer
197
Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
APPENDIX E (iii)
PART 1
Opposed To- 1 0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HONESTY (genuine, sincere)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD AT PEACE (free of conflict and war)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 2
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below:
Undesirable -1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7  Extremely Desirable
Slightly Desirable Desirable
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
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PART 3
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale below:
Never   All the time
- 1 0  1 2  3
Occasionally
CLEAN (neat, tidy)
-1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7
INTELLIGENT (logical thinking)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HEALTHY (not being sick, physically or mentally)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 4
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values is by circling a number using the 
scale below:
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
WEALTH (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLEASURE (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 5 6 7
Frequently
LOYAL (faithful to friends, group)
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-1 0 1 2  3 4  5 6 7
MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual love)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 5
Please rate the extent to which you DISRESPECT/RESPECT an individual with the following values are by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
Disrespect-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely Respect
Do not Respect Slightly Respect Respect
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7
SOCIAL ORDER (stability in society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PRIVACY
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(the right to have a private life)
PLEASE FILL IN  YOUR  
Sex: _____
Acrp.'
THANK- YOU
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PART 1
Please rate how important each of the following vaiues are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
APPENDIX E (iV)
Opposed To -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD AT PEACE (free of conflict and war)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 2
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below:
Undesirable -1 0 1 2 3 4  5 6 7  Extremely Desirable
Slightly Desirable Desirable
SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
2 0 1
PART 3
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale below:
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never   Al! the time
-1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7
Occasionally Frequently
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
INTELLIGENT (logical thinking)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 4
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values is by circling a number using the 
scale below:
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
WEALTH (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual tove)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 2
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PARTS
Please rate the extent to which you DISRESPECT/RESPECT an individual with the following values are by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
Disrespect-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely Respect
Do not Respect Slightly Respect Respect
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SOCIAL ORDER (stability in society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PRIVACY (the right to have a private life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLEASE FILL IN  YOUR
Sex: _____
A w
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Please rate how important each of the following values are as a GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN YOUR LIFE by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
APPENDIX E (V)
PART 1
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HONESTY (genuine, sincere)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD AT PEACE (free of conflict and war)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 2
Please rate how UNDESIRABLE / DESIRABLE each of the following values are by circling a number using 
the scale below:
Undesirable -1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7  Extremely Desirable
Slightly Desirable Desirable
SUCCESS (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)
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PART 3
Please rate how OFTEN YOU THINK ABOUT the following values by circling a number according to the 
scale below:
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never    All the time
-1 0 1  2 3 4  5 6 7
Occasionally Frequently
CLEAN (neat, tidy)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
INTELLIGENT (logical thinking)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HEALTHY (not being sick, physically or mentally)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 4
Please rate how IMPORTANT TO SOCIETY each of the following values is by circling a number using the 
scale below:
Opposed To-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Extremely Important
Unimportant Slightly Important Important
WEALTH (material possessions, money)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PLEASURE (gratification of desire)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOYAL (faithful to friends, group)
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-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MATURE LOVE (deep emotional and spiritual love)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PART 5
Please rate the extent to which you DISRESPECT/RESPECT an individual with the following values are by 
circling a number according to the scale below:
Disrespect -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely Respect
Do not Respect Slightly Respect Respect
POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6  7
SOCIAL ORDER (stability in society)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PRIVACY
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(the right to have a private life)
PLEASE FILL IN  YOUR  
Sex: _____
Acre'
THANK-YOU
APPENDIX E (vi)
ARTICLE READABILITY
The purpose of the following task is to assess the quality of samples of writing.
Below is an extract from an article concerning University Tuition Fees. Your task is to read the 
passage carefully and then complete the questions overleaf. There are no right or wrong 
answers; it is YOUR OPINION that counts.
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APPENDIX E (vli)
Tony Blair’s government has swapped the university student maintenance grants (for 
accommodation, food, living expenses) and replaced them with ‘student loans’. In addition, 
they have introduced tuition fees for university students -  a contribution of £1000 a year for 
each student. Students have never before had to make a contribution to their university tuition 
costs in Britain. There are a number of arguments in favour of this system.
• The government has only a limited amount of money available that can be spent on education.
Priority should therefore, be for the education of children from the ages of 5 to 16 years since 
this is the critical period and benefits all children.
• The system will ensure equal opportunity for all young people, since those who cannot afford 
fees will not have to pay them back. The system has worked well for student loans without 
discouraging less well off students from applying and should work for tuition fees.
• In the first few years of the system, there has been an increase in the number of young people
applying to universities suggesting that charging tuition fees had not put people off applying
to university.
• University education is a fantastic opportunity to for any individual. It is therefore reasonable 
that students make a contribution towards the cost.
• Every student pays the same tuition fees and has the same potential access to the better 
teaching and facilities paid for by those fees.
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Tony Blair’s government has swapped the university student maintenance grants (for 
accommodation, food, living expenses) and replaced them with 'student loans’. In addition, 
they have introduced tuition fees for university students -  a contribution of £1000 a year for 
each student. Students have never before had to make a contribution to their university tuition 
costs in Britain. There are a number of arguments in favour of this system.
• It seems that the Government would like to reduce the amount of money they contribute to 
university education. It is right that the priority should be on the education of children from the 
ages of 5 to 16 years since this is the period in education available to everyone.
• In the first few years of the tuition fee system, there has been only a small decrease in the 
number of young people applying to universities.
• University education is a bonus not a right. It is therefore reasonable to raise money for 
higher education by charging tuition fees.
• University education benefits most students. It seems reasonable that all students make a 
contribution to the cost.
• Since those who cannot afford tuition fees will be given an extended period in which to pay 
them back after graduation, it is hoped that unlike the student loans, less well off students 
may not be discouraged from applying to university due to tuition fees.
APPENDIX E (viii)
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Tony Blair’s government has swapped the university student maintenance grants (for 
accommodation, food, living expenses) and replaced them with ‘student loans’. In 
addition, they have introduced tuition fees for university students -  a contribution of 
£1000 a year for each student. Students have never before had to make a contribution to 
their university tuition costs in Britain. There are a number of arguments in favour of this 
system.
• It is the students themselves who wiil benefit directly from their university education -  
earning as much as 50% more on average than a non-graduate in later life. The payment 
of tuition fees is therefore an extremely worthwhile investment.
• The introduction of student fees has ended the funding crisis in universities and colleges.
• By paying fees, university students are gaining immediate benefit by way of a lower pupil
staff ratio and better books and equipment and ultimately a superior quality of education.
• The government has confirmed that their scheme will raise the targeted £150 million by 
the year 2001 taking it up to the £2 billion target that universities need.
• It would be good if less people applied to university. Not everyone is suited to an
academic degree and many young people find themselves spending three more years 
studying for little long-term gain when they could have been .building careers and earning 
a salary.
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Tony Blair’s government has swapped the university student maintenance grants (for 
accommodation, food, living expenses) and replaced them with ‘student loans’. In addition, 
they have introduced tuition fees for university students -  a contribution of £1000 a year for 
each student. Students have never before had to make a contribution to their university tuition 
costs in Britain. There are a number of arguments in favour of this system.
• Graduates may benefit directly from their university education, earning around 15% more on 
average than a non-graduate in later life.
• By paying fees, students may help to reduce the shortage of teaching staff, books and
equipment within the next 6 years.
• The introduction of student fees has partly acted to reduce what the universities refer to as a
funding crisis and should improve the quality of university education.
• By the year 2010, the government has revealed that their scheme will help raise £150 million,
which should go directly to improve the quality of university education.
• Tuition fees have discouraged some people from applying to university. This is not necessarily 
a bad thing as some young people find themselves spending three more years studying when 
they could be working and therefore making a contribution to society.
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ARTICLE READABILITY
Piease answer the following questions in the spaces provided by ticking the relevant box. There are no 
right or wrong answers; it is your opinion, which we are interested in.
1. From the text how old would you estimate the writer to be?
□ Under 25 years
□ 25 -45 years
□ Over 45 years
□ It is impossible to tell
2. In your opinion, does the style of the text suggest it was written by:
□ A male
□ A female
□ it is impossible to tell?
3. Do you think the arguments for tuition fees are:
□ Good quality
□ Average
□ Poor quality?
4. Which of the following do you think is the source of the article
□ Newspaper
□ Periodical
□ Letter
□ Radio transcript?
□ It is impossible to tell
5. Is the text written by a native English speaker?
□ Yes
□ No
□ It is impossible to tell
6. Do you think that the writing is grammatically correct?
□ Yes
□ No
7. Do you think the article was written by:
□ A journalist
□ A scientist
□ A politician?
□ It is impossible to tell
APPENDIX E (Xii)
Using the scaie below, please indicate the degree to which each value (listed in the left hand column of
the table below) !S RELEVANT TO each of the four issues shown across the top of the page.
NOT AT ALL RELEVANT o 1 2 3 4 5 VERY RELEVANT
2 1 2
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(For each value you shouid mark 4 scores, 1 for each issue.)
ISSUES
VALUE
PRIVACY OF 
PUBLIC FIGURES
GIVING MONEY 
TO BEGGARS UNIVERSITY 
TUITION FEES
PUBLICATION OF 
SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTERS
Broadminded 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5
Wisdom 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Justice 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Capable 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
World at Peace 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Intelligent 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5
Unity with Nature 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5
Protecting the Environment 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Successful 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Equality 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Ambitious 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Wisdom 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
World of Beauty 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Self-Respect 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2  3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
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1. After 6th form, are you hoping to go to university?
□ Yes
□ No
If no, please go to question 6.
2. If yes, which of the following is your preferred university location.
□ North
□ South
□ Midlands
□ Other
3. Which of these groups does the subject you intend to study fall into?
□ Science
□ Social Science
□ Humanities
□ Business Studies
□ Law
□ Languages
□ Other
4. Are you intending to take a GAP year?
□ Yes
□ No
5. Do you envisage taking advantage of the student loans?
□ Yes
□ No
6. To what extent do you agree that students should pay university tuition fees?
□ Strongly disagree
□ Disagree
□ Neither agree nor disagree
□ Agree
□ Strongly agree
7. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the current tuition fee of £1000 per year is 
acceptable?
□ Strongly disagree
□ Disagree
□ Neither agree nor disagree
□ Agree
□ Strongly agree
HIGHER EDUCATION QUESTIONNAIRE
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8. To what extent do you agree or disagree that all students should pay tuition fees regardless of 
their financial circumstances?
□ Strongly disagree
□ Disagree
□ Neither agree nor disagree
□ Agree
□ Strongly agree
9. Do you know, at this stage which career you intend to follow?
□ Yes
□ No
THANK-YOU
215
Abelson, R.P. (1988). Conviction. American Psychologist. 43: 267-275.
Abelson, R.P. & Prentice, D.A. (1989). Beliefs as possessions: a functional perspective. In A.R. 
Pratkanis, S.J. Breckler & .G. Greenwald. Attitude Structure and Function Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ajzen (2000). Attitude structure and behaviour.
Albert, E.M. (1968). Value systems. In. international encyclopaedia of the social sciences. 16: 
287-291. New York: Macmillan / Free Press
Allport, G.W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed), The handbook of social psychology: 798- 
844. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
Allport, G.W., Vernon, P.E. & Lindzey, G. (1960). Study of values. Manual and test booklet (3rd edition). 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Augoustinos, M & Walker, I (1995). Social cognition: An integrated approach. London: Sage 
Publications.
Bales, R.F. & Couch, A. (1969). The vaiue profile: A factor analytic study of value statements. 
Sociological Inquiry. 39: 3-17.
Ball-Rokeach, S. Rokeach, M. & Grube, 1.(1984). The great American values test: Influencing behaviour 
and belief through television New York: Free Press.
Bales, R. & Couch, A. (1969). The vaiue profile: A factor analytic study of value statements. Sociological 
Inquiry. 39: 3-17.
Bargh, J.A, Chaiken, S., Gevender, R., & Pratto, F. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude 
activation effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 62:893-912.
Bargh, J.A, Chaiken, S., Raymond, P. & Hymes, C. (1996). The automatic evaluation effect:
Unconditional automatic attitude activation with a pronunciation task. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psvchologv. 64: 759-765.
Bassili, J.N. (1993). Response latency versus certainty as indices of the strength of voting intentions in 
a CATI survey. Public Opinion Quarterly. 57: 54-61.
Bassili, J.N. (1995). Response latency and the accessibility of voting intentions: What contributes to 
accessibility and how it affects vote choice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 21: 
637-653.
Bassili, J.N. (1996). Meta-judgmental versus operative indexes of psychological attributes: The case of 
measures of attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social Psvchologv. 71: 637-653.
REFERENCES
216
Bassili, J.N. & Fletcher, J.F. (1991). Response-time measurement in survey research: A method for CATI 
and a new look at nonattitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly. 55: 331-346.
Becker, G.S. (1981). Altruism in the family and selfishness in the marketplace, Economica. 48:1-15.
Bern, D.J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. 
Psychological Review. 74 :183-200.
Bern, D.J. (1970). Beliefs, attitudes, and human affairs. Belmark, Calif: Brooks/Cole.
Berger, I.E. & Mitchell, A.A. (1989). The affect of advertising on attitude accessibility, attitude
confidence and the attitude-behaviour relationship. Journal of Consumer Research. 16: 269- 
279.
Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bolt, M. (1978). The Rokeach value survey: Preferred or preferable. Perceptual and Motor Skills. 47: 
322.
Boninger, D., Krosnick, J.A., Berent, M. & Fabrigar, L.R. (1995). The causes and consequences of 
attitude importance. In R. E. Petty & J.A. Krosnick (Eds.). Attitude Strength: Antecedents and 
Consequences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Borgida, E. & Howard-Pitney, D. (1983). Personal involvement and the robustness of perceptual 
salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45: 560-570.
Braithwaite, V.A. & Law, H.G. (1985). Structure of human values: Testing the adequacy of the Rokeach 
value survey. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 49: 250-263.
Braithwaite, V.A. & Scott, W.A. (1991). Values. In J.P. Robinson; P.R. Shaver, & L.S.
Wrightsman(Eds.)(1991). Measures of Personality and Social Psvcholooicai Attitudes. Volume 
1. San Diego, CA: Academic Press Inc.
Breckler, S.J. (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behaviour and cognition as distinct components of 
attitude. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47:1191-1205.
Brown, R. (1974). Further comment on the risky shift. American Psychologist. 29: 468-470.
Burnkrant, R.E. & Howard, D.J. (1984). Effects on the use of introductory rhetorical questions versus 
statements on information processing. Journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology. 47: 
1218-1230.
Butler, D. & Stokes, D. (1971). (1st edition 1969). Political change in Britain. London: Macmillan.
Cacioppo, J.T., Harkins, S.G. & Petty, R.E. (1981). The nature of attitudes and cognitive responses and 
their relationships to behaviour. In R.E. Petty, T.M. Ostrom & T.C. Brock (Eds.), Cognitive 
responses in Persuasion. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribaum Associates.
Canter, D. (Ed.) (1985). Facet theory: Approaches to social research. New York: Springer-Veriag.
217
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus 
message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology, 39: 752-766.
Chaiken, S., Liberman, A. & Eagly, A.H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic processing within and beyond 
the persuasion context. In J.S. Uleman & J.A. Bargh (Eds), Unintended thought: 212-252. New 
York: Guildford Press.
Collins, A.M. & Loftus, E.F. (1973). A spreading-activation theory of semantic processing. Psychological 
Review, 82: 407-428.
Dose, J.J. (1997). Work values: An integrative framework and illustrative application to organizational 
socialization. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 70: 219-240.
DeBono, K.G. (1987). Investigating the social-adjustive and value-expressive functions of attitudes: 
Implications for persuasions processes. Journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology, 52: 
279-287.
Dovidio, J.F.; Evans, N. & Tyler, R.B. (1986). Racial stereotypes: The contents of their cognitive 
representations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 22(1): 22-37.
Dukes, W.F. (1955). Psychological studies of values. Psychological Bulletin. 52: 24- 
50.
Eagly, A.H. & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth, TX:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Eagly, A.H. & Chaiken, S. (1995). Attitude strength, attitude structure, and resistance to change. In R.E. 
Petty & J.A. Krosnick. Attitude Strength. Antecedents and Consequences. Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Eagly, A.H. & Chaiken, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske & G. Lindzey 
(Eds) The Handbook of Social Psychology, 1. Boston, Massachusetts, McGraw-Hill.
Eagly, A.H. & Kulsea, P. (1997). Attitudes, attitude structure, and resistance to change. Implications for 
persuasion on environmental issues. In M. H. Bazerman; D. M. Messick.; A.E. Tenbrunsel.&
K.A. Wade-Benzoni (Eds.). Environment. Ethics and Behaviour. San Francisco, New Lexicon 
Press.
Eagly, A.H.; Kulsea & Chaiken (1995). Attitudes and attitude strength as determinants of memory for 
attitude relevant information. Unpublished manuscript, Northwestern University 1995. Cited in 
A.H. Eagly & P. Kulsea. (1997) as above.
Eiser, J.R. (1987). The expression of attitudes. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Erber, M.W., Hodges, S.D. & Wilson, T.D. (1995). Attitude strength, attitude stability and the effects of 
analysing reasons. In R.E. Petty & J.A. Krosnick (Eds), Attitude strength: Antecedents and 
consequences: 433-454. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
218
Fabrigar, L.R., Priester, J.R., Petty, R.E. & Wegener, D.T. (1998). The impact of attitude accessibility on 
elaboration of persuasive messages. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 24. (4): 
339-352,
Fazio, R.H. (1986). How do attitudes guide behaviour? In R.M. Sorrentino & E.T. Higgins (Eds.), The 
handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior: 204-243. New York: 
Guilford Press.
Fazio, R. H. (1989). On the power and functionality of attitudes: The role of attitude accessibility. 
In A.R. Pratkanis, S.J. Breckler & A. J. Greenwald (Eds.) Attitude structure and function. 
Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fazio, R.H. (1990). A practical guide to use of response latency in social psychology research. In C. 
Hendrick & M.S. Clark (Eds), Review of personality and social psychology. 11: 74-97. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage
Fazio, R.H. (1995). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: determinants, consequences, and
correlates of attitude accessibility. In R.E. Petty, & J.A. Krosnick. Attitude Strength: Antecedents 
and Consequences. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Fazio, R.H. (2000). Accessible attitudes as tools for object appraisal: their costs and benefits, in
G.R.Maio & J.M. Olson. Why we evaluate: functions of attitudes. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates
Fazio, R.H., BiascovichJ., & Driscoll, D.M. (1992). On the functional value of attitudes: The influence of 
accessible attitudes upon the ease and quality of decision-making. Personality and Social 
Psvchologv Bulletin. 18: 388-401.
Fazio, R.H., Chen, J., McDonei, E.C. & Sherman, S.J. (1982). Attitude accessibility, attitude-behavior 
consistency, and the strength of the object-evaluation association. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psvchologv. 18: 339-357.
Fazio, R.H., Sanbonmatsu, D.M., Powell, M.C., & Kardes, F.R. (1986). On the automatic activation of 
attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psvchologv. 50: 229-238.
Fazio, R.H. & Williams, C.J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of the attitude-perception and 
attitude-behavior relations: An investigation of the 1984 presidential election. Journal of 
personality and Social Psvchologv. 51: 505-514.
Fazio, R.H. & Zanna, M.P. (1981). Direct experience and attitude-behaviour consistency. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psvchologv. 14. San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press.
Feather, N.T. (1971). Organisation and discrepancy in cognitive structures. Psychological Review. 78: 
355-379.
219
Feather, N.T. (1975). Values in education and society. New York: Free Press.
Feather, N.T. (1988). The meaning and importance of values: Research with the Rokeach Value Survey, 
Australian Journal of Psychology. 40 (4): 377-390.
Feather, N.T. (1990). Bridging the gap between values and attitudes: Recent applications of the value- 
expectancy model. In E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds), Handbook of motivation and 
cognition: Foundations of social behaviour. 2:151 -192. New York: Guildford Press.
Feather, N.T. (1992). Values, valences, expectations, and actions. Journal of Social Issues. 48.(2): 
109-124.
Feather, N.T. (1995). Values, valences and choice: The influence of values on the perceived
attractiveness and choice of alternatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psvchoioov. 68. 
(6): 1135-1151.
Feather, N.T. (1996). Values, deservingness and attitudes towards high achievers: Research on tall 
poppies, In C. Seligman, J.M. Olsen & M.P.Zanna (Eds), The Ontario Symposium: The 
psychology of vaiues .8: 215-251. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and 
research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social cognition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Folsom, J.K. (1937). Changing vaiues in sex and family relations. American Sociological Review. 2: 
717-726.
Gilchrist, R.S. (1996). An investigation of value accessibility and its roie in the value-attitude
relationship. Dissertation-Abstracts-lnternational-Section-A:-Humanities and Social Sciences. 
57,(1-A): 0100.
Gorlow, L. & Noll, G.A. (1967). A study of empirically derived values. Journal of Social Psvchoioov. 73: 
261-269.
Greenwald, A.G. (1989). Why are attitudes important? In A.R. Pratkanis, S.J. Breckler, & A.G. Greenwald 
(1989) Attitude Structure and Function. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Greenwald, A.G. & Banaji, M.R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and 
stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102: 4-27.
Grainger, J. & Segui, J. (1990). Neighbourhood frequency effects in visual word recognition: A 
comparison of lexical decision and masked identification latencies. Perception and 
Psvchooraphics. 47 (2). 191-198.
Guttman, L. (1968). A general nonmetric technique for finding the smallest coordinate space for a 
configuration of points. Psvchometrika. 33: 469-506.
220
Harding, S. & Phillips, D. (1986). Contrasting values in Western Europe: Unity, diversity and change. 
London: Macmillan.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relationships. New York’.Wiley.
Hendrick, C. & Seyfried, B.A. (1974). Assessing the validity of laboratory-produced attitude change. 
journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology. 29: 865-870.
Higgins, E.T. (1989). Knowledge accessibility and activation: Subjectivity and suffering from
unconscious sources. In J.S. Uleman & J.A. Bargh (Eds). Unintended though: 75-123. New 
York: Guildford Press.
Higgins, E.T. & King, G.A. (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: information processing
consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. Kihlstrom (Eds), 
Personaiitv. Cognition and Social Interaction: 69-122. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage.
Homer, P.M. & Kahle, L.R. (1988). Personality processes and individual differences: A structural 
Equation Test of the Value-Attitude-Behavior Hierarchy. Journal of Personaiitv and Social 
Psychology. 54, (4): 638-646.
Houston, D.A. & Fazio, R.H. (1989). Biased processing as a function of attitude accessibility: making 
objective judgements subjectively. Social Cognition. 7: 51-66.
Hovland.C.I., Janis, I.L. & Kelley, H.H. (1953). Communication and persuasion: Psychological studies of 
opinion change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial 
society. American Political Science Review. 65: 991-1017
Inglehart. R. (1977). The silent revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jamieson, D.W. & Zanna, M.P. (1989). Need for Structure in attitude formation and expression. In A.R. 
Pratkanis (Ed.); SJ. Breckler et al. Attitude structure and function. The Third Ohio State 
University volume on attitudes and persuasion. Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Johnson, B.T. & Eagley, A.H. (1989). The effects of involvement on persuasion: A meta-analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin. 106: 290-314.
Judd, C.M. & Downing, J.W. (1990). Political expertise and the development of attitude consistency. 
Social Cognition. 8:104-124.
221
judd, C.M., Drake, R.A., Downing, J.W., & Krosnick, J.A. (1991). Some dynamic properties of attitude 
structure: Context-induced response facilitation and polarization. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology. 60: 193-202.
Judd, C.M., & Krosnick, J.A. (1989), The structural bases of consistency among political attitudes: 
Effects of political expertise and attitude importance. In A.R. Pratkanis, SJ. Breckler, & A.G. 
Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Judd, C.M. & Kulik, J.A. (1980). Schematic effects of social attitudes on information processing and 
recall. Journal of Personality and Social Psvchologv. 38: 569-578.
Kahle, L., Beatty, S.E. & Homer, P. (1986). Alternative Measurement approaches to Consumer Values.: 
The List of Values (LOV) and Life Style (VALS) to understand consumers. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 13: 405-409.
Katz, D. (1960). The functional approach to the study of attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly. 25: 57-78.
Katz, i & Hass, R.G. (1988). Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming 
Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures. Journal of Personality and Social Psvchologv. 55. (6): 
893-905.
Kelman, H.C. (1974). Attitudes are alive and weil and gainfully employed in the sphere of action. 
American Psychologist. 29: 310-324.
Keriinger, F.N. (1984). Liberalism and conservatism: The structure and nature of social attitudes. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kluckhohn, F.R. (1951). Values and value orientation in the field of action: An exploration in definition 
and classification. In T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds), Toward a general theory of action: 388-433. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kluckholn, F.R. & Strodtbech, F. (1961). Variations in value orientations. Evanston, IL: Peterson.
Kmieciak, P. (1976). Wertstrukturen und wertwandei in der bundesrepublik: Grundlagen einer
interdisziplinaren empirischen wertforshung mit einer sekundaranalyse von umfragedaten. 
Gottingen: Sxchwartz. as cited in J.W.Van Deth & E. Scarborough (1995) (Eds), The Impact of 
Values. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kristiansen, C. M. & Zanna, M. (1988). Justifying attitudes by appealing to values: A functions 
perspective. British Journal of Social Psychology. 27: 247-256.
Krosnick, J. A. (1988). Attitude importance and attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology. 24: 240-255.
Krosnick, J.A. (1989). Attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin. 15f3): 297-308.
222
Krosnick, J. A., Boninger, D.S., Chuang, Y.C. & Berent, M.K. (1993). Attitude strength: One construct or 
many related constructs? Journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology, 65(6); 1132-1151.
Krosnick, J.A. & Petty, R.E. (1995). Attitude Strength: An Overview, in R.E. Petty & J.A. Krosnick, (Eds.) 
Attitude strength. Antecedents and consequences. New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Krosnick, J. A. and Shuman, H. (1988). Attitude intensity, importance and certainty and susceptibility to 
response effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 54: 940-952.
Levitin, T. (1968). Values. In J. P. Robinson & P.R. Shaver (Eds). Measures of social psychological 
attitudes: 405-501. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Research Centre, Institute for Social 
Research.
Levy, S. (1990). Values and Deeds. Applied Psychology. An International Review. International 
Association of Applied Psychology. US: Taylor & Francis.
Likert, R. (1932). A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 140: 44-53.
Luce, P.A. (1986). A computational analysis of uniqueness points in auditory word recognition. 
Perception and Psvchographics. 39 (3): 155-158.
Luker, K. (1984). Abortion and the politics of motherhood. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Maio, G.R. & Olson, J.M. (1995). Relations between values, attitudes, and behavioural intentions: the 
moderating role of attitude function. Journal of experimental social psychology, 31: 266-285,
Maio, G.R. & Olson, J.M. (1998). Values as truisms: Evidence and implications. Journal of Personaiitv 
and Social Psvcholoov. 74 (2): 294-311.
Maio, G.R. & Olson, J.M. (2000). Why we evaluate: functions of attitudes. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper.
Maslow, A. H. (1962). Toward a psychology of being. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Van Nostrand.
McLeod, W.T. (Ed.) & Hanks, P. (Ed.) (1982). The New Collins Concise Dictionary of the English 
Language. London & Glasgow: Collins.
McGuire, W.J. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds), Handbook of 
social psvcholoov, ii. Special Fields and Applications. New York: Random House.
McGuire, W.J. (1986). The vicissititudes of attitudes and similar representational constructs in twentieth 
century psychology. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16: 89-130.
McGuire, W. J. (1989). In attitude \ structure and function. A.R. Pratkanis, S.J. Breckler & A.G. 
Greenwaid. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
McGuire, W. J. & McGuire, C.V. (1991). The content, structure and operation of thought systems. In 
R.S. Wyer, Jr., & T. Srull (Eds), Advances in social cognition. 4 :1-78. Hillsdale: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
223
Meyer, D.E. & Schvaneveldt, R.W. (1976). Meaning, memory structure, and memory processes.
Science. 192 (4234). 27-33,
Morris, C.W. (1956). Varieties of human value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Newcomb, T.M., Turner, R.H. & Converse, P.E. (1965). Social psychology: A study of human interaction.
London: Routledge & Kegan.
Nisbett, R.E. 6 Wilson, T.D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychological Review. 84: 231-259.
Ostrom, T. M. (1987). Bipolar sun/ey items: An information processing perspective. In H.-J. Hippier, N. 
Schwartz, & S. Sudman (Eds), Social information processing and survey methodology: 71-85. 
New York: Springer-Verlag 
Ostrom, T. M. (1988). Dimensional versus information processing conceptions of social judgement.
Wissenshaftliche Zeitschrift-Schiller-Univrsitat. 6: 629-638.
Ostrom, T. M. (1989). Interdependence of attitude theory and measurement. In A.R. Pratkanis, S.J. 
Breckler & A.G. Greenwald (Eds). Attitude structure and function: 11 -36. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ostrom, T. M. and Brock, T. C. (1968). A cognitive model of attitudinal involvement. In R. P. Abeison, E. 
Aronson, W. J. McGuire, T. M. Newcomb, M. J. Rosenberg, & P. H. Tammenbaum (Eds.). 
Theories of cognitive consistency: A Sourcebook: 373-383. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary approaches.
Dubuque, IA: Wm.C. Brown.
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to 
attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In L. Berkowitz 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. 19. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Rennier G.A. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude
accessiblity. Unpublished manuscript ,0hio state university, Columbus. Cited in Fabrigar, L.R., 
Priester, J.R., Petty, R.E. & Wegener, D.T. (1998). The impact of attitude accessibility on 
elaboration of persuasive messages. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 24. (4): 
339-352,
Petty, R.E., Haugtvedt, C.P. & Smith, S.M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude strength: 
creating attitudes that are persistent, Resistant and predictive of behaviour. In R.E. Petty &
J.A. Krosnick (Eds). Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences. New Jersey, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
224
Petty, R.E. & Krosnick, J.A. (Eds.) (1995). Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Ertbaum Associates.
Petty, R. E., Ostrom, T.M., & Brock, T.C. (1981). Historical foundations of the cognitive response
approach to attitudes and persuasion. In R.E. Petty, T.M. Ostrom & T.C. Brock (Eds), Cognitive 
responses in persuasion: 5-29. Hilisdaie, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Petty, R.E. & Wegener, D.T. (1998). Matching versus mismatching attitude functions: Implications for 
scrutiny of persuasive messages. Personality and Social Psvchologv Bulletin. 24: 227-240.
Petty, R.E.; Wheeier, C.S. & Bizer, G, Y. (2000). Attitude functions and persuasion: an elaboration
likelihood approach to matched versus unmatched messages. In G.R. Maio & J.M. Olson. Why 
we evaluate: functions of attitudes. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Pomerantz, E.M., Chaiken, S. & Tordesillas, R.S. (1995). Attitude strength, and resistance processes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 69: 408-330.
Powell, M.C. & Fazio, R.H. (1984). Attitude accessibility as a function of repeated attitudinal expression. 
Personality and Sociai Psychology Bulletin. 10:139-148.
Pratkanis, A.R. (1989). The cognitive representation of attitudes. In A.R. Pratkanis, S.J. Breckler & A.G. 
Greenwaid (Eds). Attitude structure and function: 71-98. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Pratkanis, A.R. & Greenwaid, A.G. (1989). A sociocognitive mode! of attitude structure and function, in 
L. Berkowitz (Ed), Advances in experimental social psychology .22: 245-285. San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press.
Prislin, R„ Wood, W. & Pool, G.J. (1997), Structural consistency and the deduction of novel from 
existing attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 34. (1): 66-89.
Raden, D. (1985). Strength-related attitude dimensions. Social Psychology Quarterly. 48: 312-330.
Rajecki, D. W. (1990). Attitudes. Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates.
Ravlin, E.C. & Meglino, B.M. (1987). Effects of values on perception and decision making. A study of 
alternative work values measures. Journal of Applied Psychology. 72 (4): 666-673.
Roese, N J. & Olson, J.M. (1994). Attitude importance as a function of repeated attitude expression, 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30 (1): 39-51.
Rokeach, M. J. (1967). Value survey. Sunnyvale, CA: Halgren Tests.
Rokeach, M. J. (1968). The role of values in sociai opinion research. Public Opinion Quarterly. 32: 547- 
549.
Rokeach, M. J. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: The Free Press.
Rokeach, MJ. (1976). Beliefs, attitudes and values: A theory of organisation and change. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
225
Rokeach, M.J. (1979). (Ed) Understanding human values: Individual and societal. New York: Free
Press.
Rosenburg, M.J. (1960). An analysis of affective-cognitive consistency. In C.l. Hovland & M.J. 
Rosenburg (Eds). Attitude organisation and change: An analysis of consistency among 
attitude components. New Haven, CT: Yaie University Press.
Rosenburg, MJ. & Hovland, C.l. (1960). Cognitive, affective and behavioural components of attitudes.
In C.l. Hovland & M.J. Rosenburg (Eds), Attitude organisation and change: An analysis of 
consistency among attitude components ,1 -14. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Rushton, J.P., Chrisjohn, R.D. & Fekken, 6.C. (1981). The altruistic personality and the Self-Report 
Altruism scale. Personality and individual differences. 2: 293-302.
Schlegei, R.P. & DiTecco, D. (1982). Attitudinal structures and the attitude-behaviour relation. In M.P. 
Zanna, E.T. Higgins & C.P. Herman (Eds), Consistency in social behaviour: The Ontario 
Symposium. 2:17-49. Hiilsdaie, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Schmitt, M.J., Schwartz, S., Steyer, R. & Schmitt, T. (1993), Measurement Models for the Schwartz 
Values Inventory. European Journal of Psychological Assessment. 9. (2): 107-121
Schwartz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational functions of affective 
states. In E.T. Higgins & R.M. Sorrentino (Eds), Handbook of motivation and cognition: 
Foundations of social behaviour. 2: 527-561. New York: Guildford Press.
Schwartz S.H., (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and 
empirical tests in 20 countries, in M.P. Zanna (Ed), Advances in experimental social 
psvchoioov. 25 :1 -65. New York: Academic Press.
Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim,
H.C Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.C. Choi & G. Yoon (Eds). (1994). Individualism and Collectivism: 
Theory, methods and applications: Cross-cultural research and methodology series. 18. CA,
US: Sage Publications.
Schwartz, S.H. (1996). Value priorities and Behaviour: Applying a Theory of Integrated Value Systems. 
In C. Seligman, J.M. Olson, & M.P. Zanna (Eds.), The Psychology of Values. The Ontario 
Symposium. Vol. 8. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Schwartz, S.H. & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 53: 550-562.
Schwartz, S.H. & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of values: 
Extensions and cross-cultural replications. Journai of Personality and Social Psychology. 58: 
878-891.
226
Schwartz, S., H. & Inbar-Saban, N. (1988). Value self-confrontation as a method to aid in weight loss. 
Journal of Personaiitv and Social Psychology, 54: 396-404.
Schwartz, S., H. & Sagiv, L  (1995). Identifying culture-specifics in the content and structure of values. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 26 (1): 92-116.
Scott, W.A. (1965). Values and organisations. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Scott, W.A. (1968). Attitude Measurement. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social 
psychology. 2. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Seligman, C; Katz, A, N. The Dynamics of Value Systems. In C. Seligman, J.M. Olson, & M. P. Zanna
(Eds.). (1996). The Psychology of Values. The Ontario Symposium. 8. New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates.
Sherif, M. & Hovland, C.l. (1961). Social judgement: Assimimiiation and contrast effects in 
communication and attitude change. New Haven, CT: Yaie University Press.
Sherif, C.W., Sherif, M. & Nebergall, R.E. (1965). Attitude and attitude change: The social iudoement- 
involvement approach. Philadelphia: Saunders.
Sherman, S.J. (1987). Cognitive Processes in the Formation, Change, and Expression of Attitudes: In 
M.P. Zanna, J.M. Olson, & C. P. Herman (Eds.), Social Influence: The Ontario Symposium. 5: 
75-106, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Smith, M.B. (1969). Social psychology and human values. Chicago: Aldine.
Smith, M.B., Bruner, J.S. & White, R.W. (1956). Opinions and Personaiitv. New York: Wiley.
Assessment, 9 :107-121.
Smith, P.B. (1963). Differentiation between sociometric rankings. Human Relations. 16 (4): 335-350.
Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R.A.& Tetlock, P.E. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Politicai 
Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, P.B. (1963). Differentiation between sociometric rankings. Human Relations. 16 (4): 335-350.
Spates, J.L. (1983). The sociology of values. Annual review of Sociology, 9: 27-49.
Stern, P.C., Dietz, T., Kaiof, L. & Guagnano, G.A. (1995). Values, Beliefs, and Proenvironmentai Action: 
Attitude Formation Toward Emergent Attitude Objects. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 
25i 1611-1636.
Stern, P.C.; Dietz, T. & Guagnano, G.A. (1998). A brief inventory of values. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement. 58(6): 984-1001.
Strahlberg, D. & Frey, D. (1992). Attitudes 1: Structure, measurement and functions. In M. Hewstone, 
W. Stoebe, J-P. Codol & G.M. Stephenson (Eds.) Introduction to Social Psychology: A European 
Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell
227
Tetiock, P.E. (1986). A vaiue pluralism model of ideological reasoning. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology. 50: 819-827.
Tetiock, P.E. (1991). An alternative metaphor in the study of judgment and choice: people as 
politicians. Theory and Psychology. 1 (4): 451-475.
Thompson, E.P.; Kruglanski, A.W. & Spiegal, S. (2000) Attitudes as knowledge structures and
persuasion as a specific case of subjective knowledge acquisition. In 6.R. Maio & J.M. Olson. 
Why we evaluate: functions of attitudes. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Thurstone, L.L. (1928). Attitudes can be measured. American Journal of Sociology, 33: 529-554. 
Thurstone, L.L. (1931). The measurement of attitudes. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.
26: 249-269.
Triandis, H. C. (1972). The analysis of subjective culture. New York: Wiley.
Triandis, H. C., Bontempo, R., Betancourt, H., Bond, M., Leung, K„ Brenes, A., & de Montmoilin, G.
(1986). The measurement of the etic aspects of individualism and collectivism across cultures. 
Australian Journal of Psychology. 38: 257-267.
Tourangeau, R. Rasinsky, K.A. & D'Andrada, R. (1991). Attitude structure and belief accessibility.
Journal of Experimental Sociai Psychology. 27: 48-75.
Van Deth, J. & Scarbrough, E. (1995). The Concept of Values. In J. Van Deth, & E. Scarbrough (Eds).
The Impact of values. Oxford University Press.
Visser, P.S. ,& Krosnick, J.A (1998). Development of attitude strength over the life cycle: Surge and 
decline. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(6): 1389-1410.
Wegener, D.T.; Downing, J.; Krosnick, J.A. & Petty, R.E. (1995). Measures and manipulations of
strength-related properties of attitudes: Current practice and future directions. In L. Berkowitz 
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology. 22. San Diego, CA: Academic.
Wilson, T.D., Dun, D.J., Kraft, D. & Lisle, D.J. (1989). Introspection, attitude change and attitude- 
behavior consistency: The disruptive effects of explaining why we feel the way we do. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 22. New York: Academic Press. 
Wood, W. (1982). Retrieval of attitude-relevant information from memory: Effects on susceptibility to
persuasion and on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 42: 798- 
810.
Wood, P. (1999). Values and Worries. Unpublished Paper, University of Surrey, Guildford.
Wood, W. & Kallgren, C.A. (1988). Communicator attributes and persuasion: Recipients’ access to
attitude-relevant information in memory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14:172- 
182.
Wood, W.L., Rhodes, N. & Biek, M. (1995). Working knowledge and attitude strength: An information- 
processing analysis, in R.E. Petty & J.A. Krosnick (Eds), Attitude strength: Antecedents and 
consequences: 283-313. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Woodruff, A.D. & Divesta, F.J. (1948). The relationship between Values, Concepts, and Attitudes. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement. 8: 645-659.
Wright, Q. (1955). The study of international relations. New York: Appleton.
Wu, C. & Schaffer, D.R. (1987). Susceptibility to persuasive appeals as a function of source credibility 
and prior experience with the attitude object. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 52: 
677-688.
Wyer, R.S. & Srull, T.K. (1981). Category accessibility: some theoretical and empirical issues concerning 
the processing of social stimulus information. In E.T. Higgins, C.P. Herman, & M.P. Zanna 
(Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zaller, J. (1990). Political awareness, elite opinion leadership, and the mass survey response. Social 
Cognition, 8 :125-153.
Zanna, M.P. & Rempel, J.K. (1988). Attitudes: A new look at an old concept. In D. Bar-Tel & A.W. 
Kruglanski (Eds), The social psychology of knowledge: 315-334. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press.
T H E  E N D
